

HON. RICARDO S. MARTINEZ

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

BACKPAGE.COM, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROB MCKENNA, Attorney General of the State  
of Washington; RANDY J. FLYCKT, Adams  
County Prosecuting Attorney; BENJAMIN C.  
NICHOLS, Asotin County Prosecuting Attorney;  
ANDREW K. MILLER, Benton County  
Prosecuting Attorney; GARY A. RIESEN, Chelan  
County Prosecuting Attorney; DEBORAH S.  
KELLY, Clallam County Prosecuting Attorney;  
ANTHONY F. GOLIK, Clark County Prosecuting  
Attorney; REA L. CULWELL, Columbia County  
Prosecuting Attorney; SUSAN I. BAUR, Cowlitz  
County Prosecuting Attorney; STEVEN M.  
CLEM, Douglas County Prosecuting Attorney;  
MICHAEL SANDONA, Ferry County  
Prosecuting Attorney; SHAWN P. SANT,  
Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney;  
MATTHEW L. NEWBERG, Garfield County  
Prosecuting Attorney; ANGUS LEE, Grant  
County Prosecuting Attorney; H. STEWARD  
MENELEE, Grays Harbor County Prosecuting  
Attorney;

*(Continued on next page)*

Case No.: 2:12-cv-00954-RSM

**MOTION TO INTERVENE OF  
THE INTERNET ARCHIVE**

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:  
June 29, 2012

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

1 GREGORY M. BANKS, Island County )  
 Prosecuting Attorney; SCOTT W. )  
 2 ROSEKRANS, Jefferson County Prosecuting )  
 Attorney; DAN SATTERBERG, King County )  
 3 Prosecuting Attorney; RUSSELL D. HAUGE, )  
 Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney; )  
 4 GREGORY L. ZEMPEL, Kittitas County )  
 Prosecuting Attorney; LORI L. HOCTOR, )  
 5 Klickitat County Prosecuting Attorney; )  
 JONATHAN L. MEYER, Lewis County )  
 6 Prosecuting Attorney; JEFFREY S. )  
 BARKDULL, Lincoln County Prosecuting )  
 7 Attorney; MICHAEL K. DORCY, Mason )  
 County Prosecuting Attorney; KARL F. )  
 8 SLOAN, Okanogan County Prosecuting )  
 Attorney; DAVID J. BURKE, Pacific County )  
 9 Prosecuting Attorney; THOMAS A. )  
 METZGER, Pend Oreille County Prosecuting )  
 10 Attorney; MARK LINDQUIST, Pierce County )  
 Prosecuting Attorney; RANDALL K. )  
 11 GAYLORD, San Juan County Prosecuting )  
 Attorney; RICHARD WEYRICH, Skagit )  
 12 County Prosecuting Attorney; ADAM N. KICK, )  
 Skamania County Prosecuting Attorney; MARK )  
 13 K. ROE, Snohomish County Prosecuting )  
 Attorney; STEVEN J. TUCKER, Spokane )  
 14 County Prosecuting Attorney; TIMOTHY D. )  
 RASMUSSEN, Stevens County Prosecuting )  
 15 Attorney; JON TUNHEIM, Thurston County )  
 Prosecuting Attorney; DANIEL H. BIGELOW, )  
 16 Wahkiakum County Prosecuting Attorney; )  
 JAMES L. NAGLE, Walla Walla County )  
 17 Prosecuting Attorney; DAVID S. )  
 McEACHRAN, Whatcom County Prosecuting )  
 18 Attorney; DENIS P. TRACY, Whitman County )  
 Prosecuting Attorney; JAMES P. HAGARTY, )  
 19 Yakima County Prosecuting Attorney, )

20 Defendants, in their )  
 official capacities. )  
 21 )  
 22 )

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1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 24(a)(2), Movant the Internet Archive  
2 (“Movant”) moves to intervene as a matter of right as plaintiff in this action in order to protect its  
3 rights provided by federal law. In the alternative, the Internet Archive moves to intervene  
4 permissively pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 24(b)(1)(B).

5 The Internet Archive is a non-profit corporation whose mission – to build an “Internet  
6 library” offering permanent access for researchers, historians, and scholars to historical collections  
7 that exist in digital format – is directly at issue in this lawsuit. Because this motion is timely,  
8 Movant’s fundamental rights are at stake, disposition of this lawsuit will impair Movant’s ability to  
9 protect those rights, and Movant has unique, personal interests in the information that is the subject  
10 of this lawsuit that are different from the parties’ interests, intervention is appropriate to ensure that  
11 Movant’s constitutional rights will not be compromised in the ongoing dispute between the parties.

12 Counsel for the Internet Archive has contacted counsel for Plaintiff and the Defendants who  
13 have appeared. Plaintiff Backpage.com, LLC (“Backpage.com”) consents to the filing of Movant’s  
14 motion and complaint in intervention (*see* Exhibit A, attached). Defendants have not yet expressed  
15 an opinion, but Movant will continue to confer with Defendants in the hopes of gaining their  
16 affirmative consent.

### 17 **BACKGROUND**

18 Less than three months after the bill was introduced, Washington Governor Christine  
19 Gregoire on March 29, 2012, signed SB 6251, 62nd Leg., 2012 Sess. (Wash. 2012), (“SB 6251”),  
20 into law. The fast-tracked legislation, originally set to go into effect on June 7, 2012, and  
21 coinciding with the 10-year anniversary of the state’s passage of prior anti-trafficking laws, was  
22 aimed at “eliminating sex trafficking of minors in a manner consistent with federal laws prohibiting  
23 sexual exploitation of children.” SB 6251 § 1. The statute precludes a defense that “the defendant  
24 did not know the age of the minor depicted in the advertisement.” *Id.* § 2(2). The only defense  
25 identified by the statute is granted to those who screen screen content to ascertain the ages of  
26 individuals in posts “which include[] either an explicit or implicit offer for a commercial sex act to  
27 occur in Washington.” *Id.* § 2(1)(a).

28

1 It is a defense, which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence,  
 2 that the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of  
 3 the minor depicted in the advertisement by requiring, prior to publication,  
 4 dissemination, or display of the advertisement, production of a driver's license,  
 marriage license, birth certificate, or other governmental or educational  
 identification card or paper of the minor depicted in the advertisement and did not  
 rely solely on oral or written representations of the minor's age, or the apparent age  
 of the minor as depicted.

5 *Id.* § 2(2).

6 The articulated intent behind the introduction and passage of the bill was combatting  
 7 advertisements for escorts, particularly on online classified web sites.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, lawmakers made  
 8 clear that they were overwhelmingly motivated by a desire to combat the ongoing existence of  
 9 escort advertisements on Plaintiff Backpage.com's web site and their collective belief that  
 10 Plaintiff's efforts to prevent the posting of illegal ads by their users were insufficient.<sup>2</sup> However,  
 11 even if antipathy towards Backpage.com and the type of material its users posted drove the  
 12 introduction and passage of the statute, SB 6251's reach extends far beyond Backpage.com or even  
 13 online classified sites generally. For example, liability under SB 6251 would attach to publishers  
 14 of traditional publications such as physical newspapers and not only to Internet publishers or  
 15 distributors. *Id.* § 2(1)(a). There is also no explicit requirement in the statute that publishers or  
 16 distributors of any type receive a direct financial benefit from user advertisements before criminal  
 17 liability attaches. Moreover, the statute has no explicit requirement that a distributor of third-party  
 18 content intend for any illegal act (such as prostitution or sex trafficking) to take place. At best,

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
 20 <sup>1</sup> See, e.g., SB 6251 § 1; Jeanne Kohl-Welles, *Anti-Trafficking Bills, Including Focus on Online*  
 21 *Child Escort Ads, Signed Into Law*, Senate Democrats Blog (March 29, 2012),  
[http://blog.senatedemocrats.wa.gov/kohlwelles/anti-trafficking-bills-including-focus-on-online-](http://blog.senatedemocrats.wa.gov/kohlwelles/anti-trafficking-bills-including-focus-on-online-child-escort-ads-signed-into-law/)  
[child-escort-ads-signed-into-law/](http://blog.senatedemocrats.wa.gov/kohlwelles/anti-trafficking-bills-including-focus-on-online-child-escort-ads-signed-into-law/).

22 <sup>2</sup> See, e.g., *Public Hearing on SB 6251-6258 Before H. Pub. Safety & Emergency Preparedness*  
 23 *Comm.*, 62nd Leg., 2012 Sess. (Wash. 2012) (testimony of Jim Pugel, Department Assistant Chief,  
 24 Seattle Police Department), *available at*  
[http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com\\_tvwplayer&eventID=2012020118](http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2012020118) (stating that that  
 25 twenty-two youth rescued in Seattle in the previous three years “were specifically off  
 26 Backpage.com”); *Public Hearing on SB 6251-6260 Before the S. Jud. Comm.*, 62nd Leg., 2012  
 27 Sess. (Wash. 2012) (testimony of Sen. Jeanne Kohl-Welles, Member, S. Jud. Comm.), *available at*  
[http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com\\_tvwplayer&eventID=2012010180](http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2012010180) (focusing almost  
 28 exclusively on Backpage.com, the web site's affiliation with the *Seattle Weekly*, and its current  
 click-through age-verification procedure); *id.* (testimony of Tim Burgess, Councilmember, City of  
 Seattle) (stating that in a study of commercial sex offenses, “sixty percent of the juvenile offenders  
 were exploited through commercial advertising on Backpage.com or other Internet sites”).



1 such a statute – one that imposes criminal penalties on indirect actors, no less – is hopelessly vague  
2 and unenforceable. At worst, it puts at risk neutral online actors, both in and outside Washington –  
3 for example, operators of blogs, wikis, social media sites, and online archives – who redistribute or  
4 otherwise make available third-party content.

5 Movant is just such an actor concerned with the vagueness and overreach of the statute. The  
6 Internet Archive is a 501(c)(3) non-profit that was founded to build an Internet library. It offers  
7 permanent access for researchers, historians, scholars, people with disabilities, and the general  
8 public to historical collections that exist in digital format. Founded in 1996 and located in San  
9 Francisco, the Internet Archive works to prevent the Internet and other “born-digital” materials  
10 from disappearing into the past. In late 1999, the organization started to include more well-  
11 rounded collections. Today, the Internet Archive includes texts, audio, moving images, and  
12 software, as well as archived web pages in its collections. It also provides specialized services for  
13 adaptive reading and information access for the blind and other persons with disabilities. The  
14 Internet Archive collects and displays web materials on behalf of the Library of Congress, the  
15 National Archives, most state archives and libraries, as well as universities and other countries,  
16 working to preserve a record for generations to come.

17 As part of its mission to create an accurate and historically relevant archive of the Internet,  
18 the Internet Archive regularly gathers “snapshots” – accessible copies – of content on the World  
19 Wide Web through its “crawling” and indexing processes. It currently maintains over 150 *billion*  
20 web pages archived from 1996 to (nearly) the present from web sites around the world, including  
21 archives of third-party content posted to web sites like Backpage.com and craigslist.org. While it  
22 preserves for itself the ability to remove content at its own volition and occasionally does so for a  
23 variety of reasons, it has no practical ability to evaluate the legality of any significant portion of the  
24 third-party content that it archives and makes available.<sup>3</sup> Given that it inevitably archives and  
25 makes available copies of *some* content that may result in legal liability for the content’s original

26 <sup>3</sup> Movant has also on occasion disagreed with the legal validity of requests from third parties who  
27 insisted that it remove content or provide information about its users. *See, e.g., Internet Archive’s*  
28 *NSL Challenge: FBI Withdraws Unconstitutional NSL Served on Internet Archive*, ACLU,  
<http://www.aclu.org/national-security/internet-archives-ns-l-challenge> (last visited June 12, 2012).

1 authors, the Internet Archive is particularly alarmed by legislative efforts to extend liability to  
2 operators of conduits by which such content might be distributed or accessed.

3 Underage sex trafficking is an appalling practice that appropriately garners universal  
4 condemnation. Not surprisingly, SB 6251 and the slate of other well-intentioned anti-sex-  
5 trafficking bills passed in March were widely supported by the Washington state legislature.  
6 However, the legislature overreached in passing SB 6251, which is plainly in conflict with federal  
7 law. The statute is vague and overbroad, as it would likely lead to not only the impermissible  
8 chilling of constitutionally protected speech through self-censorship but also to arbitrary  
9 enforcement. SB 6251 also squarely conflicts with Section 230 of the federal Communications  
10 Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA 230” or “Section 230”), which immunizes providers  
11 of “interactive computer services” who host or distribute content created by third parties. Congress  
12 created this immunity in order to limit the impact on the Internet of federal or state regulations  
13 imposed either through statute or through the application of common law causes of action.  
14 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(4), (b)(2). Congress thus recognized in Section 230 what the U.S. Supreme  
15 Court later confirmed when it extended the highest level of First Amendment protection to the  
16 Internet: “governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free  
17 exchange of ideas than to encourage it.” *Reno v. ACLU*, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).

18 While SB 6251 enjoyed popular legislative support – indeed, the bill passed both houses of  
19 the legislature unanimously – legislators recognized that the bill might be vulnerable to claims that  
20 it conflicts with the First Amendment and Section 230.<sup>4</sup> In fact, amendments were introduced  
21

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22 <sup>4</sup> See, e.g., *Executive Session on SB 6251 of S. Jud. Comm.*, 62nd Leg., 2012 Sess. (Wash. 2012)  
23 (statement of Sen. Adam Kline, Member, S. Jud. Comm.), *available at*  
24 [http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com\\_tvwplayer&eventID=2012021017](http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2012021017) (expressing concern  
25 about a potential First Amendment challenge to the proposed statute); *id.* (statement of Sen. Jeanne  
26 Kohl-Welles, Member, S. Jud. Comm.) (expressing hope that the bill would be able “to pass  
27 muster” on CDA grounds); *Public Hearing on SB 6251-6260 Before the S. Jud. Comm.*, 62nd Leg.,  
28 2012 Sess. (Wash. 2012) (statement of Rep. Linda Smith), *available at*  
[http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com\\_tvwplayer&eventID=2012010180](http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2012010180) (“What  
Backpage.com would tell you is we are protected, we can hide behind the federal Communication  
Decency Act. What I would challenge you to do is find every way as I see you are doing to take  
that on and say at the state level, they’re facilitators, why is that any different than setting up a mall  
(footnote continued on following page)

1 during the legislature's consideration of SB 6251 that were aimed at addressing the bill's  
2 preemption problems, but those amendments were ultimately rejected.<sup>5</sup>

3 The statute's failings are not trivial or mere technicalities, especially as applied to online  
4 publishers and distributors. Since its passage in 1996, CDA 230 has functioned as the bedrock  
5 around which operators of online services of all kinds and sizes that provide access to third-party  
6 content have designed their operations. Absent its protections, service providers would perpetually  
7 risk incurring liability whenever they failed to adequately and accurately screen for illegal or  
8 otherwise actionable third-party material they hosted or distributed. *See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont,*  
9 *Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.*, 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding  
10 that online service providers can be held to be "publishers" of third-party comments, motivating  
11 Congress to pass CDA 230); *see also Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 31 P.3d 37, 41 (Wash. Ct.  
12 App. 2001) ("Congress passed § 230 'to remove disincentives to selfregulation [*sic*]' created by a  
13 New York state court decision holding an ISP strictly liable for unidentified third parties'  
14 defamatory comments posted on its bulletin board."). If states were free to impose liability on not  
15 only the creators of offending content but also on the providers of the channels through which such  
16 content was distributed, operators would dramatically reduce the universe of content they would  
17 permit themselves to risk hosting, inevitably shrinking the availability to the public of low-cost  
18 outlets for constitutionally-protected speech.

19 In light of the expansive scope of the statute and the apparent belief of the Washington state  
20 legislature and law enforcement officials that a provider such as Backpage.com may be found  
21 criminally liable for hosting material posted by its users, the Internet Archive is compelled to  
22 intervene in this lawsuit. Movant seeks to defend not only its interest in making digital archives of

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23 *(footnote continued from preceding page)*

24 like at South Center, putting kids in it for sale? Why is it any different to just move that into the  
25 sky?").

26 <sup>5</sup> *See, e.g., Executive Session on SB 6251 of S. Jud. Comm.*, 62nd Leg., 2012 Sess. (Wash. 2012)  
27 (statement of Sen. Jeanne Kohl-Welles, Member, S. Jud. Comm.), *available at*  
28 [http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com\\_tvwplayer&eventID=2012021017](http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2012021017) (expressing belief  
that a proposed (but ultimately rejected) amendment regarding a requirement that an advertisement  
must result in an actual "act of commercial sexual abuse of a minor" in order to trigger liability  
would increase "likelihood of conflict" with Section 230).

1 third-party content publicly available but also to defend the proper interpretation of the important  
2 federal legal framework that helps ensure that the Internet Archive's work can proceed. Movant  
3 asks that the Court grant its motion to intervene so that it can defend its own interests that may not  
4 be adequately represented by any of the parties currently involved in the suit.

### 5 ARGUMENT

#### 6 **I. The Internet Archive is Entitled to Intervene as a Matter of Right.**

7 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), a party is entitled to intervene where  
8 (1) the intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a significant protectable interest relating to the  
9 property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the disposition of the action may, as a  
10 practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; and (4) the existing  
11 parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interest. *Gonzalez v. Arizona*, 485 F.3d 1041,  
12 1051 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Prete v. Bradbury*, 438 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2006)). "Rule 24(a)  
13 is liberally construed in favor of intervenors." *Commercial Dev. Co. v. Abitibi-Consol. Inc.*, C07-  
14 5172RJB, 2007 WL 2900191, at \*4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 1, 2007) (citing *California ex rel. Lockyer v.*  
15 *U.S.*, 450 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2006)). The Internet Archive meets all four of these requirements  
16 and is entitled to intervention of right.

#### 17 **A. The Motion to Intervene is Timely.**

18 To determine the timeliness of a motion to intervene, the Court must examine "(1) the stage  
19 of the proceedings; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of the  
20 delay." *Seattle Audubon v. Sutherland*, CV06-1608MJP, 2007 WL 130324, at \*2 (W.D. Wash.  
21 Jan. 16, 2007) (citing *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson*, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir.  
22 1997)). Movant satisfies this factor. The case is still in its infancy, and the Internet Archive's  
23 intervention would not delay or otherwise prejudice any party. Plaintiff Backpage.com filed its  
24 complaint on June 4, 2012, and no responsive pleading has yet been filed. Moreover, the current  
25 parties have stipulated to an extended briefing schedule regarding the immediate question before  
26 the Court: whether it should convert the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction.  
27 If permitted to intervene, Movant would join in the outstanding preliminary injunction motion.  
28 Movant's participation can readily be integrated into the existing briefing schedule. There is no

1 reason to believe that intervention will cause delay or prejudice to the existing parties regarding the  
2 preliminary injunction briefing or any subsequent aspect of the litigation.

3 **B. The Internet Archive Has Significant Protectable Interests Shielding It from**  
4 **Criminal Liability Under SB 6251.**

5 Movant has “a significantly protectable interest” in enjoining enforcement of SB 6251, the  
6 subject matter of this lawsuit, as required by parties seeking to intervene as a matter of right. *See*  
7 *Donaldson v. United States*, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). This factor is satisfied “when ‘the interest  
8 is protectable under some law, and . . . there is a relationship between the legally protected interest  
9 and the claims at issue.’” *Arakaki v. Cayetano*, 324 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting  
10 *Sierra Club v. EPA*, 995 F.2d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993)); *see also Lockyer*, 450 F.3d at 441.

11 At its core, this lawsuit is about the ability of the state of Washington to impose liability on  
12 online service providers for hosting or disseminating content created by third parties. The  
13 threshold question for the Court will be whether the state can do so consistent with federal law,  
14 because “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or  
15 local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3); *see also Corbis v.*  
16 *Amazon.com*, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“In addition, the CDA preempts  
17 any inconsistent state or local law.”). As Movant will explain, the state cannot. The Internet  
18 Archive is a provider of “interactive computer services” within the meaning of Section 230 and  
19 therefore enjoys its full protections. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Section 230 categorically bars attempts  
20 to treat such providers as “publishers” of material provided by third parties, such as SB 6251 tries  
21 to do by criminalizing the “publish[ing],” “disseminat[ion],” or “display[.]” of (or causing “directly  
22 or indirectly, to be published, disseminated, or displayed”) “any advertisement of a commercial sex  
23 act which is to take place in the state of Washington and that includes the depiction of a minor.”  
24 SB 6251 § 2(1). *See, e.g., Voicenet Communications, Inc. v. Corbett*, No. 04-1318, 2006 WL  
25 2506318, at \*4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006) (“CDA confers a § 1983-enforceable right upon internet  
26 service providers and users to not be ‘treated’ under state criminal laws as the publisher or speaker  
27 of information provided by someone else . . .”). Among other activities, the Internet Archive’s  
28 “Wayback Machine” archives and makes available content from across the Internet, including

1 content from Backpage.com. *See generally* Internet Archive WayBack Machine,  
2 [http://wayback.archive.org/web/\\*/http://backpage.com](http://wayback.archive.org/web/*/http://backpage.com) (last visited June 12, 2012). Plaintiff has  
3 invoked CDA 230 in this lawsuit as a basis to defend against liability under SB 6251. The Court’s  
4 interpretation and application of CDA 230 will affect Movant’s ability to rely upon the same  
5 federal statutory protection to support its ongoing archival activities against any future challenge  
6 under SB 6251 or a related statute.

7 The statute similarly runs afoul of the Commerce Clause. In passing SB 6251, the state of  
8 Washington purports to regulate speech originating not only inside but also outside the state. It  
9 also attempts to impose criminal liability on entities that host or disseminate speech that is  
10 accessible to readers throughout the country and around the world. The Commerce Clause,  
11 however, prohibits individual states from regulating “Commerce with foreign Nations, and among  
12 the several States . . . ;” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. By attempting to impose liability outside the  
13 state in this manner, the state of Washington is attempting to do exactly what the Commerce  
14 Clause prohibits – regulate interstate and foreign commerce. As a leading case applying the  
15 Commerce Clause to the Internet explained:

16 The courts have long recognized that certain types of commerce demand consistent  
17 treatment and are therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national level. *The*  
18 *Internet represents one of those areas*; effective regulation will require national, and  
19 more likely global, cooperation. Regulation by any single state can only result in  
20 chaos, because at least some states will likely enact laws subjecting Internet users to  
21 conflicting obligations. Without the limitation’s [*sic*] imposed by the Commerce  
22 Clause, these inconsistent regulatory schemes could paralyze the development of the  
23 Internet altogether.

24 *American Library Ass’n v. Pataki*, 969 F. Supp. 160, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis added).

25 Courts across the country have applied the Commerce Clause to strike down attempts by states to  
26 regulate or otherwise burden Internet communications. *See, e.g., Cyberspace Communications,*  
27 *Inc. v. Engler*, 55 F. Supp. 2d. 737, 752 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (finding Commerce Clause violation  
28 because state regulation “would subject the Internet to inconsistent regulations across the nation”),  
*aff’d*, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000). Movant has a direct interest in ensuring that the Court  
correctly evaluates the validity of SB 6251 in light of the Commerce Clause.

1 Also at issue in this case are serious questions about the vagueness of the statute. In order  
2 to comply with the due process requirements imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment, a criminal  
3 statute must provide adequate notice to citizens as to what constitutes unlawful conduct and  
4 adequate standards to prevent the law's arbitrary enforcement. *See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson*, 461  
5 U.S. 352, 354 (1983). As described above, SB 6251 is unclear in a number of ways, preventing a  
6 potential defendant from ascertaining whether his or her actions fall within the conduct proscribed  
7 under the statute. It is unclear, for example, how the scienter requirement of "knowingly" is  
8 properly read, what the "indirect" dissemination of content refers to, and how one can definitively  
9 ascertain what an "implicit" offer for a commercial sex act is, under the statute. These components  
10 are vague in and of themselves but as connected elements of the same offense offer an all but  
11 insurmountable barrier; it is not at all clear what it means to "knowingly" "cause[] . . .  
12 indirectly . . . to be disseminated" an "implicit offer for a commercial sex act to occur in  
13 Washington." SB 6251 §§ 2(1), (1)(a). Movant has an interest in contesting the validity of statute  
14 on vagueness grounds.

15 Finally, SB 6251 is invalid under the First Amendment as a content-based restriction that  
16 fails to withstand strict scrutiny. "Content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid." *R.A.V. v.*  
17 *City of St. Paul*, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). To survive strict scrutiny review, a government entity  
18 must show that a restriction on free speech is "narrowly tailored to promote a compelling  
19 Government interest," *U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.*, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000), and  
20 that there are no "less restrictive alternatives [that] would be at least as effective in achieving the  
21 legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve." *Reno*, 521 U.S. at 874. SB 6251 fails to  
22 survive strict scrutiny because its vague statutory dictates will likely lead to overbroad self-  
23 censorship in order to avoid potential criminal liability. *See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech*  
24 *Coalition*, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (holding that the Constitution "gives significant protection  
25 from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment's vast and privileged sphere");  
26 *id.* (holding that a law imposing criminal penalties on speech is "a stark example of speech  
27 suppression" underscoring the need for facial challenges); *Broadrick v. Oklahoma*, 413 U.S. 601  
28

1 (1973). Movant has a direct interest in ensuring that its First Amendment concerns as well as the  
2 First Amendment concerns of its users are raised in this litigation.

3 **C. The Internet Archive’s Ability to Protect Its Interests May be Irreparably**  
4 **Impaired by the Disposition of this Lawsuit.**

5 A party seeking intervention as a matter of right must demonstrate that “the disposition of  
6 the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede [the applicant’s] ability to protect [its]  
7 interest.” *United States v. Oregon*, 839 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1988); *see also Yniguez v. State of*  
8 *Arizona*, 939 F.2d 727, 737 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing practical impairment of applicant  
9 intervenor’s interest arising from the fact that other parties in litigation are bound by court’s  
10 judgment). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit follows the guidance of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 Advisory  
11 Committee’s Notes, which state, “[I]f an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical  
12 sense by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene.”  
13 *Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg*, 268 F.3d 810, 822 (9th Cir. 2001).

14 Plaintiff Backpage.com’s challenge will offer the Court the opportunity to make a clear  
15 declaration of the enforceability and legality of the statute, and by extension the scope of Movant’s  
16 protectable interests articulated above. Because a declaration that the statute is valid and applicable  
17 to hosts of third-party content is the very harm that Movant seeks to prevent, Movant should be  
18 permitted to intervene now before these issues are resolved.

19 **D. The Internet Archive’s Interests are Not Adequately Represented by Other**  
20 **Parties to this Litigation.**

21 The Internet Archive should also be permitted to intervene as a matter of right because it  
22 has unique, institutional interests that may not be adequately represented by Backpage.com. The  
23 Supreme Court has held that the inadequacy “requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant  
24 shows that representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate; and the burden of making that  
25 showing should be treated as minimal.” *Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am.*, 404 U.S. 528,  
26 538 n.10 (1972). In assessing “whether a present party will adequately represent” a potential  
27 intervenor’s interests, the Court should “consider several factors, including whether [a present  
28 party] will undoubtedly make all of the intervenor’s arguments, whether [a present party] is  
capable of and willing to make such arguments, and whether the intervenor offers a necessary



1 element to the proceedings that would be neglected.” *Prete*, 438 F.3d at 956 (alteration in original)  
2 (quoting *Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt*, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983)). Even though an  
3 intervenor’s interest may appear to be aligned with a party to the action, the intervenor cannot be  
4 considered to be adequately represented if there may be a divergence in viewpoint between the  
5 two. *Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 (9th Cir. 1995)  
6 (holding that the group’s interest diverged from that of the state because the state represents the  
7 broad public interest and not the concerns of a particular industry), *abrogated by Wilderness Soc. v.*  
8 *U.S. Forest Serv.*, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011).

9         While the Internet Archive’s interests in seeking a declaration that SB 6251 is invalid may  
10 currently be consistent with Plaintiff Backpage.com’s, such interests may diverge in the future for a  
11 variety of reasons. To begin with, Movant would not be covered by any consent decree that  
12 Backpage.com – already identified by both law enforcement and the Washington state legislature  
13 as a target in their collective anti-sex-trafficking efforts – may enter into with the Defendants.  
14 Moreover, while both qualify as providers of “interactive computer services” under CDA 230,  
15 Internet Archive and Backpage.com operate factually distinct services that could lead to different  
16 types of claims. Unlike Backpage.com, whose third-party content is under the direct control of the  
17 third-party posters (and regularly expires or is updated or removed by third-party users), the  
18 Internet Archive has no analogous process for fine-tuned control of content, and instead creates  
19 distinct historical snapshots that preserve content that may otherwise be removed from the “live”  
20 version of an indexed site. The Internet Archive therefore has a greater interest in articulating its  
21 unique concerns about liability stemming from historical third-party content. It should be  
22 permitted to intervene as a matter of right to defend these and other unique perspectives, and  
23 should not be forced to rely solely on Backpage.com to defend those interests.

## 24 **II. The Internet Archive is Entitled to Permissive Intervention.**

25         In the event that this Court concludes that the Internet Archive may not intervene as a  
26 matter of right, permissive intervention should be granted. “On timely motion, the court may  
27 permit anyone to intervene who: has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common  
28 question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). “[A] court may grant permissive intervention

1 where the applicant shows: (1) independent grounds for jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and  
 2 (3) the applicant's claim or defense, and the main action, have a question of law or a question of  
 3 fact in common.” *Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman*, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir. 1996). A court  
 4 may consider discretionary factors such as “the nature and extent of the intervenors’ interest, their  
 5 standing to raise relevant legal issues, the legal position they seek to advance, . . . whether the  
 6 intervenors’ interests are adequately represented by other parties, whether intervention will prolong  
 7 or unduly delay the litigation, and whether parties seeking intervention will significantly contribute  
 8 to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the just and equitable  
 9 adjudication of the legal questions presented.” *Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Ed.*, 552 F.2d  
 10 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977) (footnotes omitted); *see also Seattle Audubon*, 2007 WL 130324 at \*5  
 11 (holding that in a case that has the potential to “significantly impact large and varied interests,”  
 12 affected parties should be allowed to participate).

13 The Court should, at minimum, allow the Internet Archive to intervene under this standard.  
 14 The Internet Archive’s motion is timely and intervention will not prolong or delay the litigation of  
 15 this matter. In addition, the Internet Archive’s claims – seeking declaratory and injunctive relief  
 16 involving its interests under CDA 230 and the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and  
 17 the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution – involve similar questions of law and fact, although  
 18 the Internet Archive brings its own unique perspective as an archivist of online material. Even if  
 19 this Court finds that the Internet Archive is not entitled to intervention of right, it should grant  
 20 permissive intervention.

### CONCLUSION

21 This Court should allow the Internet Archive to intervene as a matter of right under Federal  
 22 Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 24(a)(2), or, in the alternative, permissively under Federal Rule of  
 23 Civil Procedure Rule 24(b)(1)(B). Moreover, this Court should permit Movant to participate in the  
 24 briefing (and oral argument) for the outstanding preliminary injunction motion if it files its opening  
 25 brief by July 2, 2012, or otherwise at the Court’s convenience.

26 Dated: June 14, 2012

Respectfully submitted,

27 By: s/ Venkat Balasubramani

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on June 14, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

Dated: June 14, 2012

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