

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755–6000

2 June 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities -INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//FOUO) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 31 March 2008 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.7.(d) of Executive Order 12333.

(U//FOUO) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

GEORGE ELLARD

Inspector General

ITO T. POTENZA General Counsel

(U//FOUO) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

> Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:

Quarterly Report

This document may be declassified and marked "UNCLASSIFIED#For Official Use Only" upon removal of enclosure(s)

Approved for Release by NSA or .2010. FOIA Case # 57379

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20320108

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	(U) Counterintelligence Activities.	•
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	(U) Intelligence-related Activities.	
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	2. (U //FOUO) NSA OIG Intelligence Oversight Inspections, Investigations, and Special Studies.	
	(U //FOUO) During this quarter, the Office of Inspector General reviewed various intelligence activities of the NSA/CSS to determine whether they were conducted in accordance with applicable statutes, Executive Orders, Attorney General procedures, and Department of Defense and internal directives. With few exceptions, the problems uncovered were routine and showed that operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.	
	(U#FOUO)) NSA/CSS Hawaii. Although progress has been made in intelligence oversight training, the program still requires work. Some of the intelligence oversight training and testing materials contained inaccurate information. Annual refresher training was at 69.5 percent. The database to track training for those and their auditors was not accurate. The NSA/CSS Inspector General will update in a future report actions taken by NSA/CSS Hawaii to correct the inspection-findings. A highlight of the inspection was the and Standard Operating Procedure developed by	
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- 3. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS Intelligence Oversight Program.
- (U) Nothing to report.
- 4. (U) Changes to NSA/CSS published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes.
- (U) Nothing to report.
- 5. (U) Procedures governing the activities of Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components that affect U.S. persons (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to Intelligence Oversight Programs.
- (U) Nothing to report.



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12 September 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U#FOUC) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 30 June 2008 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.7.(d) of Executive Order 12333.

(U//FOUO) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

GEORGE ELLARD

Inspector General

VITO T. POTENZA General Counsel

(U/FOUO) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

KEITH B. ALEXANDER Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:

Quarterly Report

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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

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(U) Nothing to report.

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	(U#FOUO) NSA/CSS OIG Intelligence Oversight Inspections, Investigations, and Special Studies.	
•	(U //FOUO) During this quarter, the Office of Inspector General reviewed various intelligence	
	activities of the NSA/CSS to determine whether they had been conducted in accordance with	• •
	applicable statutes, Executive Orders, Attorney General procedures, and Department of Defense	
	and internal directives. With few exceptions, the problems uncovered were routine and showed	-
	that operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.	
	(U//FOUO) NSA/CSS Hawaii. The inspection found non-compliance in the completion of	
	initial and annual refresher intelligence oversight training and the database to track training	*
	for those and their auditors was not accurate. In a future report,	ı
	for those and their auditors was not accurate. In a future report, the NSA/CSS Inspector General will update actions taken by NSA/CSS Hawaii to correct the	
	for those and their auditors was not accurate. In a future report, the NSA/CSS Inspector General will update actions taken by NSA/CSS Hawaii to correct the inspection findings. A highlight of the inspection was the and Standard	
	for those and their auditors was not accurate. In a future report, the NSA/CSS Inspector General will update actions taken by NSA/CSS Hawaii to correct the	
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	for those and their auditors was not accurate. In a future report, the NSA/CSS Inspector General will update actions taken by NSA/CSS Hawaii to correct the inspection findings. A highlight of the inspection was the operating Procedure (SOP) developed by (U//FOUO) NSA/CSS Colorado. The inspection found non-compliance in the completion of initial and annual refresher intelligence oversight training. NSA/CSS Colorado lacked a process	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
	for those and their auditors was not accurate. In a future report, the NSA/CSS Inspector General will update actions taken by NSA/CSS Hawaii to correct the inspection findings. A highlight of the inspection was the Operating Procedure (SOP) developed by (U//FOUO) NSA/CSS Colorado. The inspection found non-compliance in the completion of initial and annual refresher intelligence oversight training. NSA/CSS Colorado lacked a process to track training for employees and had no processes to update the	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
	for those and their auditors was not accurate. In a future report, the NSA/CSS Inspector General will update actions taken by NSA/CSS Hawaii to correct the inspection findings. A highlight of the inspection was the operating Procedure (SOP) developed by (U//FOUO) NSA/CSS Colorado. The inspection found non-compliance in the completion of initial and annual refresher intelligence oversight training. NSA/CSS Colorado lacked a process	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-3

- 4. (U) Changes to NSA/CSS published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes.
- (U) Nothing to report.
- 5. (U) Procedures governing the activities of Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components that affect U.S. persons (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to Intelligence Oversight Programs.
- (U) Nothing to report.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5000

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MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – New York Times article "E-Mail Surveillance Renews Concerns in Congress" – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

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(U) NSA remains committed to providing transparency in these matters – a promise made by the DIRNSA. We would be pleased to meet with the Committee to address any concerns that may remain.

JONATHAN E. MILLER Associate Director Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:

Minority Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence





NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 6 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U#FOUO) Congressional Notification – News Media to Raise Serious Allegations Concerning NSA Operations -INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S) This is to inform you of an upcoming televised interview of James Bamford by ABC News Chief Investigative Correspondent Brian Ross, which is expected to soon air allegations that, after 9/11, the National Security Agency (NSA) engaged in improper intelligence activities.

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(U//FOUC) ABC News requested an NSA official appear on camera to comment on the allegations made by Mr. Bamford. We have declined an on camera interview and responded with a very brief statement, "The civilian and military members of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service take an oath to support and uphold the Constitution of the United States. We have been entrusted to protect and defend the nation with integrity, accountability, and respect for the law. As Americans, we take this obligation seriously. Our employees work tirelessly for the good of the nation, and serve this country proudly."

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JONATHAN E. MILLER
Associate Director
Legislative Affairs Office

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Copy Furnished:
Minority Staff Director, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence



TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20758-5000

24 December 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

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GEORGE ELLARD
Inspector General

VITO T. POTENZA

General Counsel

(U#FOUO) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:

Quarterly Report

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
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(U) Nothing to report.

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2. (U //FOUO) NSA/CSS OIG Intelligence Oversight inspections, investigations, and Special Studies.	
(U//FOUO) During this quarter, the OIG reviewed various intelligence activities of the	
NSA/CSS to determine whether they had been conducted in accordance with applicable statutes,	·
Executive Orders, AG procedures, and Department of Defense and internal directives. With few exceptions, the problems uncovered were routine and showed that operating elements understand	
the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.	
(U//FOUO) The joint inspection found that I/O roles	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
and responsibilities were not clearly defined and I/O processes and procedures were not developed and documented. Two percent of the workforce had not completed initial I/O training	
as required by NSA/CSS Policy 1-23. The NSA/CSS OIG will track corrective action through	
completion.	

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(S//S)	
	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U) Congressional, IOB, and DNI Notifications	
(S//SL//NF) On 6 October 2008, NSA notified the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) of an impending televised interview of James Bamford by ABC News	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
The subject of the interview was the allegation that NSA had engaged in improper intelligence activities.	
(S//SI/NF) 3. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS Intelligence Oversight Program.	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U) Nothing to report.	

- 4. (U) Changes to NSA/CSS published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes.
- (U) Nothing to report.
- 5. (U) Procedures governing the activities of Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components that affect U.S. persons (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to Intelligence Oversight Programs.
- (U) Nothing to report.



TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20758-6000

23 February 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U#FOUQ). Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 31 December 2008 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.7.(d) of Executive Order 12333.

(U//FOUO) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

GEORGE ELLARD
Inspector General

VITO T. POTENZA

General Counsel

(U//FOUO) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

KEITH B. ALEXANDER Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:

Quarterly Report

This document may be declassified and marked "UNCLASSIFIED//For Official Use Only" upon removal of enclosure(s)

Approved for Release by NSA or 01-22-2010, FOIA Case # 58957

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20320108


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(U) Nothing to report.	
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(U) Nothing to report.	

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(U) Nothing to report.

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(U) Intelligence-related Activities (b)(1) (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (S//SI//NF (TS//SI/NF) (b)(1) ---(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 € (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 -(TS//SI (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(1) (TS//SI/ /b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (TS//SI (b)(1) (b)(3)-18 USC 798 /(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (TS//S1 (b)(1) /(b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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-(TS//SL	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
2. (U//FOUO) NSA/CSS OIG Intelligence Oversight Inspections, Investigations,	
(U//FOUO) During this quarter, the OIG reviewed various intelligence activities of the NSA/CSS to determine whether they had been conducted in accordance with applicable statutes, Executive Orders, Attorney General procedures, and Department of Defense and internal directives. With few exceptions, the problems uncovered were routine and showed that operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.	,
(U //FOUO	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U//FOUO) A joint inspection found that would benefit from documented and communicated processes. The focus of the intelligence oversight program has been	

(U //FOUO	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U#FOUO) A joint inspection found that	would benefit from documented and
communicated processes. The focus of the	intelligence oversight program has been
E.O. 12333 training, but not local incident handling	procedures. Intelligence oversight training
for newcomers is at an 86 percent compliance rate,	and 99 percent for annual E.O. 12333
refresher training. Although collectors, analysts, ar	nd supervisors are aware of the restrictions on
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of U.S. r	person information, local incident reporting
standards, and internal controls to track newcomer	training and
are needed. The OIG will track corrective	e action through completion.
(U //FOUO) NSA Office	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U#FOUO) An inspection found that the intelligence	ce oversight within NSA's Office
is appropriately managed and compliant	with standing regulations.

(U# FOUO)	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//SI/	(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 /(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- (U) Congressional, IOB, and DNI Notifications.
- (U) Nothing to report.
- 3. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS intelligence Oversight Program.
- (U) Nothing to report.
- 4. (U) Changes to NSA/CSS published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes.
- (U) Nothing to report.
- 5. (U) Procedures governing the activities of Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components that affect U.S. persons (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to Intelligence Oversight Programs.
- (U) Nothing to report.



SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

14 December 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

(Unit out)- SUBJECT: (U) Inquiry from Senator Leahy	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
REFERENCE: (U) ATSD(IO) Memorandum subject: Same, received on 5 December 2007, Classified SECRET/SI//NOFORN	
- (S//SI//NF)	/(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
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Approved for Release by NSA on 01-22-2010, FOIA Case #58957

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Dated: 20070108

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	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
Assigned personnel were surveyed to determine their level of knowledge of intelligence oversight regulations and associated responsibilities. Personnel within the operational areas were well versed in the authorities.	1
(U/ /FOUO)	1
We provide))
you with this notification for your review and further action, as you deem	**
necessary. If you need additional information or clarification, please contact	
Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Oversight, on	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Inspector General

cc:

The Inspector General, Department of Defense The Inspector General, Department of the Army The Inspector General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command