

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB:

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DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 09/21/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

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OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
IOB MATTER 2007-3321 (U)

(U)

~~(S)~~ In a National Security Letter (NSL) dated June 27, 2007, the FBI issued an ECPA NSL request for subscriber information for a few email addresses. An email address which had not yet been deemed relevant to the investigation was included in the NSL. The Internet Service Provider (ISP) returned subscriber information for this address. Upon discovery of the mistake, the information was removed from the investigative case file and sequestered.

(U) Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the FBI may seek telephone and email communication records from telephone companies and internet service providers when those records "are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." 18 U.S.C. § 2709. In this instance, the request was not in compliance with ECPA because the records about the unaffiliated email account were not determined to be relevant to the investigation.

(U) The Field Office has been instructed to either return or destroy the over-collection, depending on the wishes of the Internet service provider.

~~Derived from: FBI NSISCG 20080301
Declassify on: 06/10/2008~~

~~SECRET~~

Cardozo-IOB-136

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: June 27, 2007

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB:

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: September 10, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: 18 U.S.C. § 2709)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines:

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

Erroneously requested information will be destroyed or returned, based on the wishes of the ISP.

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-06-2010 BY 65179/DMH/sdb

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-2114

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The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has determined that in conducting a counterintelligence investigation of a United States person, the FBI [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] issued a National Security Letter (NSL) to a carrier which was not reported to the United States Congress pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2709(e).

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In this instance, a telecommunications carrier provided records consistent with a toll billing records NSL. However, [REDACTED] failed to properly document the issuance of the NSL. As a result, the FBI failed to inform the United States Congress as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2709(e) of the issuance of this one NSL.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-06-2010 BY 65179/DMH/sdb

IOB SUMMARY SHEET
2007-2114

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: 04/22/2004

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 3/31/2008

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 07/10/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: 18 USC § 2709(e))

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

Cardozo-IOB-139

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
IOB MATTER 2008-507 (U)

(U)

~~(S)~~ On or about February 13, 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued a National Security Letter (NSL) requesting subscriber information for a telephone number associated with U.S. person, who was the subject of an authorized investigation. In the NSL, the FBI limited the scope of its request by providing the subscriber's name, aliases, date of birth and social security number. Upon review of the NSL results, the FBI discovered that the carrier provided information on the account after it was reassigned to another user, resulting in the unintentional acquisition of information for another subscriber, who was not related to the investigation. The FBI compounded the error by uploading the NSL results into an FBI database.

(U) By agreement with the Counsel to the IOB, the over-production of information from a carrier acting pursuant to an NSL must be reported to OGC as a potential IOB matter when the FBI compounded the error by uploading the excess information or undertaking other investigative activity on the basis of that information. In this case, the carrier mistakenly provided telephone account information on the wrong subscriber and the FBI inadvertently compounded the error by uploading the over-produced results into an FBI database. Therefore, this matter is reportable to the IOB.

(U) Upon discovery, the FBI coordinated efforts to purge the FBI database of all over-collected data and provided the NSL results to the Chief Division Counsel for sequestration. The FBI's Office of General Counsel (OGC) advised

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~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20080301
Declassify on: 05/22/2018~~

Cardozo-IOB-140

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report: 2nd Quarter

DATE OF INCIDENT: March 2008

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: July 31, 2008

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/10/2008

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
 Other (U.S.C. citation: 18 USC § 2709)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
 Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
 Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
 Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
 Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
 Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
 Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
 Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
 Section 2.7 contracting
 Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
 Section 2.10 human experimentation
 Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
 Section 2.12 indirect participation
 AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
 Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
 Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: The FBI Office of the General Counsel advised [REDACTED]

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*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION: May 2008

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INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
IOB MATTER 2008-557 (U)

(U)

~~(S)~~ On [redacted] the FBI initiated a [redacted] [redacted] on a U.S. person. Subsequently, an Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) National Security Letter (NSL) was properly issued for telephone toll billing records. In response, the telecommunications company provided records exceeding the date scope, which were uploaded into the FBI's data systems, along with the properly requested information.

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(U) By agreement with the Counsel to the IOB, third party errors in the over production of information pursuant to an NSL must be reported to OGC as a potential IOB, but they are not reportable to the IOB unless, as here, the FBI compounded the error by uploading the overproduction into an FBI database or otherwise using the overproduction for investigative purposes.

(U) The field office has purged the overcollected information from the FBI's data systems and sequestered the information with its legal unit [redacted]

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~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20080301
Declassify On: 06/11/2018~~

~~SECRET~~

Cardozo-IOB-142

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report: 2nd Quarter

DATE OF INCIDENT: May 2005

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: July 31, 2008

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/16/2008

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: 18 USC §.2709)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble; least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: The FBI Office of the General Counsel

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*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION: June 2008

~~SECRET//20180305~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1845 (U)

(U)

~~(S)~~ During a [REDACTED] of a U.S. person, [REDACTED] issued two (2) Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) National Security Letters (NSL) to two (2) credit reporting agencies, respectively. [REDACTED] requested consumer identifying and financial institution information. In response to the NSLs, both credit reporting agencies produced full credit reports. [REDACTED] subsequently inserted an account number from one of the full credit reports in a Right to Financial Privacy (RFP) NSL that was uploaded onto Automated Case Support (ACS).

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(U) In this case, [REDACTED] compounded a third party error by uploading and using for investigative purposes the account number from the full credit report.

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(U) Because the investigation is pending, [REDACTED] has been advised that it may issue curative FCRA NSLs under § 1681v requesting full credit reports if it determines that the reports are necessary to conduct its investigation. Otherwise, [REDACTED] will contact the credit reporting agencies and ask whether the original full credit reports should be returned or destroyed, with appropriate documentation to the file. [REDACTED] has also been informed that if [REDACTED] does not issue curative NSLs, then it may keep copies of the full credit reports provided that all over-produced information is redacted from each report. In addition, [REDACTED] has been instructed to redact the account number from both the uploaded and investigative file versions of the RFP NSL.

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(U) As for the RFP NSL production, [REDACTED] has been advised that it may keep the documents from the financial institution. If [REDACTED] had issued the RFP NSL without the account number, it would have received the same information. Furthermore, the financial institution had the account number before it received the RFP NSL. The FBI has concluded, therefore, that [REDACTED] need not re-issue a redundant NSL to obtain the same information that it currently has.

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~~(S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 03/05/2018~~

(U)

~~SECRET//20180305~~

Cardozo-IOB-144

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB:

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DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 03/06/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2010 BY 65179\DMH\sdb

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the General Counsel

Washington, D.C. 20535

July 10, 2008.

BY COURIER AND SECURE
FACSIMILE

Stephen Friedman, Chairman
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020
New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Friedman:

Pursuant to Executive Order 13462 and the April 17, 2007 memorandum authored by Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Office of the General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), submits the enclosed report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB).

The FBI has determined that, on July 17, 2007 and on July 19, 2007, a clerical support employee of the FBI mishandled national security information classified at the "~~Secret~~" level, and bearing the handling caveat "No Foreign" distribution. This information included two National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) documents. This unauthorized distribution was quickly reported to the FBI, and vigorous steps were immediately taken to locate and delete every copy of email and to obtain written affirmations from each recipient that the information would not be further disclosed. The employee responsible for the lapse received a security awareness briefing on the issues involved.

On July 23, 2007, the FBI Office of General Counsel orally notified the Counsel to the Intelligence Oversight Board of the details of this incident, and memorialized that report in the form of a letter dated July 27, 2007. As of June 6, 2008, no recipient has disclosed this information, nor has it appeared in any public medium.


Cardozo-IOB-146

The FBI's prompt and effective remedial action demonstrates the Bureau's awareness of the importance of compliance with the relevant statutes and other authorities. The FBI continues to train and emphasize the importance of proper handling of classified and sensitive information in an effort to prevent this from occurring in the future.

Please do not hesitate to contact me or [redacted] if you have any questions regarding the enclosed IOB matters.

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Sincerely,



Julie F. Thomas
Deputy General Counsel
National Security Law Branch

- 1 - Mr. J. Patrick Rowan (by courier only)
Acting Assistant Attorney General
National Security Division
United States Department of Justice
Room 2200 C
- 1 - Mr. Benjamin A. Powell (by secure facsimile only)
General Counsel
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Secure facsimile: [redacted]

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DECLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/sdb
ON 05-06-2010

U.S. Department of Justice

~~SECRET~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the General Counsel

Washington, D.C. 20535

June 11, 2008

VIA SECURE FACSIMILE
AND COURIER

Benjamin A. Powell
General Counsel
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Liberty Crossing Two
Room 2B-200
McLean, VA 22102
(Note: Not to be delivered by courier until June 16, 2008)
Secure Facsimile: [redacted] b2

Dear Mr. Powell:

(U) By memorandum dated February 5, 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence requested that the FBI's Office of the General Counsel (OGC) inform your office if the FBI has records of matters that were considered but not reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) between January 2001 to the present. OGC was to review such matters under the reporting guidelines set forth in the April 17, 2007 memorandum from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

(U) On February 12, 2007, I met with [redacted] and [redacted] to discuss this issue. During our meeting, I advised Ms. [redacted] and Ms. [redacted] that our IOB matters for calendar years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 have been heavily scrutinized by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Additionally, the FBI has provided all nonreportable IOB decisions from 2004 to 2006 to the Counsel for the IOB for review. Because the FBI's matters for those years have already been reviewed, [redacted] agreed that it is only necessary for the FBI to review matters for calendar years 2001, 2002, and 2003.

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(U) ~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG 20080301~~
~~Declassify On: 06/11/2018~~

~~SECRET~~ Cardozo-IOB-148

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(U) To gather matters that were considered but not reported to the IOB for calendar years 2001, 2002, and 2003, FBI OGC searched the following sites: (1) file cabinets located in the office space of OGC, National Security Law Branch (NSLB); (2) NSLB's IOB database; and (3) an FBI database, Automated Case Support (ACS), for IOB matters that were adjudicated between the period of January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2003. After searching these places, NSLB located 16 matters for calendar year 2001; 10 matters for calendar year 2002; and 13 matters for calendar year 2003.

(U) Additionally, FBI OGC contacted the FBI's Inspection Division to determine whether other nonreportable IOB matters for calendar years 2001 through 2003 were located there. The Inspection Division determined that there were two additional nonreportable IOB matters, both for calendar year 2002.

(U) After reviewing the 41 matters, I determined that, under current FBI policy and the April 17, 2007 memorandum from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the following four matters would now be reported. These matters are set forth below:

(U) (S) In IOB matter 2002-27, the FBI initiated a [redacted] on a United States person. The [redacted] expired on [redacted]. Due to an administrative error, and after the [redacted] had expired, [redacted] of the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (FCIG), effective March 8, 1999. The [redacted] was properly renewed on [redacted].

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(U) (S) In IOB matter 2002-28, the FBI initiated a [redacted] on a non-United States person. The [redacted] expired on [redacted]. Due to an administrative error, and after the [redacted] had expired, the FBI conducted several investigative interviews in violation of section III.B.3.h of the FCIG. It should be noted that because the FBI neither interviewed the subject of the investigation nor conducted a [redacted] of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective October 31, 2003, [redacted]

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Cardozo-IOB-149

~~SECRET~~

(U)

~~SECRET~~

(S) In IOB matter 2003-04, the FBI initiated a [redacted] on a non-United States person. The [redacted] Due to an administrative error, and after the [redacted] had expired, the FBI conducted an

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[redacted]

(U)

(S) Finally, in IOB matter 2003-25, the FBI initiated a [redacted] on a United States person. The [redacted] expired on [redacted] Due to administrative error, and after the expiration of the [redacted] the FBI interviewed the subject of the inquiry on [redacted] Upon realizing that the [redacted] had expired, the FBI extended the investigation.

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(U)

[redacted]

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(U) Please do not hesitate to contact [redacted] or me if you have any questions regarding these or any other IOB matters.

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b7C

Sincerely,

Julie F. Thomas
Julie F. Thomas

Deputy General Counsel
National Security Law Branch

Cardozo-IOB-150

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 - Homer S. Pointer, Counsel (by secure facsimile and courier)
Intelligence Oversight Board
Room 5020
New Executive Office Building
725 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503
Secure Facsimile: b2

1 - Mark A. Bradley (by courier)
Chief, Oversight Section
U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
Office of Intelligence
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Suite 6150
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 514-5600

Cardozo-IOB-151

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIA/PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

6 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

- (b)(1)
- (b)(2)
- (b)(3) _____
- _____
- _____
- (b)(4)
- (b)(5)
- (b)(6)

- (b)(7)(A)
- (b)(7)(B)
- (b)(7)(C)
- (b)(7)(D)
- (b)(7)(E)
- (b)(7)(F)
- (b)(8)
- (b)(9)

- (d)(5)
- (j)(1)
- (k)(1)
- (k)(2)
- (k)(3)
- (k)(4)
- (k)(5)
- (k)(6)
- (k)(7)

Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

Document(s) originated with another government agency (OGA). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and you will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information.

_____ Page(s) contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

_____ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

6 Page(s) were not considered for release as they are duplicative of **Cardozo-IOB-5 through Cardozo-IOB-10**

_____ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):_

⊗ The following number(s) is (are) to be used for reference regarding these pages : **Cardozo-IOB-152 through Cardozo-IOB-157**

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

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~~SECRET//20180208~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-2160 (U)

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(U)

~~(S)~~ On [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] on a non-United States person. The [REDACTED] was due to expire to expire on [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED] new Attorney General national security guidelines established a new [REDACTED] expiration date of [REDACTED] placed the case in a "pending inactive" status from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] due to the case agent being assigned to a temporary duty assignment. Upon returning the case to a pending status, the supervisory special agent of squad [REDACTED] removed the duration of the "pending inactive" status from the 180-day restriction. During this time frame, [REDACTED] sought a mail cover on the subject.

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(U)

~~(S)~~ In reviewing this matter, OGC notes that there is no provision for "pending inactive status" in The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the investigation was meant to expire six months from its inception, on [REDACTED] however, conducted investigative activity in this matter without having secured an extension of the [REDACTED]. Specifically, [REDACTED] had no authority to seek a mail cover on the subject on [REDACTED] without having an investigation open at the time. As a result, [REDACTED] has committed an IOB violation.

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(U) [REDACTED] has been instructed to remove from its files and databases any mail received from the mail cover, and either destroy the mail or return it to the postmaster, with appropriate documentation to file. In the meantime, [REDACTED] has been instructed to sequester the mail with the CDC.

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~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180208~~

~~SECRET//20180208~~-IOB-158

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/3/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 08/07/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
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- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

b2
b7E

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180222~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER

[REDACTED] DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-1987 (U)

b2
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ The [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] reported that after closing a [REDACTED] against a non-USPER, physical surveillance was still directed against the subject. As a result of this occurrence, the squad has implemented a checklist for closing investigations, which includes notifying the surveillance groups.

(U)

~~(S)~~ The matter is being reported to the IOB [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 02/22/2008~~

b2
b5
b7E

~~SECRET//20180222~~

Cardozo-IOB-160

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 7/3/2008

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 06/20/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office): N/A

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

b2
b7E

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

PIOB was filed; new checklist for closing investigations was implemented.

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION: 10/12/2007

DATE: 05-10-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/sdb
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-10-2035

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET//20171128~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1030-NSL (U)

b2
b7E

(S)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has determined that in conducting an investigation [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] issued a toll billing NSL in response to which the carrier returned records one day beyond the parameters of the request and the information was uploaded into a database. In this regard, on or about [REDACTED] opened an investigation [REDACTED]

b1
b2
b7E

[REDACTED] who is not a "United States person" as that term is used in Section 101(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). During the course of this investigation, an NSL dated 02/13/2003 was issued pursuant to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2709, for telephone toll billing records. The carrier returned the requested information, but, in addition, provided one additional day of records. The information was uploaded into [REDACTED] [REDACTED] By EC dated 04/05/2007, this matter was reported as a potential IOB. The information has since been purged from [REDACTED] and redacted from the case file. (S)

The IOB has instructed OGC to report matters in which information overcollected due to carrier error is uploaded into a database. Thus, this situation is being reported to the IOB. (U)

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 11/28/2017~~

~~SECRET//20171128~~

Cardozo-IOB-162

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI OGC CY Quarterly Report: 2007
DATE OF INCIDENT: 02/13/03 (issuance of NSL) DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: ~~12/30/07~~ 4/30/2009
DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/05/07
DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
 Other (U.S.C. citation: 18 USC 2709)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
 Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
 Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
 Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
 Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
 Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
 Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
 Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
 Section 2.7 contracting
 Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
 Section 2.10 human experimentation
 Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
 Section 2.12 indirect participation
 AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
 Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
 Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Advised field that matter would be reported to IOB; overcollected data already purged from database, redacted from file.

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180208~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER:
[REDACTED] DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-1983-NSL (U)

b2
b7E

(U)

(S) A [REDACTED] of a non- United States person was initiated on [REDACTED]. In a May 26, 2004 NSL to a telephone carrier, the [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] requested subscriber information for [REDACTED] telephone numbers, from [REDACTED]. In its response, the carrier provided responsive records for all [REDACTED] numbers. [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

[REDACTED] According to [REDACTED] some of this excess information was uploaded to the Automated Case Support System (ACS).

(U) In this instance, an error on the part of the carrier resulted in the unintentional acquisition of information beyond the requested date scope and for a telephone number not requested. By letters dated November 13, 2006 and July 31, 2007, the Counsel to the IOB agreed that third party errors in the collection of information pursuant to an NSL must be reported to OGC as a potential IOB, but they are not reportable to the IOB unless the FBI has compounded the error by, for example, uploading, disseminating or using the records in conjunction with another investigation. Because here the unintentionally acquired information was uploaded, the error has thus been compounded and is being reported to the IOB.

(U)

[REDACTED]

b2
b5
b7E

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180208~~

~~SECRET//20180208~~
Cardozo-IOB-164

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: 05/26/04

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 06/26/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2709 (ECPA))

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Return or destroy

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-12-2010
CLASSIFIED BY 65179DMH/plj
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-12-2035

~~SECRET//20171128~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER

(S)

[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1031-NSL (U)

b1
b2
b7E

(S)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has determined that in conducting an investigation [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] issued a toll billing NSL in response to which the carrier returned records beyond the parameters of the request and the information was uploaded into a database. In this regard, on or about

(S)

[REDACTED] opened an investigation [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who is not a "United States person" as that term is used in Section 101(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). During the course of this investigation, an NSL dated 03/13/2003 was issued pursuant to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2709, for telephone toll billing records. The carrier returned the requested information, but, in addition, provided information beyond the scope of the request. The information was uploaded into [REDACTED]. By EC dated 04/05/2007, this matter was reported as a potential IOB. The information has since been purged from [REDACTED] and the information has been sealed. [REDACTED] has been advised to destroy or return the information to the carrier. (S)

b1
b2
b7E

The IOB has instructed OGC to report matters in which information overcollected due to carrier error is uploaded into a database. Thus, this situation is being reported to the IOB. (U)

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 11/28/2017~~

~~SECRET//20171128~~

~~SECRET~~

Cardozo-IOB-166

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI OGC

CY Quarterly Report: 2007

DATE OF INCIDENT: 03/03/03 (issuance of NSL)

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: ~~12/30/07~~ 4/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/05/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: 18 USC 2709)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO-12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Advised field that matter would be reported to IOB; overcollected data already purged from database, and in process of being destroyed.

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER

[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE

IOB MATTER 2007-2460-FCRA (U)

b2
b7E

(U)

(S) During a [REDACTED] of a non-U.S. person, [REDACTED] issued a National Security Letter (NSL) citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681v and seeking "a copy of a consumer report and all other information in [the credit reporting agency's] files." The certification within the NSL, however, was not the certification required for a 15 U.S.C. § 1681v NSL; rather, it was the certification required for a 15 U.S.C. § 1681u NSL. Despite the fact that [REDACTED] requested a full credit report, the credit reporting agency only produced a "credit profile" with limited information beyond the target's consumer identifying information.

b2
b7E

(U) In this case, an error was committed by the field office when it requested a full credit report pursuant to FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v for an [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that did not have an international terrorism nexus.

(U) Because the NSL included the appropriate 15 U.S.C. § 1681u certification, the field office has been advised that it may keep a copy of the credit profile provided that all information beyond consumer identifying and financial institution information is redacted from the copy. The field office has been instructed to immediately redact all information beyond consumer identifying and financial institution information obtained pursuant to the NSL from all hard and uploaded records, including any documents on an FBI database. Finally, the field office has been instructed to contact the credit reporting agency and ask whether the original credit profile should be returned or destroyed, with appropriate documentation to the file.

~~SECRET~~

Cardozo-IOB-168

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

b2
b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/02/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info.

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180102~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTERS 2007-1144-NSL (U)

b2
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ During a [REDACTED] of a non-U.S. person, [REDACTED] issued a National Security Letter (NSL) to a bank directing the production of "names and addresses of all financial institutions . . . at which the below-named consumer maintains or has maintained an account." [REDACTED] included the following certification in the NSL:

In accordance with Title 15, U.S.C., Section 1681u(a), I certify that the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, and that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

(U) The NSL did not contain any other certification.

(U) This matter is reportable because the field office's NSL was not valid under either the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) or the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA). The NSL was not valid under FCRA because the bank is not a "consumer credit reporting agency" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a. It was not valid under RFPA because it did not include the certification that the FBI had complied with all applicable provisions of RFPA. The field office has been instructed to contact the bank and ask whether the production should be returned or destroyed, with appropriate documentation to the file.

(U)

~~(S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 01/02/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180102-IOB-170~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-06-2010 BY 65179/DMH/sdb

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: 10/20/2005

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/5/07

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/06/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u and 1681v)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

Cardozo-IOB-171

~~SECRET//20171227~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1122 (U)

b2
b7E

(U) On March 29, 2007, the [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] reported a potential IOB error in conjunction with a closed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of four non-United States Persons.

(U) (S) On [REDACTED] [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] of an [REDACTED]. The investigation was predicated on information received from [REDACTED] that a US person, had been murdered in [REDACTED]. While this investigation likely could have been opened under either criminal or counterterrorism investigative guidelines, the opening document indicates it was opened under a counterterrorism casefile number. As such, [REDACTED] was obligated to follow the requirements of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG).

b2
b7E

(U) (S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. A violation occurs if failure to provide an annual report is deemed to hinder OIPR's oversight ability. In the instant case, [REDACTED] was 13 months tardy when filing the report.

(U) (S) During the 13 months there is no indication from the casefile that [REDACTED] used specific techniques that required OIPR approval or would have involved OIPR such that they could have been able to exercise oversight without the formal report. While it is not an excuse for failure to comply with the formal NSIG requirements, [REDACTED] did have significant oversight from the local US Attorney's Office. Acting on advice from the local US Attorney's Office, [REDACTED] agents did travel to [REDACTED] to interview [REDACTED] Federal Police had in custody.

b2
b7E

(U) (S) On March 20, 2007, approximately 13 months after the notification was required, consistent with the NSIG, [REDACTED] did file a report updating progress on the case. The failure to properly report on the pendency of the investigation to OIPR impacted their oversight ability of this investigation as the investigation was closed soon after the report was filed with OIPR. [REDACTED] has been admonished to ensure appropriate procedures are followed in all counterterrorism cases.

b2
b7E

~~Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 12/27/2007~~

~~SECRET//20171227
Cardozo-IOB-172~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: March 29, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
 Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble; least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

b2
b7E

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
 Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
 Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180211~~

(U)

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2008-154 (U)

b2
b7E

~~(S)~~ The [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] reports that while conducting a [REDACTED] of a non-United States person, they failed to file an annual Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) as required in [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

However, prior to October 31, 2003, the NSIG's predecessor, the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (AGG), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] did not provide an investigatory summary before [REDACTED] as required by the new NSIG and the implementing guidelines. The case closed later in August 2004 with no investigative activity occurring between February and August.

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b7E

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180211~~

~~SECRET//20180211~~
Cardozo IOB-174

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-06-2010 BY 65179/DMH/sdb

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

b2
b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 12/14/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Return or destroy

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

Cardozo-IOB-175

~~SECRET//20180221~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER.

[REDACTED] DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-2162 (U)

b2
b7E

(U) An electronic communication (EC) from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED], dated 07/25/2007, reported a potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation involving the late notification of initiation of a [REDACTED] and failure to submit annual LHMs to OIPR.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] of a non-"United States person" on [REDACTED]. During the course of the investigation, [REDACTED] did not provide FBI HQ with a Notice of Initiation until 2007. In addition, [REDACTED] did not submit an annual LHM for 2005 and 2006. [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

administrative oversights and issued a Notice of Initiation and annual LHM on [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003 (NSIG), [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

[REDACTED] " After receiving the notice from the field office, FBIHQ shall provide notice to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and to the Criminal Division. OIPR shall then notify the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General.

(U) The failure to notify OIPR of the investigation in a timely manner "substantially impaired" their oversight of this case. Here, an opening LHM was not submitted to FBIHQ until more than three years after the investigation had been opened. Additionally, no annual LHMs were issued until 2007, further hindering OIPR's oversight of the investigation.

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 02/21/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180221~~

Cardozo-IOB-176

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [REDACTED]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/2008

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 07/25/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines [REDACTED]

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

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~~SECRET//20180207~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[redacted] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-3730 (U)

(U)

(S) A [redacted] of a non-United States person was properly initiated on [redacted] set to expire on [redacted]. The Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (AGG) that were in effect prior to October 31, 2003, [redacted]

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[redacted] So on [redacted] the [redacted] was extended for a 90-day period, set to expire on [redacted]

(U)

(S) The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), which superceded the AGG and became effective October 31, 2003, authorizes [redacted] to operate for 180-day periods before re-authorization is required. NSIG

[redacted] Consequently, in the instant matter, it appears that the case agent incorrectly believed that his [redacted] was now automatically valid under the NSIG for twelve months, through [redacted]. In reality, however, under the [redacted]

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[redacted] any [redacted] open for less than six months as of October 31, 2003 would run for a total of six months from the date of initiation. Thus the case at issue expired on [redacted]

(U)

(S) Nonetheless, acting under a good faith belief that a valid [redacted] was in effect, [redacted] among other investigative activities in furtherance of the case, engaged in physical surveillance of the subject and issued a National Security Letter on or about [redacted]


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Therefore, [redacted] has violated the NSIG, because impermissible investigative activity occurred under an [redacted]


~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180207~~


~~SECRET//20180207~~
Cardozo-IOB-178

~~SECRET//26180207~~



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(U) ~~(S)~~ With regard to the surveillance, having determined that the surveillance of the subject in the absence of a properly authorized investigation was a violation of the NSIG, we turn to the handling of information acquired thereby. Exclusion is a remedy of judicial origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and, 



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~~SECRET//26180207~~

Cardozo-10B-179

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/20/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: June 15, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines [redacted]

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b7E

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180111~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER

[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-2128 (U)

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b7E

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] (S) Previously on [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] acting on behalf of [REDACTED] requested subscriber information on the correct e-mail address. In response, however, the provider supplied information for the wrong e-mail address. [REDACTED] inadvertently forwarded the wrong information to [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

Derived From : G-3
Declassify on: 01/11/2018
Cardozo-IOB-181

~~SECRET//20180111~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [REDACTED]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

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DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: July 9, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
 Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
 Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
 Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
 Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
 Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
 Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
 Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
 Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
 Section 2.7 contracting
 Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
 Section 2.10 human experimentation
 Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
 Section 2.12 indirect participation
 AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
 Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
 Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: [REDACTED]

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*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180128~~

(U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-3084 (U)

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(U) [REDACTED]

(U) (S) On January 24, 2007, [REDACTED] discovered that it had received data on the wrong subscriber. Upon discovery, [REDACTED] immediately contacted the FBI's technical staff, FBI Headquarters (FBI HQ) and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), and launched an investigation.

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(U) [REDACTED]

b2
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(U) [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(U) (S) Here, [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

[REDACTED] Based upon our analysis, in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of E.O. 12863, the carrier's error is being reported to the IOB because the surveillance resulted in the unintentional acquisition of communications for a subscriber not authorized to be monitored under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or Executive Order 12333.

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify on: 01/28/2018
Cardozo-IOB-183~~

~~SECRET//20180128~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report: _____

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: June 14, 2007

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DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office): _____

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info.
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG-Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

b2
b7E

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION: _____

~~SECRET//20180215~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-3573 (U)

(U)

[REDACTED]

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(U) (S) On [REDACTED] discovered that the telephone number had been reassigned on [REDACTED] to another user, who was not the subject of investigation.

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(U) (S) Upon discovery, [REDACTED] immediately stopped all collection on the account and launched an investigation. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] determined that the overcollection occurred because the carrier failed to notify the FBI that it had reassigned the number to another user. Furthermore, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) The FBI has not produced any reports or received any audio on intercepts collected after the carrier reassigned the number. If not already accomplished, OGC advised [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) (S) Here, the carrier's reassignment of a target's telephone account to another user resulted in the unintentional acquisition of electronic communications. Based upon our analysis, in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of E.O. 12863, the oversight is being reported to the IOB because the surveillance resulted in the unintentional acquisition of communications for a subscriber not authorized to be monitored under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or Executive Order 12333.

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify on: 02/15/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180215 IOB-185~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [REDACTED]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

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DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: September 14, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: FBI [REDACTED] immediately stopped all collection on the account and launched an investigation. If not already accomplished, OGC advised [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180108~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1982 (U)

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b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~ On [REDACTED] discovered that the subscriber of these accounts had changed to other persons who were not the subjects of investigation. The carrier deactivated one account on [REDACTED] and reactivated it on [REDACTED] under a new subscriber. The carrier deactivated the other account on [REDACTED] and reactivated it on [REDACTED] under a new subscriber. In response, [REDACTED] immediately stopped all collection, review and translation of material derived from the wireless accounts.

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(U)

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~ Here, collection on the wireless accounts after the carrier reassigned the accounts to new subscribers resulted in the unintentional acquisition of electronic communications. Based upon our analysis, in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of E.O. 12863, the oversight is being reported to the IOB because the surveillance resulted in the unintentional acquisition of communications from numbers not authorized to be monitored under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or Executive Order 12333.

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify on: 01/09/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180108 IOB-187~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

b2
b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: May 29, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least-intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

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*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180108~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-2125 (U)

(U)

[REDACTED]

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b7E

(U)

(S) On [REDACTED] discovered that the subscriber of these accounts had changed to another non-U.S. person who was not the subject of investigation. The change in subscribers occurred on [REDACTED]. In response, [REDACTED] promptly advised the appropriate Telecommunications Specialist (TS) to stop all collection on the accounts.

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(U)

(S) On [REDACTED] learned that collection on the accounts had not stopped as requested on [REDACTED]. Again, [REDACTED] promptly contacted the TS and requested the immediate cessation of all collection on the two accounts. This time, the TS confirmed that all collection had stopped on [REDACTED].

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(U)

[REDACTED]

(U)

(S) Here, collection on the wireless accounts after there was a change in subscribers resulted in the unintentional acquisition of electronic communications. Based upon our analysis, in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of E.O. 12863, the oversight is being reported to the IOB because the surveillance resulted in the unintentional acquisition of communications from numbers not authorized to be monitored under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or Executive Order 12333.

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify on: 01/08/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180108~~ IOB-189

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [REDACTED]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 7/30/08

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DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: July 26, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

[REDACTED]

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*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//720180103~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1996 (U)

b2
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(U)

[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

(U)

(S) Here, an oversight error during the review of a FISA renewal application resulted in the unintentional acquisition of electronic communications. Based upon our analysis, in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of E.O. 12863, the oversight is being reported to the IOB because the surveillance resulted in the unintentional acquisition of communications from a [REDACTED] not authorized to be monitored under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or Executive Order 12333.

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~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify on: 01/08/2018~~

~~Cardozo-IOB-191~~

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IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [REDACTED]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08 b2 b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: June 20, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: [REDACTED]

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*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-3421 (U)

(U)

[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED]

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(U)

(S) CD is in the process of copying the records, deleting all over-provided data, and saving the redacted working copies onto discs. CD advises it will sequester the original discs in a sealed envelope to be enclosed to the appropriate case file. CD further advises it then will submit the sequestered material to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). If not already accomplished, OGC advised [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U)

(S) Here, an error on the part of a [REDACTED] Based upon our analysis, in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of E.O. 12863, the [REDACTED] mistake is being reported to the IOB because the overproduction [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] to be covered under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or Executive Order 12333.

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify on: 01/31/2018~~

~~Cardozo IOB-193
SECRET//20180131~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [REDACTED]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: October 2, 2007

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DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

OGC advised [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER
[redacted] DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-989NSL (U)

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(U) On 4/4/2007 [redacted] Division [redacted] reported a potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation involving the expiration of a [redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ On [redacted] [redacted] opened a [redacted] on a U.S. person target. The [redacted] expired on [redacted] however, the [redacted] was not renewed. The [redacted] was converted to a [redacted] on [redacted] approximately eight months after the expiration of the [redacted]

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(U)

~~(S)~~ While the [redacted] was lapsed, the case agent conducted spot check surveillance of the subject on a few occasions and also continued to investigate the subject's actions and travel. Accordingly, the case agent conducted investigative activity following the expiration of the [redacted] in violation of the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG). [redacted] Accordingly, this matter is reported to the IOB.

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[redacted]

(U)

handling of information acquired thereby. Exclusion is a remedy of judicial origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and, [redacted]

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[redacted]

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify On: 11/30/2017~~

~~SECRET//20180131~~

Cardozo-IOB-195

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report: _____

DATE OF INCIDENT: 03/02

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/05/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines [REDACTED]

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: FBI/OGC advised [REDACTED]

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*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION: 11/14/07

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER

[REDACTED] DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-1053NSL/(U)

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b7E

(U) On 3/28/2007 [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] reported a potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation involving the expiration of a [REDACTED]

(U) (S) On [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] on a U.S. person target. The [REDACTED] was appropriately extended on a few occasions. However, the [REDACTED] expired on [REDACTED] and was not renewed by the Counterintelligence Division until [REDACTED]

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(U) (S) While the [REDACTED] was lapsed, the case agent sought and obtained approval to conduct a trash cover at the target's residence. In [REDACTED] trash was obtained and documented. The [REDACTED] subsequently was closed on [REDACTED]

(U) (S) [REDACTED] of the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG). A [REDACTED] must be open in order to conduct a trash cover; it may not be conducted under a [REDACTED]. Accordingly, this matter is reported to the IOB.

(U) (S) [REDACTED] PI has lapsed was a violation of the NSIG, we turn to the handling of information acquired thereby. Exclusion is a remedy of judicial origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify On: 11/29/2017~~

~~SECRET//20180131
Cardozo-IOB-197~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: 01/04

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 2/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 03/28/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines [REDACTED]

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY):

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: FBI/OGC advised [REDACTED]

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b7E

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION: 11/14/07

Cardozo-IOB-198

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER
[REDACTED] DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-1054NSL (U)

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b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ On 3/27/2007 [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] reported a potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation involving the expiration of a [REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~ On [REDACTED] [REDACTED] reopened a [REDACTED] on a U.S. person target. The [REDACTED] expired on [REDACTED] but was not closed by the case agent until [REDACTED]. After the [REDACTED] had expired, the case agent conducted an interview of the subject of the investigation.

(U)

~~(S)~~ Consequently, [REDACTED] of the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG). [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Having determined that the interview of the subject conducted after a PI has lapsed was a violation of the NSIG, we turn to the handling of information acquired thereby. Exclusion is a remedy of judicial origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and, [REDACTED]

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b5
b7E

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify On: 11/29/2017~~

~~SECRET//20180131
Cardozo IOB-199~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: 06/03

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 04/30/09

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 03/27/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines [REDACTED]

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: FBI/OGC advised [REDACTED]

b2
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*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION: 11/14/07

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER
[REDACTED] DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-1196NSL (U)

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b7E

(U) On 4/9/2007 [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] reported a potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation involving the expiration of a [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ On [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] on a U.S. person target. The [REDACTED] requested an extension from FBI Headquarters but was denied. The [REDACTED] was not closed by [REDACTED] until [REDACTED]. After the [REDACTED] had expired, [REDACTED] continued to conduct investigation of the target, including physical surveillance and source tasking.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Consequently, [REDACTED] of the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG). A [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Having determined that the surveillance of the subject and the source reporting after a PI has lapsed were violations of the NSIG, we turn to the handling of information acquired thereby. Exclusion is a remedy of judicial origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and,

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~~Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 01/31/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180131
Cardozo-IOB-201~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report: 1st Q 2008

DATE OF INCIDENT: 2006

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: April 30, 2008

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY:

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation):

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
 Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
 Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
 Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

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b7E

OTHER

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: The Office of the General Counsel reported this matter to the IOB and instructed the field office of the

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER
[REDACTED] DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-1976 (U)

(U) On 05/22/2007 [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] reported a potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation involving the expiration of a [REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ On [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] on a U.S. person target. The [REDACTED] expired on [REDACTED] but was not closed until [REDACTED]. After the [REDACTED] had expired, the case agent continued to conduct physical surveillance of the target.

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Having determined that the surveillance of the subject and the source reporting after a PI has lapsed were violations of the NSIG, we turn to the handling of information acquired thereby. Exclusion is a remedy of judicial origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and,

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b7E

[REDACTED]

~~Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 01/31/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180131
Cardozo IOB-203~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: 12/06

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 05/22/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines [REDACTED]

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: FBI/OGC advised [REDACTED]

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b7E

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION: 11/14/07

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[redacted] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1089 (U)

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b7E

(U) On April 09, 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [redacted] Field Office [redacted] reported a potential IOB error in conjunction with a closed [redacted] of two United States Persons.

(U) ~~(S)~~ On [redacted] two [redacted] citizens, apparently tourists, walked into the [redacted] police station to report their involvement in a single vehicle automobile accident. Background information confirmed that both tourists were admitted to the US on [redacted] through [redacted] airport. After entering through [redacted] the tourists traveled to [redacted] where the pair borrowed a vehicle belonging to two US citizens. The tourists were apparently using the car to tour the US and eventually made their way to [redacted] in [redacted] where the accident occurred. Thereafter, the [redacted] County Sheriff's Office [redacted] became involved and conducted a search of the vehicle with negative results, but for a picture of the two tourists holding an automatic weapon. Criminal background checks on both subjects were negative. The [redacted] provided this information in a police report to the FBI.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Based upon the [redacted] report, the FBI checked various database indices for both parties and found nothing of concern. The FBI then advised the [redacted] that there was not sufficient information to hold the pair and advised they be released.

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b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ However, on [redacted] opened a [redacted] [redacted] on the vehicle owners from [redacted]. While the case was opened as a [redacted] it was not given priority attention as there was no documented investigative activity performed before its closing less than a year later in [redacted].

(U) ~~(S)~~ In review, OGC determined [redacted]
[redacted]

b2
b5
b7E

Cardozo-IOB-205

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [REDACTED]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

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b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: April 9, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: 18 USC 2709 (ECPA))

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines [REDACTED]

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OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

Field Office closed the [REDACTED] Reported Attorney
General's Guidelines violation to the Intelligence Oversight Board.

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*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER:
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1487 (U)

b2
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ On March 27, 2007, the [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] reported a potential IOB error in conjunction with its ongoing [REDACTED] of a United States Person.

(S) During this investigation, on [REDACTED] requested a six-month extension of FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ). The [REDACTED] was set to expire on [REDACTED]. FBIHQ did not approve the extension until [REDACTED] approximately two and a half months after the request. In this interim period of authorization, [REDACTED] issued a Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) National Security Letter (NSL) to a bank for financial records related to the subject of the investigation. The bank complied with the request and forwarded records for the subject's financial accounts to [REDACTED]. As the [REDACTED] was not properly authorized when the NSL request was sent, and NSLs are a specific investigative technique authorized under a [REDACTED] issued the NSL in contravention of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG) and the RFPA, and therefore is being reported to the IOB.

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(U)

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] has been advised to either return or destroy the unintentionally acquired information, based on the bank's preference. If the records were uploaded to an FBI database or used in conjunction with any FBI investigation, [REDACTED] must remove the information from the database(s) upon receipt of this b2 EC. If the information is relevant to an open investigation, b7E [REDACTED] may issue a new NSL requesting this information, but the present collection must first be destroyed or returned as described above.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: ~~Original IOB 207~~

~~SECRET//20180131~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

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DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 3/27/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: 12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A), Right to Financial Privacy Act)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

Issue new authorized NSL or purge records.

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] DIVISION,
IOB MATTER 2007-929 (U)

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(U)

(S) The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] has determined that in conducting a counterintelligence investigation on a United States person that a reportable issue has occurred in the authorization of the investigation.

(U)

(S) [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] on the target on [REDACTED] that expired on [REDACTED]. The case agent in charge of this case was assigned to a temporary duty assignment from [REDACTED]. The case agent attempted to request a six month extension and place the case in a "pending inactive status" during this period. Believing the extension and 'pending inactive status' requests were appropriate, the case agent resumed investigation upon return. During the time when the investigation was expired (not properly authorized), [REDACTED] among other investigative activities, conducted physical surveillance of the subject.

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[REDACTED]

(U)

(S) [REDACTED] we turn to the handling of information acquired thereby. [REDACTED] is a remedy of judicial origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

~~(S) Derived from G-3
Declassify on: 12/28/2017~~

(U)

~~SECRET//20180131
Cardozo IOB-209~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-06-2010 BY 65179/DMH/sdb IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 12/31/2007 4/20/08

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DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 4/11/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
 Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines (Guidelines name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
 Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
 Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Reported to the IOB

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

Cardozo-IOB-210

~~SECRET//20180130~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1250 (U)

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b7E

(U) On April 4, 2007, the [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] reported investigative activity occurring against a United States person after the investigation was closed.

(U)

(S) In this matter, [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] Pursuant to FBI policy, the target was entered into the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] correctly conducted the investigation and closed the investigation on [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] learned the target left the country. On [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received apparent confirmation that the target's record had been deleted from [REDACTED] However, on or about [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(U)

(S) [REDACTED] of the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG). A [REDACTED] must be open in order to request a secondary inspection by the Customs and Border patrol; it may not be conducted under a threat assessment. Accordingly, this matter is reported to the IOB.

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~~Derived From: G-3
Declassify on: 01/30/2018~~

Cardozo-IOB-211

~~SECRET//20180130~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

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b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/05/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-861-NSL (U)

(U)

~~(S)~~ On [REDACTED] initiated a [REDACTED] of a U.S. person. The [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

On [REDACTED] FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) granted [REDACTED] an extension through [REDACTED]. Rather than obtain approval for an additional extension, [REDACTED] subsequently extended the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] conducted a [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Such investigative activity is not permitted in the absence of either a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~ We now turn to the handling of the information acquired from the pretext interview. Exclusion is a remedy of judicial origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U)

~~(S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 01/31/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180131~~
Cardozo-IOB-213

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

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b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/07/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180130~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1582 (U)

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(U)

~~(S)~~ By electronic communication ("EC") dated April 05, 2007, the [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] reported a potential IOB error in conjunction with its open [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of a United States Person.

(U)

[REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] we turn to the handling of information acquired thereby. Exclusion is a remedy of judicial origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and [REDACTED]

b2
b5
b7E

[REDACTED]

~~Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 01/30/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180130
Cardozo-IOB-215~~

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/3/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 4/5/2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info.

b2

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

b7E

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to-law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180208~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[redacted] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-927NSL (U)

b2
b7E

(U) On [redacted] the Federal Bureau of Investigation, [redacted] Field Office [redacted] initiated a [redacted] on a United States person. The [redacted] expired on [redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ In [redacted] the Case Agent requested a six-month extension of the investigation. The extension was improperly

[redacted] of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), [redacted]

[redacted] Accordingly, the investigation was improperly extended.

(U)

~~(S)~~ Following the purported extension, [redacted] conducted physical surveillance of the target's residence. Under the NSIG, a [redacted] is required to conduct physical, photographic, and video surveillance (where such surveillance does not required unconsented entry), including use of such surveillance to identify an individual in contact with the subject of the investigation. NSIG, [redacted]

b2
b7E

(U)

[redacted]

b2
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ OGC has advised [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b2
b5
b7E

[redacted] the incident must be reported to OGC as a possible IOB matter.

(U) ~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: 2018/02/08~~

~~SECRET//20171221~~
Cardozo-IOB-217

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI.

CY Quarterly Report: 1st Q 2008

DATE OF INCIDENT:

b2
b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: April 11, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: The Office of the General Counsel has advised

b2
b5
b7E

IOB matter

the incident must be reported to OGC as a possible

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180116~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] DIVISION,
IOB MATTER 2007-1353 (U)

b2
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ During a [REDACTED] of a United States person opened on [REDACTED] never submitted the required 10-day notice of initiation of a national security investigation (NSI) or provided the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) any other notice of the investigation as required by the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) In light of the fact that OIPR was not notified of this investigation at all during the time it was open, the FBI has concluded that the lack of notice substantially impaired OIPR's ability to oversee the investigation. Therefore, the FBI is reporting this matter to the IOB.

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 01/16/2018~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/sdb
ON 05-10-2010

~~SECRET//20180116~~

Cardozo-IOB-219

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [REDACTED]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: ~~December 31, 2007~~ 4/30/09

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: April 10, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

b2
b7E

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines [REDACTED]

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Reported to the IOB

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180116~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] DIVISION,
IOB MATTER 2007-960-NSL(U)

b2
b7E

(U) On [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] on a
U.S. person. After a six month extension, the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] 17 days
after the expiration of the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] conducted a trash cover of the subject's residence.

(U)

(S) This matter is being reported because [REDACTED]
conducted a trash cover after the expiration of the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Such investigative activity is not permitted in
the absence of either a [REDACTED] as
required by the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National
Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection
(NSIG).

b2
b7E

(U) (S) We now turn to the handling of the information
acquired from the trash cover. Exclusion is a remedy of judicial
origin created to address violations of constitutional dimension.
In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this
instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has
been violated and, [REDACTED]

b2
b5
b7E

[REDACTED]

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 01/16/2018~~

~~SECRET//20160116~~

Cardozo IOB-221

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: June 10, 2005

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: December 31, 2006

4/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 Guidelines [REDACTED]

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Reported to the IOB

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180207~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1598 (U)

b2
b7E

(U) By electronic communication (EC) dated April 9, 2007, the [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] reported this potential IOB error in conjunction with an open [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of a United States Person.

(U) (S) On [REDACTED] initiated a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of a United States Person under the approval of a Supervisory Special Agent rather than the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) or Assistant SAC (ASAC).

(U) (S) [REDACTED] of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, clearly requires SAC or ASAC approval in this instance. b2 b7E

(U) (S) In addition, among other investigative activities, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] issued National Security Letters (NSL's) on January 7, 2005, March 24, 2005, and October 3, 2005. NSLs are an investigative technique permissible by [REDACTED] only in furtherance of a properly authorized [REDACTED] [REDACTED] b2 b7E

(U) (S) The ASAC has since reviewed and approved, retroactively, the opening EC, thus ensuring that the original predicate was sufficient for opening a [REDACTED]

(U) The field office has been instructed to purge its electronic databases of these NSL collections, and either return or destroy the results, in accordance with the provider's instructions, with appropriate documentation to file. Then, if these collections remain relevant to an ongoing investigation, the field office may issue new NSLs to request the records anew.

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180207~~

~~SECRET//20180207~~

Cardozo-IOB-223

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

b2
b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/09/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- X AG Approved EO 12333

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Return or destroy

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180207~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1728 (U)

b2
b7E

(U) By electronic communication (EC) dated May 14, 2007, the [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] reported this potential IOB error in a counterintelligence investigation of a United States Person.

(S) A [REDACTED] of a U.S. person was initiated on [REDACTED] with only [REDACTED] Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) approval, the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was extended on [REDACTED] and converted to a [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(S) Except under specific conditions not present in this case, The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG) [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(S) In addition, among other investigative activities, [REDACTED] issued three National Security Letters (NSLs) during the course of the unauthorized investigation periods. An NSL is an investigative technique permissible by [REDACTED] only in furtherance of a properly authorized [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(U) The field office has been instructed to purge its electronic databases of these NSL collections, and either return or destroy the results, in accordance with the provider's instructions, with appropriate documentation to file. Then, if these collections remain relevant to an ongoing investigation, the field office may issue a new NSL to request the records anew.

(S) [REDACTED] has been further instructed to have the SAC or ASAC review the opening EC to ensure that the predicates were sufficient first for extending the [REDACTED] and then for converting it to a [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

~~Derived from G-3
Declassify on: 20180207~~

~~SECRET//20180207~~

Cardozo-IOB-225

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

b2
b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 05/14/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation:)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation:)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation:)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Return or destroy

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180207~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1600 (U)

b2
b7E

(U) By electronic communication (EC) dated April 9, 2007, the [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED] reported this potential IOB error in conjunction with an open [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of a United States Person.

(U) (S) On [REDACTED] initiated a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of a United States Person under the approval of a Supervisory Special Agent rather than the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) or Assistant SAC (ASAC).

(U) (S) [REDACTED] of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(U) (S) In addition, [REDACTED] on September 9, 2006, served an NSL to obtain the target's credit history, an investigative technique permissible by [REDACTED] only in furtherance of a properly authorized [REDACTED]

(U) (S) The ASAC has since reviewed and approved, retroactively, the opening EC, thus ensuring that the original predicate was sufficient for opening a [REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(U) The field office has been instructed to purge its electronic databases of this NSL collection, and either return or destroy the results, in accordance with the provider's instructions, with appropriate documentation to file. Then, if the collection remains relevant to an ongoing investigation, the field office may issue a new NSL to request the records anew.

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180207~~

~~SECRET//20180207~~

Cardozo-IOB-227

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

b2
b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/09/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Return or destroy

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180131~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] DIVISION,
IOB MATTER 2007-1670 (U)

(U) On [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in conjunction with its investigation of a
presumed United States person as that term is defined in the
Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security. [REDACTED]
failed to file the required LHM at the time the case was opened.

b2
b7E

(U)

[REDACTED] This Section was designed in part to protect
the rights of individuals by allowing OIPR investigatory
oversight. If a violation of this provision has "substantially
impaired" OIPR's oversight ability, the FBI must report the
violation to the IOB.

(U) In light of the fact that OIPR was never notified
of this investigation, OGC concludes that this lack of notice
substantially deprived OIPR of the opportunity to provide
oversight of the investigation.

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180131~~

~~SECRET//20180131~~

Cardozo IOB-229

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

b2
b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: May 9, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180130~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER

[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE

(U) IOB MATTERS 2007-3180-, -3758-, -3199-, -3757-, -3756-NSL (U)

(S) ~~(S)~~ The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has determined that in conducting investigations of various subjects, [REDACTED] failed to file annual Letterhead Memoranda (LHMs) as required by Attorney General Guidelines.

b2
b7E

(S) ~~(S)~~ On or about [REDACTED] opened an investigation [REDACTED] a United States Person as that term is used in Section 101(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). The investigation closed on [REDACTED]. At least since the inception of the October 31, 2003 Attorney General Guidelines to the case closing, no LHMs were filed in this case. On or about [REDACTED] opened an

b1
b2
b7E

(S) investigation [REDACTED] a non-USP. The investigation closed on [REDACTED]. There were no LHMs filed. On or about [REDACTED] opened an investigation [REDACTED] a USP. The investigation closed on [REDACTED]. There were no LHMs filed, except an opening LHM. On or about [REDACTED] opened an investigation of [REDACTED] a

(S)

(S) USP. The investigation closed on [REDACTED]. Since the inception of the October 31, 2003 Attorney General Guidelines to the case closing, no LHMs were filed. On or about [REDACTED] opened an investigation [REDACTED] a non-USP. The investigation closed on [REDACTED]. At least since the inception of the October 31, 2003 Attorney General Guidelines to the case closing, no LHMs were filed.

b1
b2
b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ The failure to file annual LHMs was a violation of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] While not every such violation is worthy of reporting to the IOB, in this instance, the pattern of conduct was such that OGC believes that these matters should be reported to the IOB.

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 01/30/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180130~~

Cardozo-IOB-231

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI OGC

CY Quarterly Report: 2007 1st Q 2008

DATE OF INCIDENT: various

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 08/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/05/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: 18 USC 2709)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333

b2
b7E

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Advised field that pattern of failing to file LHMs was being reported to IOB.

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

~~SECRET//20180208~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1402 (U)

b2
b7E

(U) The [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] investigation. No notification of this investigation was forwarded to FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), nor were annual investigative summaries documented in this case until its closing in 2007.

(U)

[REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(U)

(S) The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(U) Under the relevant Guidelines, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b2
b7E

(U) Because OIPR was not provided notice at the inception of the investigation, nor was it provided timely annual notice of the ongoing investigation, its oversight ability was substantially impaired. The case is now closed.

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 02/08/2018~~

~~SECRET//20180208~~

Cardozo-IOB-233

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: January 9, 2003

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/03

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: March 26, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

- FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)
- Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

- Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info
- Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection
- Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US
- Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US
- Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US
- Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad
- Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad
- Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement
- Section 2.7 contracting
- Section 2.9 undisclosed participation
- Section 2.10 human experimentation
- Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination
- Section 2.12 indirect participation
- AG Approved EO 12333: [REDACTED]

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

- Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)
- Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

- COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION
- Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

b2
b7E

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INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[redacted] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1590 (U)

b2
b7E

(U) By electronic communication (EC) dated April 9, 2007, the [redacted] Field Office [redacted] reported this potential IOB error in conjunction with an open [redacted] [redacted] of a United States Person.

(U) ~~(S)~~ On [redacted] initiated a [redacted] [redacted] of a United States Person under the approval of a Supervisory Special Agent rather than the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) or Assistant SAC (ASAC).

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, [redacted]

b2
b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ In addition, [redacted] engaged in physical surveillance of the target, [redacted] [redacted] only in furtherance of a properly authorized [redacted]. The ASAC has since reviewed and approved, retroactively, the opening EC, thus ensuring that the original predicate was sufficient for opening a [redacted]

b2
b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [redacted] we turn to the handling of information acquired thereby. [redacted] created to address violations of constitutional dimension. In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provide for an exclusionary rule. In this instance, neither the Constitution nor any applicable statute has been violated and, [redacted]

b2
b5
b7E

[redacted]

Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180207

~~SECRET//20180207~~
Cardozo-IOB-235

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT:

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

b2
b7E

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: 04/09/07

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation):

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION: Return or destroy

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

Cardozo-IOB-236

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INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] FIELD OFFICE
IOB MATTER 2007-1140 (U)

b2
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ A [REDACTED] of a United States person was properly initiated on [REDACTED] and properly extended for an additional six months on [REDACTED]. The initiation and extension were approved by the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), with contemporaneous notification to FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ). The [REDACTED] was extended again on [REDACTED] the one-year anniversary, again with SAC approval and contemporaneous FBIHQ notification. On [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was initiated. This matter is presented as a potential IOB because the second [REDACTED] extension was approved by the SAC, rather than by FBIHQ. Between the second [REDACTED] extension on [REDACTED] and the conversion to a [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] issued five National Security Letters (NSL's) in furtherance of the case.

b2
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~ Here, the [REDACTED] SAC approved an extension of a [REDACTED] beyond the initial one-year period, instead of FBIHQ, and [REDACTED] issued five NSL's in violation of [REDACTED]. That [REDACTED] provided contemporaneous actual notice of the extension to FBIHQ is not tantamount to FBIHQ approval.

b2
b7E

(U) The field office has been instructed to purge its electronic databases of these NSL collections, and either return or destroy the results, in accordance with the provider's instructions, with appropriate documentation to file. Then, if these collections remain relevant to an ongoing investigation, the field office may issue new NSL's to request the records anew.

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180207~~

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Cardozo-IOB-237

IOB SUMMARY SHEET

Name of Department or Agency: FBI

CY Quarterly Report:

DATE OF INCIDENT: [REDACTED]

DATE OF REPORT TO IOB: 4/30/08

DATE OF REPORT TO DEPARTMENT/AGENCY: April 5, 2007

DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO OTHER ENTITY (i.e., DoJ, Congress, Civil Liberties Office):

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF:

STATUTE (United States Code Citation)

FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801)

Other

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13333:

Section 2.3 collection & dissemination of USP info

Section 2.4 preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a) CIA electronic surveillance w/in US

Section 2.4(b) unconsented physical search w/in US

Section 2.4(c) physical surveillance of USP w/in US

Section 2.4(d) physical surveillance of USP abroad

Section 2.5 AG approval w/in US or against USP abroad

Section 2.6 assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7 contracting

Section 2.9 undisclosed participation

Section 2.10 human experimentation

Section 2.11 prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12 indirect participation

AG Approved EO 12333 [REDACTED]

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other (EO citation: _____)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)

COVERT ACTION FINDING/MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other (Presidential Directive citation: _____)

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY ACTION:

*DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION:

b2
b7E

~~SECRET//20180207~~

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER
[REDACTED] DIVISION
IOB MATTER 2007-1312 (U)

b2
b7E

(U) The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has determined that actions taken by FBI's [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] during a [REDACTED] of a United States person should be reported to the IOB.

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] opened a [REDACTED] of a U.S. person on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] converted this [REDACTED] On [REDACTED] subsequent to the expiration but prior to the conversion, [REDACTED] issued a National Security Letter (NSL). b2 b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ The issuance of an NSL is lawful only when in furtherance of an authorized investigation. In the matter at hand, the investigation had lapsed at the time the NSL was issued. Thus this matter must be reported to the IOB.

(U) The field office has been instructed to purge its electronic databases of this NSL collection, and either return or destroy the results, in accordance with the provider's instructions, with appropriate documentation to file. Then, if the collection remains relevant to an ongoing investigation, the field office may issue a new NSL to request the records anew.

DECLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/sdb
ON 05-10-2010

~~Derived from: G-3
Declassify on: 20180207~~

~~SECRET//20180207~~

Cardozo-IOB-239