



MARCIA HOFMANN ESQ  
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION  
454 SHOTWELL STREET  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94110

April 8, 2008

Subject: INVESTIGATIVE DATA WAREHOUSE

FOIPA No. 1058805- 000

Dear Ms. Hofmann:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

**Section 552**

**Section 552a**

- |  |   |                                 |
|--|---|---------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(2) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3) _____      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1) |
| _____                                      | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2) |
| _____                                      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3) |
| _____                                      | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(5) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6) |   | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

184 page(s) were reviewed and 173 page(s) are being released.

- Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:
  - referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
  - referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).

If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,



David M. Hardy  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

The enclosed documents represent the fourth of a series of interim releases that will be made with regard to your request pertaining to the Investigative Data Warehouse.

For your information, some of the enclosed pages contain information about other subject matters. We consider this information "outside the scope" of your request, and have redacted the information and marked it as "Outside the Scope".

The first page of this correspondence reflects that 184 pages were reviewed for this release. There were actually 1076 pages reviewed, however a further review determined that 888 pages of this material are not responsive to this request.

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
***PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE***

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-01-2007 BY 65179 DMH/BJA/CAL

1058805



**SYSTEM**

**CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS)**

**INVESTIGATIVE DATA WAREHOUSE (IDW)**

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26 March 2004  
Version 3

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) provides FBI users with the capability to view, query, search, retrieve, correlate, integrate, synthesize, share, and protect information from multiple data sources in support of intelligence and investigative activities. As a single point of entry for accessing both FBI data and non-FBI data, IDW provides FBI users with information needed to successfully accomplish the FBI's counter-crime, counter-intelligence, and counter-terrorism missions.

This Concept of Operations (CONOPS) documents IDW as an evolving family of systems that will provide near- and long-term operational and developmental capabilities to the FBI. When fully deployed, IDW will include four (4) systems:

- The IDW Secret-level operational system (IDW-S) consists of those builds which have undergone appropriate security and operational testing and have been approved by the responsible FBI authorities for operational use. IDW-S V1.0 received Interim Authority to Operate (IATO) on January 23, 2004 and began operations for approved users over FBI Net on January 25, 2004. IDW-S V2 is currently being developed.
- The IDW Integration system (IDW-I) is a Secret-level representation of IDW-S that serves as an environment in which maintenance fixes and proposed new capabilities can be realistically tested before being released into IDW-S.
- IDW-TS/SCI is a version of IDW-S that, when built, will be approved for data that is classified as Top Secret and/or Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI). It should be noted that because the IDW Program has given high priority to IDW-S, the IDW-TS/SCI system is currently in the definition stage.
- The IDW Development system (IDW-D) is an Unclassified prototyping environment used to facilitate experimentation with proposed new IDW technologies.

This initial IDW CONOPS is focused on IDW-S and IDW-I, the two IDW systems currently developed. As noted above, IDW-S operates under an IATO, whereas IDW-I will operate under an Interim Authority to Test (IATT). This is appropriate to the role of IDW-S as an operational system with a general user base and to the intended role of IDW-I as a test environment. This CONOPS identifies all major IDW system processes and internal and external interfaces. It provides an overview of the IDW-S conceptual design and a high-level description of IDW system requirements. This IDW CONOPS is intended to complement other IDW Program documentation, in particular the IDW Program Management Plan, the IDW-S System Security Plan, and the Target IDW/Virtual Case File (VCF) Business Architecture.

SECTION 3

DESCRIPTION OF THE IDW PROJECT

Pertinent details regarding the IDW project are:

**Project Name:** Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)

**Account Identification Code:** 15-0200-0-1-999,

**Project Initiation Date:** March 2003,

**Project Planned Completion Date:** December 2006 (As the Master Data Warehouse<sup>1</sup>).

As a single point of entry for accessing investigative data sources, IDW provides FBI users with the capability to readily acquire, store, share, use, disseminate, and protect the information needed to successfully accomplish their assignments and the FBI's overlapping missions in intelligence, counter-terrorism, and criminal investigations.

The IDW system environment consists of a collection of UNIX and NT servers that provide secure access to a family of very large-scale storage devices. The servers provide application, web servers, relational database servers, and security filtering servers. User desktop units that have access to FBINet can access the IDW web application. This provides browser-based access to the central databases and their access control units. The environment is configured so that the FBI analytic and investigative users can access any of the data sources and analytic capabilities of the system for which they are authorized. The entire configuration is scalable to enable expansion as more data sources and capabilities are added.


The FBI currently owns or has access to over 30 information technology systems and well over 100 enterprise level applications that support investigative functions. At the user level, the number of databases containing case-centric intelligence is estimated to be in the thousands, a number that has increased largely due to the lack of an enterprise-wide application for data analysis. The IDW project initiative will ultimately integrate many of the underlying system data sources into a single Investigative Data Warehouse that will support data mining and target searching of both FBI data and data from external sources. The project will also support the selective sharing of data with other Federal agencies as part of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Horizontal Information Sharing Initiative and the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The data warehouse capability will permit the abundance of this investigative data to be shared on an FBI-wide basis, providing a complete data picture to analysts and agents.

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<sup>1</sup> The Master Data Warehouse is the next generation investigative warehouse which expands the analytical tool capabilities and includes administrative data sets so that the FBI can adequately evaluate return on investment in applying resources to investigative programs.

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the following data sets:

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
- Approved case files from the FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS) case management system,
- Electronic versions of the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry (JICI) archived documents,
- Secure Automated Messaging Network (SAMNet) message traffic;
- IntelPlus File Rooms (IDW V1.0 does not currently update this information),
- Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) data from the Criminal Justice Information Systems (CJIS) Division (IDW V1.0 does not currently update this information).



following additional databases and/or data sources:

- [Redacted] - Data provided from FINCEN system
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- Virtual Case File (VCF)
- [Redacted]


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
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IDW-I data includes the same data sets present on IDW-S:


Outside the Scope

- Approved case files from the FBI's ACS case management system,
- Electronic versions of the JICI defined archived documents,
- SAMNet message traffic;
- IntelPlus File Rooms,
- VGTOF data from the CJIS Division,
- Translingual Information Detection, Extraction and Summarization (TIDES) Program Open Source News Data




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**Figure 5-2 Data Ingest Data Transformation Process**

The ingested data is transformed from a source structure to a staging structure to provide more efficient searches and database organization (see Figure 5-2). During the transformation process, the data obtained from multiple sources is integrated so that relationships between the several data elements of the original data source can be established. The new structure provides the basis for analysis by the BI tools. In addition to the transformation, the Data Ingest analyzes the data quality and will maintain this metric for manual use by the analysts and automated use by the analysis tools.



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



The SDMA component of the IDW-S system will process and manage all structured data by providing the following major processes:

- Store and manage structured data from all external and legacy systems (IDW V2 will initially include VCF, VGTOF, [redacted] UNI, and [redacted] and other future data sources. This data will be provided to SDMA by Data Ingest.
- Store and manage unstructured data as part of the IDW Data Store.

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


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### 6.3 Manage and Analyze Unstructured Data

The unstructured data management and analysis subsystem (UDMA) provides functionality for storing, indexing, searching, and extracting information from unstructured information. This unstructured information is documented and associated with the document's metadata. The initial data sources for IDW UDMA are: ACS/VCF, INTEL+/JICI, SAMNET, and  data, however, except for some key metadata that are captured for these sources there is nothing unique about the unstructured data handled by this subsystem. UDMA will be designed to work with most any unstructured data source.

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



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
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

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Data Ingest, including: VCF, SAMNET, Intel

Plus, JICI, and 




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**6.10 Data Sources**

The IDW V2 system will provide one web-based interface to the user thereby allowing access to any of nine data sources with an access control system applying to all of the data sources in order to conduct global searching and analysis. These sources include four that are structured ( [redacted] VGTOF [redacted] and [redacted] ) and five that are unstructured ( VCF, Intel+, JICI, SAMNet [redacted] ). Versions of IDW beyond V2 will support the processing from additional data sources.

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


The users have requested that IDW system support searches of the following databases. Some of these are currently not funded:

- Legacy Systems
  - SAMNet-S
  - JICI
  - ACS or VCF (since VCF is planned to replace ACS)
  - VGTOF
  - [Redacted]
  - [Redacted]
  - [Redacted]
  - IntelPlus
  - FINCEN - [Redacted]

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

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


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**APPENDIX B**  
**Document References**

- Department of Justice (DOJ) System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Guidance Document
- SCOPE Concept of Operations, September 2002.
- Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FY2004 Exhibit 300 Capital Asset Plan, Secure Counter-terrorism Operational Prototype Environment (SCOPE) Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW), July, 2002 version.
- *"FBI Data Warehousing, Data Mining & Collaboration: An Enterprise View of Data"* a public briefing 5/30/03. Mr. Kenneth Ritchhart, Section Chief, Data Engineering & Integration Program Management Office.
- System Requirements Document, Investigative Data Warehouse, version 9, dated March 24, 2004
- Investigative Data Warehouse Business CONOPS, version 1.0, dated February 2, 2004
- System Security Plan (SSP) for the Investigative data Warehouse – Secret (IDW-S), Version 0.9, dated January 8, 2004
- System Engineering Management Plan (SEMP), Final Draft, version 1.3, dated March 17, 2004
- Unstructured Data Management and Analysis Subsystem Design Document, draft document dated February 17, 2004
- Structured Data Management and Analysis Subsystem Design Document, draft document, version 1.2, dated February 25, 2004
- Data Ingest Subsystem High-Level Design Specification, Version 0.4, dated February 4, 2004

**APPENDIX D**  
**Data Source Descriptions**

**D.1 VGTOF: Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File**


Since September 11, 2001, Director Mueller has directed field offices of the FBI to place the subjects of open terrorism related investigations into the FBI's Terrorism Watch List which is part of the Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) maintained by the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC). The Terrorism Watch List is currently the Counterterrorism Division's integrated listing of lone terrorists, or terrorist groups, of investigative interest to the FBI.

The subjects of counterterrorism investigations are being added to the file daily and are accessed by other Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies whenever these agencies access the system for the purpose of running criminal history checks on individuals of interest to their own investigations (i.e., during routine traffic stops). When accessed by an officer, an application used with the database is capable of automatically notifying the officer that the name is of interest to the FBI and should be treated with caution. The system can provide further instructions such as requesting the officer to notify the FBI of the reason for the inquiry.

The purpose of the data base is to share pertinent biographical information with other Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies for officer safety and mutual investigative interest.

The Terrorism Watch List (VGTOF) is in the process of being consolidated into a single data base managed by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the recently announced Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).

D.2



The application is also used as an analytical tool and a source for intelligence information.

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D.3 [redacted]

[redacted] is an investigative tool that also serves as the central repository for [redacted] data obtained throughout the course of an FBI investigation, to include [redacted]. The [redacted] source data is in part obtained from FBI operations.

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D.4 [redacted]

This is actually a dual program [redacted] serving as one repository.

[redacted]

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provides the ability [redacted] within various criteria and provides statistical reports. [redacted] is the repository for [redacted] provided to the FBI by FINCEN.

**D.5 VCF: Virtual Case File**

This will be the central repository for FBI investigations. It is currently under development and is expected to become operational by the end of 2004. The VCF system will be a structured central database supporting investigative activities enterprise-wide. The database will contain relevant data to all cases opened for investigation including court files and related law-enforcement information from state and local field office sources. Due to security and access control challenges and programmatic constraints, current plans are for the IDW system to use a subset of the entire VCF content. This subset of VCF content will be consistent with the case classification restrictions, and other (Federal Grand Jury, Federal Taxpayer Information, Bank Secrecy Act Information) restrictions which are currently on ACS documents being copied into the IDW.

**D.6. SAMNET: Secure Automated Message Network**

This system is used to transmit and receive messages from the Intelligence Community and other agencies. SAMNET is also used by Legat Offices, and Field and Headquarters Divisions to exchange messages up to the TS/SCI level. The system is being modernized to include a migration to the Defense Message System (DMS), and replacement of an existing manual method of printing and delivering paper, with electronic delivery to the

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appropriate desktop, based on functional profile. SAMNET information can be from DoD and other Intelligence Community sources.

**D.7 JICI: Joint Intelligence Community Inquiry**

This is a static collection of anti-terrorist files collected from FBI field office files following 9/11. The collection represents a historical record of field office files and is not currently updated on a regular basis. The files are searched for target words usually in conjunction with other associated databases.

**D.8 IntelPlus: Intelligence Plus**

This is an application which allows the users to view "Table of Contents" lists from large collections of records in various formats. The user is able to display the document whether it is in text form or one of several graphic formats and then print, copy or store the information. The application allows researchers in tracking associated documents by assisting the user on going to related topics and provides a convenient search capability. The Intel Plus application is currently organized around six separate counterterrorism collections:

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

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**D.9** [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The service is available to government organizations.

Table 2 Data Ingest Initiated Transaction

Item #	Ingest Initiated Transaction	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Record Size (average)	Reference HLF
1	Ingest data from external source							REQT30
2	Ingest data from ACS/CF							REQT30.1
3	Ingest data from VGTOF							REQT30.2
4	Ingest data from SAMNET-S							REQT30.3
5	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.4
6	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.5
7	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.6
8	Ingest data from IntelPlus							REQT30.7
9	Ingest data from [redacted] from the field							REQT30.8
10	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.9
11	Ingest data from JICI							REQT30.11
12	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.12
13	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.13
14	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.14
15	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.15
16	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.16

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**Table 2 Ingest Initiated Transaction**

Item #	Ingest Initiated Transaction	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Record Size (average)	Reference HLFR
17	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.17
18	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.18
19	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.19
20	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.20
21	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.21
22	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.22
23	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.23
24	Ingest data from [redacted]							REQT30.24

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Table 2 Ingest Initiated Transaction

Item #	Ingest Initiated Transaction	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Record Size (average)	Reference HLF
25	Ingest data from FinCen - [redacted] Information.							REQT30.25
26	Ingest selectively from FinCen Data							REQT65.2
27	Ingest selectively [redacted]							REQT65.3
28	Ingest selectively [redacted]							REQT65.4
29	Ingest selectively [redacted]							REQT65.5
30	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT67
31	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT67.1
32	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT67.2
33	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT67.3
34	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT67.4

b2  
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Table 2 Ingest Initiated Transaction

Item #	Ingest Initiated Transaction	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Record Size (average)	Reference HLFR
35	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT67.5
36	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT67.6
37	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT67.7
38	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT67.8
39	Ingest selectively on an ad hoc basis, data from open sources.							REQT69
40	Ingest selectively from the [redacted]							REQT69.1
41	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT69.2
42	Ingest selectively from [redacted] data.							REQT69.3
43	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT69.4
44	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT69.5

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Table 2 Ingest Initiated Transaction

Item #	Ingest Initiated Transaction	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Record Size (average)	Reference HLF
45	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT69.6
46	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT69.7
47	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT69.8
48	Ingest selectively from [redacted]							REQT69.9
49	Ingest selectively from data about [redacted]							REQT69.10

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**Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) Documentation**  
**26 Aug 2005**

1. Analysis of Requirements for Holding NATO Classified
2. Chiliad - Analyst Update Course
3. Computer Security Incident Response Plan
4. Configuration Management Plan
5. Data Administration Manual
6. Data Ingest Subsystem - Component Design Specifications
7. Data Ingest Subsystem - High Level Design Specifications
8. Data Ingest Subsystem - Record Tracking
9. Data Ingest Subsystem - Unstructured Data Processing
10. Data Management Manual
11. IDW - MiTap ICD
12. IDW - SAMNet ICD v1
13. IDW - Virtual Case File ICD
14. IDW 1.1 Users Guide
15. IDW Operations and Maintenance Support Plan
16. IDW Security Operations Manual
17. IDW-I Build Out Test Report - Phase 1
18. IDW-I System Security Plan -I
19. IDW-S - SAMNet ICD
20. IDW-S ACS ICD V1
21. IDW-S System Security Plan -S
22. Maintenance Manual
23. Materials Request Policy
24. Performance Monitoring and Measurements
25. Privileged Users Guide
26. Project Management Plan
27. RetrievalWare - Analyst Update Course
28. System Administrators Guide
29. System Administrators Manual
30. Test and Evaluation Test Analysis Report
31. Training Evaluation Plan
32. Training Management Plan
33. User Support Manual
34. Users Reference Guide
35. Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) ICD

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Data Type	Media	Frequency
Intel Plus	FTP	Weekly
JICI	N/A	One-time
SAMNet	FTP	3X Daily
Open Source	CD	Daily
VGTOF	CD	Weekly

Table 5-1 IDW Data Ingest Type, Media and Frequency

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DATE 08-02-2007 BY 65179 DMH/BJA/CAL

[redacted] (ITOD) (FBI)

**From:** [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, September 21, 2006 5:37 PM  
**To:** STACY-ROSE, FREIDA T. (ITOD) (FBI); JOLMA, LAWRENCE N. (ITOD)(FBI); [redacted] (ITOD)(FBI); PATON, THOMAS M. (ITOD)(FBI); FERGUSON, RICHARD A. (ITOD) (FBI); GOLDSWORTHY, ABRAM C. (ITOD)(FBI); WHITE, JERRY T. (WE) (FBI); SCHWARTZ, RONALD (ITOD)(FBI); [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); SPENCER, JAMES A. (ITOD)(FBI); ROBERTS, THOMAS J. (ITOD)(FBI); MCCANN, OWEN (ITOD) (FBI); SHORT, EILEEN F. (ITOD) (FBI); PRICE, [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); SCAVONGELLI, GAIL (ITOD) (FBI); SANCHEZ, JENNIFER R. (ITOD)(FBI); SINGER, NAOMI E. (ITOD)(FBI); MORGAN, LEO T. III (ITOD)(FBI); [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); SMITH, LESLIE J. (ITOD)(FBI); SHORT, JAMES E. JR (ITOD) (FBI); [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); BROOKS, JULIUS J. (ITOD) (FBI); MORIN, PAUL A. (ITOD)(FBI); REINER, STEVEN E (ITOD) (FBI); [redacted] (NE) (FBI); STEFANSSON, KAREN M. (ITOD)(FBI); [redacted] (ITOD)(FBI); SNELLINGS, RICHARD (ITOD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (ITOD) (FBI); GRAY, SHAWN E. (ITOD) (FBI); [redacted] (ITOD)(FBI)  
**Subject:** INVESTIGATIVE DATA WAREHOUSE (IDW)

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**NON-RECORD**

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**ITOD Section Chiefs/Unit Chiefs:**

Within the next 30 days, an **Operational Readiness Review (ORR)** will take place for the **INVESTIGATIVE DATA WAREHOUSE (IDW)** Project. At this particular time, the date of the ORR has not been determined. IDW documentation has been placed on the S drive under [redacted] for your review. As soon as possible, please make an effort to review the IDW documents that refer to your area of expertise. IDW has been following the Lifecycle Management Directive (LCMD) throughout the Lifecycle of the project.

If you are unfamiliar with IDW, please see the description of IDW below.

**Description of IDW:**

**Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)** – IDW is developed by Office of the Chief Technology Officer. IDW enables users to perform very flexible searches simultaneously across multiple databases such as ACS (ECF), Intelligence Community cable messages, and selected major counterterrorism IntelPlus file rooms. Users are primarily from the Counter-Terrorism Division and Field Intelligence Groups. Through the IDW Special Projects page, created with the cooperation of the Counterterrorism Division (CTD), users can search additional sources, including all CIA Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) sent to the FBI from 1978 to present, selected terrorism watch lists, and several databases provided by other federal agencies (e.g. [redacted]).

Thank You!!!

b6  
b7C  
b2

[redacted]  
ITOD Transition Management Unit (TMU)  
Room 9483, (202) 324 [redacted]

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**Total Development Costs (including hardware)**

- (To be provided by the Project Manager at a later date)
- Operations and Maintenance costs are  per year.

<b><u>Complexity</u></b>		L	Low	M	Medium	H	High
L	No interface with other systems						
H	Subsequent iterations (IDW-S v1.1 and V2) will integrate or provide access to <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> -data provided from FINCEN system <input type="text"/>						

b2  
b7E

<b><u>Criticality</u></b>		●	Low	●	Moderate	●	High
●	Due to the usage of IDW and the support of the Counterterrorism Division, Criminal Investigative Division and JTTF, system criticality is deemed high.						

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# Federal Bureau of Investigation

## Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) Program



***IDW Status Update***  
*(21 September 2005)*

*Prepared for*

[Redacted]

***(FBI IDW PM)***

[Redacted]

***(SPAWAR)***


b6  
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IDW O&M Status Update  
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## Other Program Updates: IDW Statistics

- Documents in IDW
  - 434,638,628 "unique" documents (up from 434,548,739)
  - 697,728,261 available documents (up from 697,615,952 )





## IDW-S V1.2 Data Collections as of August 27, 2005

### Change Notes:

- (i) The [redacted] Reports Collection was released on the IDW-S V1.2 Core and taken off the IDW-S SPT Subsystem on August 27, 2005. b2 b7E
1. Automated Case System (ACS) Electronic Case File (ECF) – This data set contains copies of the ECs, FD-302s, Facsimiles, FD-542s, Inserts, Transcriptions, Teletypes, Letter Head Memorandums (LHM), Memorandums and other FBI documents contained within ACS/ECF for all but the following FBI case classification violations: [redacted] b2  
[redacted] The files are updated daily.
2. CIA Intelligence Information Reports (IIR-CIA): Electronic copies of all CIA non-TS/non-SCI Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) and Technical Disseminations (TDs) from 1978 to MAY 2004. These files are not updated.
3. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to an FBI [redacted] investigation of [redacted] Updated periodically. b2 b6 b7C b7E
4. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to multiple FBI field office data regarding the terrorist activities involving [redacted] [redacted] Updated periodically.
5. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to the [redacted] investigation. Updated periodically. b2 b7E
6. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to an FBI [redacted] investigation of [redacted] Updated periodically. b2 b7E
7. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to [redacted] and provided to the FBI. Updated periodically.
8. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to acts of domestic terrorism, such as the April 19, 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing (Okbom). Updated periodically. b2 b7E

9. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files collected by the FBI's [redacted]. Updated periodically.
10. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to Al Qaeda [redacted]. Updated periodically.
11. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to an FBI [redacted]. Updated periodically.
12. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to an FBI [redacted] investigation of the [redacted]. The data, once received will be updated periodically, preferably daily.
13. IntelPlus [redacted] Fileroom – This data set contains copies of scanned pages and their corresponding OCR text files related to [redacted] from all 56 FBI field divisions and other agencies. Updated periodically.
14. Joint Intelligence Committee Investigation (JICI) – Scanned copies and their corresponding OCR text files of all FBI documents related to extremist Islamic terrorism between 1993 and 2002. These files are not updated.
15. Open Source News – Various foreign news sources that have been translated into English, as well as a few large U.S. publications, such as the Washington Post. These files are updated daily.
16. Secure Automated Messaging Network (SAMNet) – SAMNet consists of messaging traffic that is sent between different U.S. Government agencies through the Automated Digital Information Network (AutoDIN), including Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) and Technical Disseminations (TD) from the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and others from November of 2002 to present. IDW receives copies of these classified messages up to SECRET with no SCI caveats. These files are updated daily.
17. [redacted] – This [redacted] data set contains copies of reports regarding [redacted].
18. Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) - Lists of individuals and organizations associated with violent gangs and terrorism, provided by the FBI National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This file is updated monthly.

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# Investigative Data Warehouse Program

Presented by

b6  
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September 12, 2005

# Concept of Operation - Data

- CORE library documents
  - ~ 42.3 M unstructured documents in 17 collections
    - ACS ECF: Updated daily
    - IntelPlus (11 Filerooms): Updated when provided
    - SAMNet: Updated daily
    - JICI: Static
    - VGTOF: Updated monthly
    - Open Source News: Updated thrice weekly

[Redacted]

- SPT documents

Outside the Scope

- Sources


- FBI
    - [Redacted]
    - Financial Crimes Enforcement Center (FinCen)
    - [Redacted]
    - [Redacted]
    - [Redacted]

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# Planned Major Changes to Services


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- 
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- Data Ingest
  - Add new sources of data as requested & as approved by ISPG



- 
- 






# Program QA & CM

Outside the Scope

•



- Work is also ongoing to develop and populate an Access database to support the property management and configuration management aspects of IDW.

September 12, 2005

49



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Information Resources Division  
Data Management Section




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Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)  
Performance Measurement & Monitoring  
Baseline Version 1.0  
March 15, 2004

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## 2 IDW Overview

Outside the Scope

IDW is composed of three distinct sections, ingest, user query and control

### 2.1 Ingest

The ingest function accepts information from external sources, validates the data, and formats the data for data storage.

#### 2.1.1 External Sources

IDW receives data from,

- The Automated Case System (ACS) is composed of several applications. These applications are Investigative Case Management (ICM), Electronic Case File (ECF) and the Universal Index (UNI). IDW uses a subset of the Electronic Case File (ECF).
- Intelplus (CT Filerooms) formerly called the [redacted]
- Secure Automated Messaging Network (SAMNET) cable traffic messages received by the FBI
- Violent Gang Terrorist Offender File (VGTOF) from Criminal Justice Information Systems (CJIS) Division
- Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry (JICI) - Paper counter-terrorism files
- The Open Source Library is collected from global news sources that are either in English or have been translated into English
- [redacted] data received from the [redacted]
- Various paper documents including
  - handwritten notes
  - official FBI correspondence
  - intelligence analysis
  - other terrorism related information

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#### 2.1.2 Data Validation


IDW has been certified to handle data at a Secret level. Any data classified higher than Secret cannot exist in IDW. The data validation process verifies that all data to be stored in

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IDW meets this security guideline. Data that is questionable is removed from the system, and is reviewed. After the reviewer certifies that the data is appropriate for IDW it is placed into the IDW databases.



Outside the Scope

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**Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) Training  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D.C.**

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

1. [Redacted] Data Sources, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**OUTLINE:**

Outside the Scope

1. [Redacted] Data Sources [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b. Data Sources: IDW draws its information from the following data sources:

- **ACS:** Automated Case Support. (CT Case Files) Archived Investigative dating back through calendar year 1995. Updates pushed (FTP) to IDW once per day.
- **Intel Plus:** Updates pushed (FTP) to IDW as needed (usually once per day).

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted] Domestic terrorism incidents
- [Redacted] Al-Qaeda [Redacted]
- [Redacted] Significant international terrorism incidents


b2  
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- **JICI:** Archived data from the Joint Intelligence Committee Investigation (JICI) regarding 9/11. (Static file system)
- **ORCON:** Parsed data from SAMNet and ACS data collections at this caveat. Pushed to IDW once per day.
- **SAMNet:** SECRET and below cable traffic to/from FBI Headquarters. Pulled (FTP) from SAMNet server (IDW chronological job runs every 10 minutes; SAMNet posts new data 3 times per day).
- **TFRG:** Terrorist Financial records. Updates pushed (FTP) to IDW once per day.
- **VGTOF:** Violent Gang & Terrorist Offense File. Updated data file is provided in entirety by CD on a weekly basis.
- **Open Source Research (OSINT):** Current from the MiTAP server.

c. Handling caveats can apply (here are some examples) –

- ORCON – Originator Controlled
- [Redacted]
- NOFORN – Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
- LES – Law Enforcement Sensitive
- COMINT – Communications Intelligence

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b7E



Outside the Scope



### IDW draws its information from the following data sources:

**ACS:** Automated Case Support. Archived Investigative dating back through calendar year 1995. **(CT Case Files)**  
Updates pushed (FTP) to IDW once per day.

**Intel Plus** (Updates pushed (FTP) to IDW as needed (once per day)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Domestic terrorism incidents

[REDACTED] Al Qaeda [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Significant international terrorism incidents

**JICI:** Archived data from the Joint Intelligence Committee Investigation (JICI) regarding 9/11. (Static file system)

b2  
b7E



**ORCON:** parsed data from SAMNet and ACS data collections at this caveat. Pushed to IDW once per day

**SAMNet:** SECRET and below cable traffic to/from FBI Headquarters. Pulled (FTP) from SAMNet server (IDW chronological job runs every 10 minutes; SAMNet posts new data 3 times per day)

**TFRG:** Terrorist Financial records

Updates pushed (FTP) to IDW once per day.

**VGTOF:** Violent Gang & Terrorist Offense File Updated datafile is provided in entirety by CD on a weekly basis

**Open Source Research (OSINT):** Pulled (FTP) from MiTAP server daily

Collections to search: Select 'Browse' to view a collection's frequently occurring concepts.

[\(Select all collections\)](#)      [\(Unselect all collections\)](#)

- ACS ([Browse](#))
- Intel+  ([Browse](#))
- Intel+  ([Browse](#))
- Intel+  ([Browse](#))
- Intel+  ([Browse](#))
- Intel+  ([Browse](#))
- Intel+  ([Browse](#))
- JICI ([Browse](#))
- ORCON ([Browse](#))
- Opensource ([Browse](#))
- SAMNET ([Browse](#))
- VGTOF ([Browse](#))

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Outside the Scope

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**IDW**

## Open Source Data Sources



Addis Ababa Tribune –  
Agencia Brasilia -  
Al-Ahram (Egypt, weekly English  
version) –  
AllAfrica.com –  
Arabic News –  
Asahi Shimbun -  
Asia Times (Hong Kong) –  
Bangkok Post -  
Christian Science Monitor -  
Crescent International -  
Daily Telegraph (London,  
England) -  
Dawn (Karachi, Pakistan) -  
Debka (Israel) -  
East Africa Daily Nation -  
Gulf News (UAE) -  
Ha'aretz (Israel) -  
IFRC International Federation of  
the Red Cross -  
IRIN Integrated Regional  
Information Network -  
Iraq Press News Agency -  
Islamic Republic News Agency  
(Iran) -  
Jakarta Post -  
Janes -  
Jordan Times -  
L'Osservatore Romano -  
Lagos (Nigeria) Guardian -  
Lahore (Pakistan) Nation -  
Lebanon Daily Star (Beirut) -  
Malaysian Star -  
Manila Bulletin -  
Manila Times -  
Miami Herald -



Moscow Times -  
National Post and CP -  
New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur) -  
PETRA (Jordanian News Agency) -  
Pakistan Observer (Islamabad) -  
Palestine Chronicle -  
People's Daily (China) -  
Philippine Star -  
Pravda -  
ProMed - epidemiology mail list  
Russian Information Agency  
Novosti -  
Russian Issues (Misc. Russian news) -  
Russian Observer -  
SABA (The News Agency of Yemen) -  
Saudi Gazette -  
South African Dispatch -  
Sydney Morning Herald -  
Tehran Times -  
Times of India -  
UNHCR UN High Commissioner on Refugees -  
Ummah News -  
Uzbekistan Report -  
Washington Post -  
XinHua News Service -  
Yemen Times (weekly) -  
Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan) -

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IDW-NG-PM-001.01.00

# **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)**


## **Project Management Plan**

**June 30, 2005**



**Prepared under Subcontract 04-6844-27  
(Prime Contract N65236-04-D-6844)  
Task Order 0093**

***NORTHROP GRUMMAN***  
*Information Technology*



Data ingest functions will be the most frequently performed data administration tasks. As this function is primarily tasked to another subcontractor, O&M personnel are not deeply knowledgeable of the specific administrative tasks. The table below indicates the source and frequency of periodic data ingest operations that are performed; other operations may be needed on an ad hoc basis.

Data Type	Media	Frequency
ACS	FTP	Daily

Data Type	Media	Frequency
Intel Plus	FTP	Weekly
JICI	N/A	One-time
SAMNet	FTP	3X Daily
Open Source	CD	Daily
VGTOF	CD	Weekly

Table 5-1 IDW Data Ingest Type, Media and Frequency

# rtshea

 HighView Image  
 08/04/08 13:06



IDW-NG-CA-002.01.06

**Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  
Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)**

**System Security Plan**

**June 30, 2005**




**Prepared under Subcontract 04-6844-27  
(Prime Contract N65236-04-D-6844)  
Task Order 0093**

***NORTHROP GRUMMAN***

*Information Technology*

IDW System Data Ingest Flow

Outside the Scope




**Automated Transfer of Raw Data to IDW-S**


Raw data is automatically transferred to the IDW-S system from approved data sources in accordance with an Interconnection Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding, Memorandum of Agreement or Interface Control Document. IDW-S V1.2.9 receives update data by the following means:

- ACS update data is transmitted to the IDW-S system via File Transfer Protocol (FTP) sessions over FBINet. ACS initiates the FTP session.
- IntelPlus update data is transmitted to the IDW-S system via File Transfer Protocol (FTP) sessions over FBINet. IntelPlus initiates the FTP session.
- SAMNet update data is transmitted to the IDW-S system via File Transfer Protocol (FTP) sessions over FBINet. For SAMNet, the IDW-S system initiates the FTP session.
- VGTOF data is transmitted to the IDW-S system via CD/DVD.
- Open Source News data is transmitted to the IDW-S system via CD/DVD.
- The JICI library is static and is not updated on IDW-S.
- The IIR library is static.


Outside the Scope



data into individual serial records (in the case of ACS ECF), documents (IntelPlus, JICI, Open Source News, IIR), messages (SAMNet), or files (VGTOF)








DATASET NAME	DATA SOURCE	CLASSIFICATION
ACS Electronic Case Files (ECF)	FBI Automated Case System (ACS)	Secret and below
IntelPlus Filerooms	FBI IntelPlus	Secret and below

b2  
b7E

DATASET NAME	DATA SOURCE	CLASSIFICATION
SAMNet	FBI Secure Automated Messaging Network (SAMNet)	Secret and below
VGTOF	FBI National Crime Information Center (NCIC)	SBU
JICI	FBI Records Management Division (RMD), Document Laboratory (DocLab), FBIHQ	Secret and below
Open Source News	MiTAP	Unclassified
Intelligence Information Reports	CIA	Secret

b2  
b7E

Table 3.5.1.1 IDW-S Data Sets



Outside the Scope

### 3.9.9 Indirect Connections


#### 3.9.9.1 IDW-S Core Subsystem Indirect Connections

SYSTEM NAME	CLASSIFICATION & COMPARTMENTS	ACCREDITED BY	TRANSFER METHOD
FBI Automated Case System (ACS)	Secret	FBI	FTP
FBI Intel Plus	Secret	FBI	FTP

b2  
b7E

SYSTEM NAME	CLASSIFICATION & COMPARTMENTS	ACCREDITED BY	TRANSFER METHOD
FBI Secure Automated Messaging Network (SAMNet)	Secret	FBI	FTP
FBI National Crime Information Center (NCIC)	Unclassified/SBU	FBI	CD-ROM
FBI Document Conversion Laboratory (DocLab), Records Management Division (RMD), FBIHQ	Secret	FBI	CD/DVD
MiTAP – Open Source News	Unclassified	NA	CD-ROM
IIR	Secret	CIA	CD-ROM

b2  
b7E



Outside the Scope

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)

**From:** GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 01, 2005 12:35 PM

**To:** TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC)(FBI)

**Cc:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)

**Subject:** RE [redacted]

b2  
b6  
b7C

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Extracts from [redacted] are available in the Direct Database portion of the IDW. These were approved by the ISPG last year.

b2  
b7E

UC G. Clayton Grigg  
Proactive Data Exploitation Unit (PDEU), Rm 4913  
Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS)  
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

[redacted]

(202) 324 [redacted] (office)  
[redacted] (pager)

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/BJA/CAL

b2  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

-----Original Message-----

**From:** TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI)

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 01, 2005 12:31 PM

**To:** [redacted] (OGC)(FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)

**Cc:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)

**Subject:** RE [redacted]

b2  
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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

The following was received from my staff concerning the mention of [redacted] in the letter.

b2  
b7E

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (CTD)(FBI)

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 01, 2005 11:12 AM

**To:** TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (OGA); [redacted] (CTD)(FBI);

[redacted] (CTD) (FBI)

**Subject:** RE: [redacted]

b2  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Mark -

[redacted]

b2  
b7E

Hope this helps

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Mark A. Tanner  
Director of the  
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force  
703 [Redacted]

b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:** TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Monday, October 31, 2005 4:00 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] OGC(FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] OGC (FBI) [Redacted] OGC (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE [Redacted]

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

I have seen and concur with [Redacted] changes. With regard to [Redacted] question in the answer to #2,  
this [Redacted]

Mark A. Tanner  
Director of the  
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force  
703 [Redacted]

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] OGC(FBI)  
**Sent:** Monday, October 31, 2005 2:05 PM  
**To:** TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] OGC (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: [Redacted]

b2  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Mark, Gurvais,

These documents pertaining to FTTTF & IDW just came to NSLB's attention today. OCA has asked us for any comment we have nit tomorrow to meet a Thursday ExecSec deadline.

We wanted to be sure you had seen these - please assure us you have.

Thanks

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Policy & Training Unit  
National Security Law Branch, OGC  
FBI HQ Room 7947  
202 [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] OGC (FBI)

**Sent:** Monday, October 31, 2005 1:26 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[redacted] as we discussed.  
vpc

[redacted]  
Assistant General Counsel  
Policy & Training Unit  
National Security Law Branch  
(202 [redacted])

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Monday, October 31, 2005 1:04 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI); TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted] (INSD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OCIO) (FBI); RITCHHART,  
KENNETH MICHAEL (ITSD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted]  
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); KELLEY,  
PATRICK W. (OGC) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: [redacted]

b6  
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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[redacted] my comments on the document are in red. I referenced the PIA that we just did for FTTTF in a couple of places. I'm attaching a copy of the entire PIA FYI. We have not yet decided what is appropriate for release/publication from the PIA so Mark Tanner (FTTTF) needs to ok use of any of the language from the PIA in this letter.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] Can you send [redacted] a copy of the letter that is going to congress as a follow up to the FTTTF GAO report so that we can be consistent in our responses?

Finally - I'm concerned about the statement that we only have 3 data mining projects in the FBI. In the cover letter, you make the point that our definition of data mining only includes large sets of data but I still think the definition is very broad and could include other systems. For example, what about STAS systems? I am not familiar with those systems -(but we are starting work on a PIA so I will be in the near future) but my sense is that they collect and sift through a lot of data. What about EDMS and some of the other systems that collect tech cut data from FISAs and allow analysts to search through the data for relevant info? I would think that could be considered data mining under your definition - but I'll defer to the CIO's office on this issue. We just need to make sure we can distinguish these other projects.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, October 28, 2005 5:23 PM

b6  
b7C

To: [redacted] (OCIO) (FBI); RITCHHART, KENNETH MICHAEL (ITSD) (FBI); [redacted]  
 [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
 Cc: [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
 Subject: RE: [redacted]

b6  
 b7C  
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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

If I can get feedback by COB Monday, 10/31, that would be great. If you have questions, please give me a call. Thanks,

[redacted]  
 Special Counsel  
 Office of Congressional Affairs  
 202 [redacted]

b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OCIO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, October 28, 2005 8:58 AM  
**To:** RITCHHART, KENNETH MICHAEL (ITSD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: [redacted]  
**Importance:** High

b6  
 b7C  
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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Ken and [redacted]  
 Your help is needed to resolve issues regarding subject response. Ken can you address issue # 2 on ICDM and [redacted] can you address issue # 5 on PIA.  
 Thanks,

b6  
 b7C

[redacted]  
 ex: [redacted]

b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 27, 2005 5:25 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (OCIO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: [redacted]

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

b2  
 b7E

[redacted] I understand that you have seen earlier versions of this letter and coordinated with CTD in drafting responses. We're close to finalizing the letter as described below, but still have some outstanding substantive issues - also indicated below. Please provide input from OCIO's perspective - both to the specific questions noted and to the response generally. Please call if you have questions. Thanks,

[redacted]  
 Special Counsel  
 Office of Congressional Affairs

b6  
 b7C



202-324 [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI)

**Sent:** Thursday, October 27, 2005 5:24 PM

**To:** GEDMINTAS, RUTA A. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI);

ExecSec (RMD); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI)

**Cc:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI)

**Subject:** RE: [redacted]

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

ExecSec has reassigned the matter and OCA will coordinate directly with OCIO. We will also ensure that AD Hulon and AD Azmi sign off before our AD signs the transmittal letter. However, there are still several matters that need to be clarified substantively as follows:

1. See Answer 2, para 3 on the FTTTF discussion - the inclusion of the word "routinely" begs the question - under what circumstances is the data ingested? We should clarify this part of the response as well as the sentence re white pages. CTD - please resolve this with input from FTTTF.

2. In the GAO Rpt, the ICDM is described as an initiative - i.e. not operation. To the extent it is discussed in a limited manner in the CTD response, we need to make sure that it is completely operational. If so, my modified answers to 1 and 2 need to be tweaked to reflect this development since the GAO report was issued. If it's not operational, the language in the remaining answers should be modified. OCA will reach out to OCIO to resolve this question

3. In Answer 3 paragraph 1 - who do we receive requests to run subject-based queries from? Without clarification, this feeds into the concern that we could be collecting data on individuals without predication. CTD - please clarify / respond as this is an FTTTF issue.

4. I agree with you that Answer 5 is a mishmash - I'm not sure what the answer is... Maybe we say that "FTTTF refers to an operational task force. We understand the question to ask about data mining initiatives of FTTTF" and then answer whether we've conducted an effectiveness study on the data mining initiative of FTTTF. If CTD concurs with this approach, OCA will reach out to OCIO to resolve.

5. Answer 7 - what are National Security Systems and why is the significance of them having once been exempt from PIAs, but now PIAs are mandated? OCA will coordinate with OCIO on this.

CTD - please resolve substantively to the issues identified for you above by COB Monday, 10/31. Call if you have questions. Thanks,

[redacted]

Special Counsel  
Office of Congressional Affairs

202- [redacted]

b6  
b7C

b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:** GEDMINTAS, RUTA A. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 27, 2005 5:10 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); ExecSec (RMD); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: [redacted]

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

If Exec Sec reassigns the the [redacted] as you requested then it would probably be most expeditious if OCA went directly to the OCIO to deal directly with any issues on this letter. Since AD Hulon is still on the copy count, he should review the letter after OCA and the CIO come to an agreement on this letter.

b6  
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Ruta Gedmintas

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 27, 2005 4:59 PM  
**To:** GEDMINTAS, RUTA A. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); ExecSec (RMD); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: [redacted]

b6  
b7C

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Will do Ruta - will CTD be providing feedback on the issues we identified? or should I go to OCIO for all of these issues?

b2  
b6  
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[redacted]

Special Counsel  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
202-324-[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

**From:** GEDMINTAS, RUTA A. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 27, 2005 4:55 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); ExecSec (RMD); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: [redacted]

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[redacted]

The POC for the CIO for this matter is [redacted] Please

keep me apprised of the CIO's comments and/or approvals regarding this letter.

Thanks,

SSA Ruta Gedmintas  
Executive Staff  
202-324-

b6  
b7C  
b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:**  (OCA) (FBI)

**Sent:** Thursday, October 27, 2005 12:00 PM

**To:** GEDMINTAS, RUTA A. (CTD) (FBI)

(FBI); ExecSec (RMD)

(RMD) (FBI)

**Cc:**  (OCA) (FBI)

(DO) (FBI)

**Subject:** RE:

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

After discussions with our AD, we've changed the format of the response slightly - see attached. Our office will sign a cover letter conveying the responses to the specific questions posed by Senators Feingold and Sununu. That change is reflected in the attached revised draft. We will need to get CTD and OIO signoff on the enclosure / response to questions. The substance of the responses has not changed from the draft that  sent this morning. Please review the revised substance and provide comments / responses to questions by OCA below. Also, please identify POC in OCIO - we will coordinate their review as well.

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ExecSec  please reassign this matter to OCA and extend the deadline to allow us to complete the necessary coordination.

Thanks much to CTD for all of your work on this to date. Please call if you have any questions.

Special Counsel  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
202-

b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:**  (OCA) (FBI)

**Sent:** Thursday, October 27, 2005 8:42 AM

**To:** GEDMINTAS, RUTA A. (CTD) (FBI)

**Cc:**  (OCA) (FBI)

(DO) (FBI)

b6  
b7C

[redacted] (OCA) (FBI)

**Subject:** FW: [redacted]

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Ruta: Here are additional OCA issues with the proposed letter. Regards, [redacted]

b6  
b7C

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI)

**Sent:** Wednesday, October 26, 2005 5:54 PM

**To:** [redacted] (OCA) (FBI)

**Subject:** RE: [redacted]

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[redacted] - attached is a proposed revised draft - I had started working on this before I understood that CTD had taken it back for additional revision. The major re-write is in response to Qs 1 & 2. Also, per your observation, this information needs to be conveyed in response to a committee request, not just because Feingold asked the questions - so I re-did the salutation / intro to provide context for our responses.

My re-writes address a couple of your issues below (para 1, answer 1 and para 1, answer 2). I agree with you that "routinely" in para 4, answer 2 (now para 3 on FTTTF discussion in answer 2) - it begs the question - under what circumstances is the data ingested? We should clarify this part of the response as well as the sentence re white pages.

In addition, I think the following issues need to be clarified or addressed.

1. In the GAO Rpt, the ICDM is described as an initiative - i.e. not operation. To the extent it is discussed in a limited manner in the CTD response, we need to make sure that it is completely operational. If so, my modified answers to 1 and 2 need to be tweaked to reflect this development since the GAO report was issued. If it's not operational, the language in the remaining answers should be modified.
2. In Answer 3 paragraph 1 - who do we receive requests to run subject-based queries from? Without clarification, this feeds into the concern that we could be collecting data on individuals without predication.
3. I agree with you that Answer 5 is a mishmash - I'm not sure what the answer is... Maybe we say that "FTTTF refers to an

operational task force. We understand the question to ask about data mining initiatives of FTTTF" and then answer whether we've conducted an effectiveness study on the data mining initiative of FTTTF.

4. Answer 7 - what are National Security Systems and why is the significance of them having once been exempt from PIAs, but now PIAs are mandated?

thanks for the chance to weigh in...

[Redacted]

b6  
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Special Counsel  
Office of Congressional Affairs

202 [Redacted]

b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (DCA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 25, 2005 11:22 AM  
**To:** [Redacted] (OCA) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: [Redacted]  
**Importance:** High

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**UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD**

Here's the problem child. As you will see the preamble is problematic. In para 1 to Answer 1 - bringing up "profile" is not good, I suggest deleting the entire sentence. In para 1 to Answer 2 suggest dropping 52 (obvious follow-up is name them). In para 4 of Answer 2 - "routinely" concerns me likewise the last sentence. The answer to Question 5 is a mish-mash - I recommended deleting all reference to the Inspection process and personnel performance plans.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 20, 2005 4:40 PM  
**To:** ExecSec (RMD); [Redacted] (OCA) (FBI); [Redacted] (OCA) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: [Redacted]  
**Importance:** High

b6  
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b2  
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**UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD**

Sorry everyone but the white to  
Senator Feingold didn't attach  
properly....here it is.....

**Thank you!!**

[Redacted]  
Intelligence Analyst  
CTD/Executive Staff  
FBIHQ LX-1 [Redacted]  
Desk: (571) [Redacted]  
Secure [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] E. (CTD)  
(FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 20, 2005  
4:37 PM  
**To:** ExecSec (RMD) [Redacted]  
B (OCA) (FBI) [Redacted]  
(OCA) (FBI)  
**Subject:** [Redacted]  
**Importance:** High

b6  
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**UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD**

Everyone:

Please review the attached draft  
response letters for [Redacted] and  
make revisions as appropriate to your  
office.

I have also included a copy of the  
original letter from Senator Feingold  
and Senator Sununu.

A great many people worked on,  
reviewed, and approved of the final  
draft of this letter, and please see the  
complete list of these individuals in  
the attached document entitled  
"Background Information for [Redacted]  
[Redacted]"

b2  
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Please return the revisions to me via E-  
mail at your earliest convenience so  
that CTD can finalize the letters and  
obtain AD Hulon's signature (Due date  
is October 25, 2005).

Thank you so much!!

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Intelligence Analyst  
CTD/Executive Staff

FBIHQ LX [Redacted]

Desk: (571) [Redacted]

b2

Secure: [Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2005 1:48 PM  
To: [redacted] (OI) (OGA)  
Cc: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Summary of meeting re SAO Process/ Ingest of [redacted]

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**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[redacted] Based upon our prior MOU w [redacted] I think we already have agreement that the FBI wants the [redacted] Data. This will give us even greater access so as to be able to run batch queries and will, hopefully, facilitate streaming the SAO process.  
[redacted] has already notified IDW folks that they will need to "refresh" their PIA submission re the addition of this new data source.

b2  
b7E

What I would be interested in his high level, management approval of reviewing the intel requirements regarding what info and from which countries we should be capturing and what our vulnerabilities/gaps are. So, I would foresee briefing this to the ISPG so as to encourage participation/representation by the division reps, i.e., for some accountability.

[redacted]  
Assistant General Counsel  
Policy & Training Unit  
National Security Law Branch  
(202) [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/BJA/CAL

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-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OI) (OGA)  
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2005 1:37 PM  
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Summary of meeting re SAO Process/ Ingest of [redacted]

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

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b7E

Should this be briefed to the ISPG to get buy-in at the EAD and AD level?

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2005 12:54 PM  
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI); CANNON, MICHAEL A. (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (OGA); VAN DUYN, DONALD N. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OI) (OGA); [redacted] (IP) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (ITOD) (CON); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)

b6  
b7C



**Subject:** Summary of meeting re SAO Process/ Ingest of [redacted]

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

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Tom:

Today I met with various representatives from RMD/National Name Check Program, Counterintelligence Division, Counterterrorism, ITOD, and DI to discuss issues involving the Security Advisory Opinion process re [redacted]

These are the pending issues:

(1) Ingest of [redacted] into IDW: CTD wants to ingest the [redacted] into IDW. [redacted] is amenable to accomplishing this and our unit would be involved with preparing an addendum to the original MOU that I worked on w [redacted] re the [redacted] I think this would be very valuable, both for intelligence generally and facilitating the SAO process more specifically.

Outside the Scope

(2) [redacted]

**ACTION NEEDED:**

b2  
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(1) Meet with [redacted] To accomplish the ingest of the [redacted], we will need to meet with [redacted] [redacted] DI, is arranging a meeting for next week. This involves legal issues re the MOU.

(2) Establish Working Group to set Intel Requirements: To determine what changes can be made to the SAO process, we need to establish a working group with reps from CD, CID, CTD and DI, who can provide the intel requirements necessary for ensuring that we capture the necessary information from [redacted] via the [redacted] that will meet our national security/criminal investigatory needs. This working group will need to address whether the info currently being captured by [redacted] via the [redacted] meets our current national security threats.

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The SAO process affects more than one division and is in need of review at a macro level, rather than simply a country-by-country, analyst-by-analyst review. We are hoping that the reps sent to the working group are able to represent the views of their divisions so as to develop a cohesive strategy.

[redacted] and I will be involved with this Working Group but more as observers because we recognize that this Working Group will need to address intel requirements and is not addressing legal issues.

b6  
b7C

Please let me know whether you have any questions.  
If anyone from today's mtg would like to add to these comments, please feel free to do so.  
thanks  
vpc

From our standpoint, we will need to ensure that if we have the [redacted] that we have assigned the appropriate personnel to check the information that is in the [redacted] and have the appropriate controls (or checks) to ensure accountability for reviewing and responding to these requests.  
I have asked each of the persons at today's mtg to provide me w/ the appropriate POCs to participate in this working group.

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[redacted]  
Assistant General Counsel  
Policy & Training Unit  
National Security Law Branch  
(202) [redacted]

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b7C

b2

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

b6  
b7C

[redacted] OGC) (FBI)

From: [redacted] OGC) (FBI)  
 Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2005 12:54 PM  
 To: [redacted] OGC) (FBI)  
 Cc: [redacted] OGC)(FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI); CANNON, MICHAEL A. (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (OGA); VAN DUYN, DONALD N. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OI) (OGA); [redacted] (IP) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (ITOD) (CON); [redacted] (ITOD) (CON); [redacted] OGC) (FBI)

b6  
b7C

Subject: Summary of meeting re SAO Process/ Ingest of [redacted]

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

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DATE 08-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/BJA/CAL

Tom:

Today I met with various representatives from RMD/National Name Check Program, Counterintelligence Division, Counterterrorism, ITOD, and DI to discuss issues involving the Security Advisory Opinion process re [redacted]

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These are the pending issues:

(1) Ingest of [redacted] into IDW: GTD wants to ingest the [redacted] into IDW. DoS is amenable to accomplishing this and our unit would be involved with preparing an addendum to the original MOU that I worked on w [redacted] re the [redacted] I think this would be very valuable, both for intelligence generally and facilitating the SAO process more specifically.

(2)

[Large redacted area]

Outside the Scope

ACTION NEEDED:

(1) Meet with [redacted] To accomplish the ingest of the [redacted] we will need to meet with [redacted] [redacted] DI, is arranging a meeting for next week.  
This involves legal issues re the MOU.

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(2) Establish Working Group to set Intel Requirements: To determine what changes can be made to the SAO process, we need to establish a working group with reps from CD, CID, CTD and DI, who can provide the intel requirements necessary for ensuring that we capture the necessary information from [redacted] via the [redacted] that will meet our national security/criminal investigatory needs.

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This working group will need to address whether the info currently being captured by [redacted] via the [redacted] [redacted] meets our current national security threats.

The SAO process affects more than one division and is in need of review at a macro level, rather than simply a country-by-country, analyst-by-analyst review. We are hoping that the reps sent to the working group are able to represent the views of their divisions so as to develop a cohesive strategy.

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[redacted] and I will be involved with this Working Group but more as observers because we recognize that this Working Group will need to address intel requirements and is not addressing legal issues.

Please let me know whether you have any questions.

If anyone from today's mtg would like to add to these comments, please feel free to do so.

thanks

vpc

From our standpoint, we will need to ensure that if we have the [redacted] that we have assigned the appropriate personnel to check the information that is in the [redacted] and have the appropriate controls (or checks) to ensure accountability for reviewing and responding to these requests.

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b7E

I have asked each of the persons at today's mtg to provide me w/ the appropriate POCs to participate in this working group.

[redacted]  
Assistant General Counsel  
Policy & Training Unit  
National Security Law Branch  
(202) [redacted]

b6  
b7C

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**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

b6  
b7C

[redacted] OGC) (FBI)

**From:** GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 14, 2005 12:38 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OI) (FBI); CANNON, MICHAEL A. (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC)(FBI); [redacted] (ITSD)(FBI); [redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: New [redacted] Interface Control Document

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

That is fine for me as well. I can volunteer the same room again Rm 4712 if that is fine with everyone?

b2  
b7E

**UC G. Clayton Grigg**  
**Proactive Data Exploitation Unit (PDEU), Rm 4913**  
Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS)  
Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

[redacted]

(202) [redacted] office)  
(877) [redacted] pager)

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DATE 08-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/BJA/CAL

b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 14, 2005 11:54 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (OI) (FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI); CANNON, MICHAEL A. (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC)(FBI); [redacted] (ITSD)(FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: New [redacted] Interface Control Document

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Ok, let's try Wed, 9/22 @ 10 am. Does that work?  
vpc

[redacted]  
Assistant General Counsel  
Policy & Training Unit  
National Security Law Branch  
(202) [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OI) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 14, 2005 11:41 AM

**To:** GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); CANNON, MICHAEL A. (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC)(FBI); [redacted] (ITSD)(FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: New [redacted] Interface Control Document

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

I'm also free all day Wednesday...

-----  
 [redacted]  
 Program Analyst  
 Technology Planning & Operations Support Unit  
 Directorate of Intelligence  
 202 [redacted]

b2  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

-----Original Message-----

**From:** GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 14, 2005 11:38 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OI) (FBI); CANNON, MICHAEL A. (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC)(FBI); [redacted] (ITSD)(FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: New [redacted] Interface Control Document  
**Importance:** High

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b7C

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

I am in Philadelphia on Monday returning mid/late Tuesday. The only other must commitment I have next week is an 11A to 12P meeting on 9/22. This is a top priority for us as well and would like to see it resolved. The IDW owes OGC an EC detailing how they are currently complying with PIA requirements on existing datasets. This must be completed prior to the ISPG approving new datasets. I spoke with IDW Program Manager [redacted] about this and it will be completed.

b6  
b7C

**UC G. Clayton Grigg**  
**Proactive Data Exploitation Unit (PDEU), Rm 4913**  
 Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS)  
 Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

[redacted]

b2  
b6  
b7C

(202) 324 [redacted] (office)  
(877) 270 [redacted] (pager)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 14, 2005 11:29 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (OI) (FBI); CANNON, MICHAEL A. (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)

b6  
b7C

Cc: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E. (OI) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (RMD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC)(FBI)  
Subject: RE: New [redacted] Interface Control Document

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[redacted] Mike [redacted] Gurvais:

To move this project forward and to facilitate the parallel DHS/SAO streamlining initiative, I think we should meet regarding (1) the planned ingest of [redacted] into IDW and (2) [redacted] plan to phase out its cables re the SAOs.

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Also, we need to clarify with [redacted] the following language in the ICD, which is attached to this email.

[redacted]

We understood during our negotiations of the [redacted] MOU that this did not include substantive derogatory responses, which can't be sent via OSIS if they are classified. So, we'll need to clarify what the "FBI responses to the SAO requests" include.

I would suggest first having an internal mtg and then a mtg w [redacted]

Are you available on Monday, 9/19 at 10 am? If so, I'll try to arrange for our NSLB conference room.

thanks  
vpc

[redacted]  
Assistant General Counsel  
Policy & Training Unit  
National Security Law Branch  
(202) 324-[redacted]

b2  
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b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OI) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2005 10:11 AM  
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
Subject: New [redacted] Interface Control Document

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

This document contains all the fields which [redacted] is willing to send us...

[redacted]

b2  
b7E

Program Analyst  
Technology Planning & Operations Support Unit  
Directorate of Intelligence  
202

b2

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UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)

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**From:** GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Monday, September 19, 2005 1:45 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (ITSD)(FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (OGA); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW:  
**Importance:** High  
**Follow Up Flag:** Follow up  
**Flag Status:** Flagged

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 DATE 08-27-2007 BY 65179 DMH/BJA/CAL

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[redacted]

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Since you are the [redacted] for IDW I thought you would be in the best position to answer [redacted] question regarding the IDW:

"Gurvais: As you can see from the attached Congressional letter, the questions from Senators Feingold and Sununu also mention the "Secure Collaborative Operational Prototype Environment/Investigative Data Warehouse" and the "FBI Intelligence Community Data Marts." The Senators ask whether the GAO is correct that "the purpose of each of these programs is to analyze intelligence and detect terrorist activities and each program relies on personal information, although only FTTF relies on private sector data." Could you respond for IDW."

**UC G. Clayton Grigg**  
**Proactive Data Exploitation Unit (PDEU), Rm 4712**  
 Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS)  
 Counterterrorism Division (CTD)

[redacted]

b2  
b6  
b7C

(202) 324- [redacted] office)  
 (877) 270- [redacted] pager)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Monday, September 19, 2005 1:11 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); GRIGG, G. CLAYTON (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (OGA)  
**Subject:** RE:

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

All [redacted] has been working with FTTF on preparing a Privacy Impact Assessment, which was one of the main recommendations regarding the FBI in the GAO's 8/2005 Report. So, it should be stressed in the talking points that the FBI has already begun responding to the GAO's recommendations. I believe there is a target date for completion, as well. (mid October??)

Also, we should stress that the FTTF's activities comply with the Privacy Act. For example, FBI's use of the data

is covered by the FBI's published system of records notices. And yes, the FBI did not included in its notice a description of how individuals can review their personal information because the FBI properly claimed an exemption from doing so for law enforcement records. [we could note that this is done for other similar law enforcement info]

We could follow the chart on p. 9 of the GAO Report to hit how the FBI safeguards the info.

The GAO noted that the PIA should address that the FBI's datamining effort should comply with OMB guidance, including analyses of the info to be collected, the purposes of the collection, the intended use of the info, w/ whom info will be shared, how the info is to be secured, opportunities for impacted individuals to comment, and the choices made by the agency as a result of the assessment.

Gurvais: As you can see from the attached Congressional letter, the questions from Senators Feingold and Sununu also mention the "Secure Collaborative Operational Prototype Environment/Investigative Data Warehouse" and the "FBI Intelligence Community Data Marts." The Senators ask whether the GAO is correct that "the purpose of each of these programs is to analyze intelligence and detect terrorist activities and each program relies on personal information, although only FTTTF relies on private sector data." Could you respond for IDW.

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Also, we need to agree with a definition of datamining before we can answer the questions below. IN the 8/2005 Report, the GAO relies upon its definition from a 5/2004 Report, which defined federal datamining efforts as follows: "the application of database technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis and modeling—to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future results."

[Redacted]  
Assistant General Counsel  
Policy & Training Unit  
National Security Law Branch  
(202) 324-[Redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Monday, September 19, 2005 12:46 PM  
**To:** TANNER, MARK A. (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)  
**Subject:**

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Mark,

NSLPTU has been tasked to create talking points for Gary Bald (he testifies Wednesday on the Hill) regarding data-mining.

Question are as follows:

1. Is the FBI data-mining?
2. Describe the FBI's efforts to safeguard the information.

Can you put some thoughts into an e-mail?

Thanks,

JB

[Redacted]  
Assistant General Counsel  
National Security Law Policy and Training Unit  
FBI HQ Room 7975  
STU III: (202) 324-[Redacted]  
Unclassified Fax: (202) 324-[Redacted]  
Secure Fax: (202) 324-[Redacted]

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