



Homeland Security

Privacy Office, Mail Stop 0550

November 1, 2007

Mr. David L. Sobel
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 650
Washington, DC 20009

Re: DHS/OS/PRIV 07-160/Sobel request

Dear Mr. Sobel:

This is our seventh partial release to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), dated November 7, 2006 and December 6, 2006, requesting DHS records concerning the Automated Targeting System (ATS). These two requests were aggregated to simplify processing. The following is a consolidated list of records requested:

1. All Privacy Impact Assessments prepared for the ATS system or any predecessor system that served the same function but bore a different name.
2. A Memorandum of Understanding executed on or about March 9, 2005 between Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Canada Border Services Agency to facilitate the Automated Exchange of Lookouts and the Exchange of Advance Passenger Information.
3. All records, including Privacy Act notices, which discuss or describe the use of personally-identifiable information by the CBP (or its predecessors) for purposes of screening air and sea travelers.
4. All System of Records Notices (SORNs) that discuss or describe targeting, screening, or assigning "risk assessments" of U.S. citizens by CBP or its predecessors.
5. All records that discuss or describe the redress that is available to individuals who believe that the ATS contains or utilizes inaccurate, incomplete or outdated information about them.
6. All records that discuss or describe the potential consequences that individuals might experience as a result of the agency's use of the ATS, including but not limited to arrest, physical searches, surveillance, denial of the opportunity to travel, and loss of employment opportunities.
7. All records that discuss or identify the number of individuals who have been arrested as a result of screening by the ATS and the offenses for which they were charged.
8. All complaints received from individuals concerning actions taken by the agency as a result of ATS "risk assessments" or other information contained in the ATS, and the agency's response to those complaints.
9. All records that discuss or describe Section 514 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, P.L. 109-295 (H.R. 5441) and its prohibition against the development or testing of "algorithms assigning risk to passengers whose names are not on Government watch lists."
10. All records that address any of the following issues:
 - a. Whether a system of due process exists whereby aviation passengers determined to pose a threat are either delayed or prohibited from boarding their scheduled flights may appeal such decision and correct erroneous information contained in the ATS;
 - b. Whether the underlying error rate of the government and private databases that will be used in the ATS to assign a risk level to an individual will not produce a large number of false

- positives that will result in a significant number of individuals being treated mistakenly or security resources being diverted;
- c. Whether the agency has stress-tested and demonstrated the efficacy and accuracy of all search tools in the ATS and has demonstrated that the ATS can make an accurate predictive assessment of those individuals who may constitute a threat;
 - d. Whether the Secretary of Homeland Security has established an internal oversight board to monitor the manner in which the ATS is being developed and prepared;
 - e. Whether the agency has built in sufficient operational safeguards to reduce the opportunities for abuse;
 - f. Whether substantial security measures are in place to protect the ATS from unauthorized access by hackers or other intruders;
 - g. Whether the agency has adopted policies establishing effective oversight of the use and operation of the system;
 - h. Whether there are no specific privacy concerns with the technological architecture of the system;
 - i. Whether the agency has, pursuant to the requirements of section 44903(i)(2)(A) of Title 49, United States Code, modified the ATS with respect to intrastate transportation to accommodate states with unique air transportation needs and passengers who might otherwise regularly trigger a high risk status; and
 - j. Whether appropriate life-cycle estimates, expenditure and program plans exist.

Our October 1, 2007 letter summarized our processing of your request. Our searches directed to the DHS Office of the Executive Secretariat (ES), DHS Office of Policy (PLCY), DHS Privacy Office (PRIV), DHS Office of General Counsel (OGC), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have thus far produced a combined total of 827 pages. Out of those 827 pages, we provided you with a combined total of 437 pages with certain information withheld pursuant to the FOIA. We have continued to process your request within CBP.

A search directed to CBP has produced an additional 164 pages of records responsive to your request. We have determined that 12 pages are releasable to you in their entirety, and 152 pages are releasable to you with certain information withheld pursuant to Exemptions 2, 3, 5, 6, 7C and 7E of the FOIA.

Please be advised that while processing FOIA request number DHS/OS/PRIV 07-90/Hofmann request, documents originating with the DHS Management Directorate (MGMT), PLCY, and TSA were found to be responsive to this request. As such, we are now providing you with those documents, described below, as a supplement to our October 1, 2007 release.

Documents, totaling 3 pages, were found to originate with MGMT. We have determined that 1 page is releasable to you in its entirety, and 2 pages are releasable to you with certain information withheld pursuant to Exemption 6 of the FOIA.

Documents, totaling 67 pages, were found to originate with PLCY. Of those 67 pages, we have determined that 5 pages are releasable to you with certain information withheld pursuant to Exemption 7E of the FOIA, and 62 pages are withheld in their entirety pursuant to Exemptions 5 and 7E of the FOIA. We are consulting with other offices concerning additional supplemental PLCY documents and will respond to you regarding those documents once our consultations are completed.


Documents, totaling 11 pages, were found to originate with TSA. We have determined that 8 pages are releasable to you in their entirety, and 3 pages are releasable to you with certain information withheld pursuant to Exemptions 2 and 3 of the FOIA.

Enclosed are 183 pages of releasable information. The withheld information, which will be noted on the Vaughn index when completed, consists of names, telephone numbers, email addresses, deliberative material, legal opinions, law enforcement information, and homeland security information. I am withholding

this information pursuant to Exemptions 2, 3, 5, 6, 7C and 7E of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(E). Exemption 2(high) protects information applicable to internal administrative matters to the extent that disclosure would risk circumvention of an agency regulation or statute, impede the effectiveness of an agency's activities, or reveal sensitive information that may put the security and safety of an agency activity or employee at risk. Included within such information may be operating rules, guidelines, manuals of procedures for examiners or adjudicators, and homeland security information. Exemption 2(low) protects information applicable to internal administrative personnel matters to the extent that the information is of a relatively trivial nature. Exemption 3 protects information specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute. Title 49 CFR Part 1520.5 pertains to Sensitive Security Information (SSI) which is information obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities, including research and development, the disclosure of which TSA has determined would (1) constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy; (2) reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential information obtained from any person; or (3) be detrimental to the security of transportation. Specifically Part 1520.5(b)(9) exempts from disclosure information regarding security screening under aviation or maritime transportation security requirements of Federal law. Exemption 5 exempts from disclosure certain inter- and intra-agency communications protected by deliberative process privilege, attorney work-product privilege, and attorney-client privilege. Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure records the release of which would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption 7C protects records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes that could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption 7E protects records compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which would disclose techniques and/or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

Our office continues to process your request as it pertains to CBP. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please refer to **DHS/OS/PRIV 07-160/Sobel request**. This office can be reached at 866-431-0486. Thank you for your patience as we proceed with your request.

Sincerely,



Vania T. Lockett

Associate Director, Disclosure & FOIA Operations

Enclosures: 183 pages

ATS/PASSENGER [b7(E)] MEETING
National Targeting Center
May 15, 2006

ATS/Passenger [b7(E)]

A summary of passenger [b7(E)]s given in:

- 040323 [b7(E)] Summary.doc

There was a passenger [b7(E)] meeting in August 2001 (b7E & b3) The documents are:

- 010814-ATSP Meeting.doc
- 010814-ATSP Meeting-App3.ppt
- 010814-Postmeeting Notes.ppt

There was a rules and GUI meeting in November 2002:

- 021107-Conference Notes.doc

We met on several occasions with (b6) while they were here on detail in March 2003:

- 040323-Passenger [b7(E)] Discussions.doc
- 040323-Sweep [b7(E)] Revisions-Mod2.doc

Since these meetings, we've also implemented [b7(E)] are there lessons learned from this that could be applied to ATS/P in general?

We may also wish to consider name matching techniques used throughout ATS/P [b7(E)]
[b7(E)]

We may also wish to consider the use of alternative/additional data sources [b7(E)]
[b7(E)]

[b7(E) #b3]

Basic [b7(E)] dating from 2001 and earlier:

- 010818 [b3 & b7E]
- 010831-Postmeeting [b7(E)] Emails.doc

We may wish to consider updating these rules, especially to take advantage of PNR/other information.

Shared Border Accord Rules

Currently the SBA rules are in ([b3 & b7(E)])
• 051003-SBA Summary.doc

There may be techniques/concepts here that we'd like to utilize more broadly in ATS/P.

**CBP-National Targeting Center
March 2, 2006
Mexico APIS Program Issues**

I. Background

b7E

II. Revisions

b3 &

b7E

b3
&
b7E

[b7E]

Prepared by: Mexico APIS Team

Reviewed by: (b6)

CONTACT: NTC Watch Commander

(b2)

APPENDIX 1

Default (b7E) Query

The default (b7E) query shall be based upon the following filter:


[b2 high, b3
&
b7E]

The initial default (b7E) query's result shall contain the following information in the order shown:

[b2
high, b3
&
b7E]

APPENDIX 2
Preliminary Design of (b7E) Summary Information Page

The Passenger Sweep summary information page shall contain summaries of record matches based upon the following sources: (b3 & b7E]



... to be followed by sections of details.

APPENDIX 4
Preliminary (b7E) Data Element Scoring

The (b7E) score shall be calculated as:

[b3 & b7E]

where Q_{type} is the Quality of Match factor for the different types of matches as follows:

Description	Default Factor
[b3 & b7E]	

and the individual data elements shall be evaluated as follows:

[b3 & b7E]

Consider adding: (b3 & b7E) other concepts.

Minimum (b7E) Score (for inclusion in list) = (b3)

[b3 & b7E]

(b3)

b3
§
b7E

b3
&
b7E

b3
&
b7E

(b7E)

(b7E)

Score

b3

&

b7E

Travel Document Scores:

Travel Document Condition

Score

b7E

b3
&
b7E

b3
&
b7E

[b3 & b7E]

b3
&
b7E

[b3 & b7E]

b3
&
b7E

[b3 & b7E]

b3 &
b7E

[

b7 E & b3

]

APPENDIX 5

b3
&
b7E

APPENDIX 6

[b3
&
b7E]

APPENDIX 7

b3
&
b7E

APPENDIX 8

b3
&
b7E

APPENDIX 9

b3
&
b7E

b3 .

&

b7 E

B: (b7E)

b3
b7E

b3

b7E

C: Truck Schools

b3

b7E

b3
P
b7E

b3

b7E

03

07E

b3

b7E

b3
b
b7E

b3

b7E

b3

b7E

b3

b7E

APPENDIX 10

b3
&
b7E

APPENDIX 11

b3
‡
b7E

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS

b2 high

b6

b7C


b7E

b2 high

b6

b7C

b7E



b2 high

b6

b7C

b7E

[b2high, b6, b7C, b7E]

The positive enforcement results specified above include adverse actions on travelers matching the criteria for this IDSO. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (b2) or a member of my staff.

(b6, b7C)

Director of Tactical Operations

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS

b2 high

b6

b7C

b7E

/

b2 high
b6
b7C
b7E

The positive enforcement results specified above include adverse actions on travelers matching the criteria for this IDSO. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (b2) or a member of my staff.

(b6, b7C)
Director of Tactical Operations

Dec 6 - Dec 12
OFO Weekly Report

TIDE	Encounters	Positives	Entry Denied	Arrest	Paroled	Admitted	Other
Dec 6 - Dec 12	[b2 high, b7E]						
FYTD 2006							
FY2005							

TIDE ADVERSE ACTION	Entry Denied	Sec 237	Sec 240	ER	WR	275	259
Dec 6 - Dec 12	[b2 high, b7E]						
FYTD 2006							
FY2005							

TIDE OTHER	MX APIS	Outbound	Cargo	BP	CIS/ICE	Exterior
Dec 6 - Dec 12	(b2 high, b7E)					

Visa Revocations	Positives	Entry Denied	Arrest	Paroled	Admitted	Other
Dec 6 - Dec 12	[b2 high, b7E]					
FYTD 2006						
FY2005						

INBOUND TSA/NO FLY TIDE	Positives	Entry Denied	Arrest	Paroled	Admitted	Other
Dec 6 - Dec 12	[b2 high, b7E]					
FYTD 2006						
FY2005						

TECS	Positives	Entry Denied	Arrest	Paroled	Admitted	Other
Dec 6 - Dec 12	[b2 high, b7E]					
FYTD 2006						
FY2005						

TECS Refusals	Entry Denied	Sec 237	Sec 240	ER	WR	275	Other
Dec 6 - Dec 12	[b2 high, b7E]						
FYTD 2006							
FY2005							

Canada-US Shared Lookouts	Positives	Entry Denied	Arrest	Paroled	Admitted	Other
Dec 6 - Dec 12	[b2 high, b7E]					
FYTD 2006						
FY2005						

Mexico APIS	Flights Vetted	Passengers Screened	Hits Vetted	Non-TIDE Attache Referrals
Dec 6 - Dec 12	(b2 high, b7E)			

MX Attache Referrals (Non TIDE)	Terrorism	NCIC	Missing Person	Arrest	Special Op	Interpol	Other
2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

(b2 high, b7E)

FY 05

TIDE	TACS/lookout	Threshold Targets	IDSO	DDEFR's	Discretion	Total	Refused A
USC							
LPR							
Aliens	✓ 21000		[b2 high b5 b7E]			[b2 high b5, b7E]	

Arrested →

CTRS



[b2 high
b5
b7E]

~~21000~~

(b6
b7C)
Please check with NTS
is this program of
PNR? The address by
SAM 7/21. M 7/20



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

July 18, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director /s/ Robert Jacksta
Border Security and Facilitation

FROM: DIRECTOR, FIELD OPERATIONS
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Possible Unauthorized Use of ResMon Within ATS-P
(ACTION: (b2) Due 7/28/05)

This is in response to your memorandum, dated July 18, 2005, regarding the possible unauthorized use of ResMon within ATS-P by SCBPO (b6, b7C)

On July 18, 2005 Assistant Port Director (b6, b7C) telephonically contacted SCBPO (b6, b7C) where he was attending a week of training. SCBPO (b6, b7C) provided the following information concerning his use of ResMon on July 10, 2005 (b2, b6, b7C, b7E)

(b2, b6, b7C, b7E) SCBPO (b6, b7C)
(b2, b6, b7C, b7E)

SCBPO (b6, b7C) stated that in this case he wanted to try using the system (b2, b7E)

[b2 high
b7E]

SCBPO (b6, b7C) commented that although he understood the restrictions of the system, it does (b2 high, b7E) He understands the sensitive nature of ResMon data, and has assured us that his actions were in full support of the CBP mission.

For the record, SCBPO (b6, b7C) is an outstanding supervisor and skilled intelligence analyst. He has developed and continues to maintain one of the most effective PAUs in the country.

[b6
b7C]

b2 high
b5
b7E

CBP's Strategy to Target, Identify, and Prevent the Entry of Potential Terrorists

You'll see me again
Boston
I'll be back

early Friday

b2 high
b5
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Current Terrorist Threat

- Despite our nation's successes in the global war on terror, our enemies are still dangerous and more determined than ever to attack us here at home. (



b2 high
&
b7 E



- However, according to 9/11 commission report, "To [terrorists], international travel presents great danger, because they must surface to pass through regulated channels, present themselves to border security officials, or attempt to circumvent inspection points."
- Therefore, the border is the place where the terrorists can be stopped and must be stopped. No DHS agency is better positioned to execute this mission than U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CBP's Priority Mission

To prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States without unduly impeding legitimate trade and travel.

CBP Personnel and Authorities

- CBP unified the customs, immigration entry control and agriculture protection responsibilities and the broad legal authorities of predecessor agencies. That CBP consolidated the interdiction efforts at our Ports of Entry of approximately 20,000 law enforcement CBP officers:
 - The authority to deny admission; and
 - The broadest search authority of any government agency which includes, the authority to search or question without warrant or suspicion any person, goods, vehicle or conveyance entering or leaving the United States.



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Preventing Terrorists from Entering the U.S. – Risk Targeting

Pushing security beyond our borders through international coordination.

- International Coordination
- Immigration Advisory Program (IAP)

Working with our interagency partners to share information and coordinate joint operational responses to potential high-risk travelers.

- ICE
- FBI (JTTF)
- TSA
- TSC
- NCTC

USCG

Using advance electronic information for automated targeting of high-risk passengers traveling to and from the U.S.

- Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)
 - APIS Final Rule Published April 7, 2005
- Passenger Name Record (PNR)
- Automated Targeting System (ATS)
- National Targeting Center (NTC)
- Local Passenger Analysis Units (PAUs)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Risk Targeting Continued

Providing Appropriate Training, Authorities, and Protocols to Ensure Counterterrorism Response

- CTR Training
- Counterterrorism Response protocols lead to post primary questioning and searches:



b2 high
&
b7E



{ Have
stats
Ready

Deploying advanced technology and fraudulent document detection to improve inspection capability and detection.

- USVISIT - Biometrics
- Fraudulent Documents Analysis Unit – Trend Analysis

* Get
Info

Increasing security and facilitating legitimate travel through trusted traveler programs.

- NEXUS SENTRI NEXUS-Air US PASS



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CBP Antiterrorism Response

When a terrorist watchlisted individual or a potential terrorist is encountered, CBP has clear and comprehensive national policies and procedures in place.

At the ports of entry:

[

b2 high
b7E

]

Between the Ports:

- Apprehend aliens entering illegally

[

b2 high
b7E

]

- Refer for prosecution if applicable or request detention pending removal from the US

Results:

- CBP has used watchlist information in combination with the national policies and procedures detailed above to deny entry to [b7E] individuals last year.

Details !



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Finding Non-Watchlisted Terrorist Suspects

CBP uses a risk management strategy to go beyond TIDE:

- Strategic Intelligence
- Automated Targeting

-ATS-P
-IDSO's



b2 high
b7E



- Border Search Authority



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Finding Non-Watchlisted Terrorist Suspects

CBP's use of intelligence to risk manage who is subject to CTR questioning

b2 high
b7E

- CBP: Office of Anti-Terrorism coordinates appropriate operational actions, with CBP's operational offices:
 - Intelligence
 - Field Operations
 - Border Patrol
 - International Affairs
 - CBP Air
- Identify relevant intelligence applicable to border enforcement, i.e., CBP.
- Distribute and apply known intelligence where appropriate



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Finding Non-Watchlisted Terrorist Suspects

CBP's Use of Automated Targeting

- Development of Automated Targeting System – Passenger (ATS-P)
 - Rules based system designed to identify high-risk international passengers traveling both inbound and outbound
 - Ability to incorporate relevant strategic intelligence regard terrorist risk factors and travel patterns into scenario based rules to help focus limited inspectional resources to travelers presenting a potential terrorist risk, with explosives or potential terrorist operatives.



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Identifying Non-Watchlisted Terrorist Suspects

CBP's Passenger Based Threshold Targeting/Augmented Primary

- Uses current strategic intelligence to identify passengers posing a potential risk (warranting CTR)
- Passenger matching the targeting rules result in automated lookouts entered into TECS that require further CBP examination of the identified subject (**Distinguish CBP TECS Lookout from TIDE**)
- All current and new intelligence is reviewed on a daily basis by INTEL, OFO and OAT at CBP's daily Intel/Op's meeting
- Intel/Op's intelligence assessment may lead to threshold rule development or modification (

[

b2 high, b7E

]



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Identifying Non-Watchlisted Terrorist Suspects

CBP's Use of Border Search Authority

- CBP has legal authority to inspect all passengers entering the United States
- CBP uses this authority in various ways to identify high-risk passengers
 - Intelligence Driven Special Operations



b2 high
b7E



- Primary Officer Training
- Counter Terrorism Response Teams
- Advanced Training in Interview Techniques
 - Detecting Deception and Eliciting Response



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

IDSO: Intelligence Driven Special Operations

- IDSOs are intensified inspection operations of a specified duration
- CBP Headquarters-initiated operation based on a specific intelligence stream, such as one that indicates a suspect group may attempt to enter at specific ports over a particular period of time
- Scope may be broad (national) or targeted (designated locations)
- IDSO guidance to the field will provide protocols for interviews and inspections, baggage document examination, lines of questioning, systems queries to validate identities, etc
- Field locations are normally required to make daily reporting of positive results with consolidated reports at the end of the IDSO. As per standard CBP protocol, (b2 high]
(b7E)
- Field are expected to and do go beyond IDSO's. The priority mission is to prevent the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons.



U.S. Customs and Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Primary Officer Training

FDAU
Notice

All CBP Officers receive Anti-Terrorism Training and Fraudulent Document Detection Training.

- Includes current threats and trends – entry methods – use of other documents.

Goal of primary is to determine purpose and intent.

Encouraged to refer any passenger for CTR exam if terrorist concerns.

[b2 high b7E]



U.S. Customs and Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Counter Terrorism Response Teams

- In addition to structured primary and secondary interviews, CBP employs specially trained Counter Terrorism Response (CTR) officers assigned to patrol baggage and passenger areas.
- These personnel, who are familiar with CBP alert and information concerning, terrorist risk factors, are trained to detect suspect behavior before, during and after initial primary inspection.
- Primary inspectors are also to refer individuals to CTR secondary if they have a concern regarding terrorism.

? DDER
training
Summary ?



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Secondary Interview

- Although persons identified by the preceding strategies require extra scrutiny, no definitive determination has yet been made.
- At this point they are subject to Counterterrorism Response (CTR) secondary inspection by specially trained CBP officers. (

b2 high
b7E

) The full authority and informational resources of CBP are put at the disposal of the officer during the process, including reach back to the NTC.

b2 high
b7E

- Throughout the process, CTR personnel work with NTC Target Analysts who are able to exploit additional data sources, (

b2 high, b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Admissibility after CTR Secondary

b2 high
&
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Advanced Interview Techniques

Detecting Deception and Eliciting Response (DDER)

- To address the current terrorist threat, DDER is an advanced behavioral science and interviewing strategies course designed for CBP CTR Officers/Agents to build upon and improve their skills of information collection and their ability to gather valid and factual information from potential terrorist suspects.

b2 high
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

STATS

30BP

example?

Controlling the Border Between the Ports of Entry

The Threat: In addition to its attempts to defeat the U.S. immigration system with fraudulent documents, (

[

b2 high
b7E

]

•CBP's Office of Border Patrol employs a balanced mix of personnel (Patrol Agents), technology (sensors, cameras, traffic checkpoints) and border infrastructure, in a layered deployment, to identify and interdict illegal entrant aliens.

•OBP apprehended approximately 1.4 million illegal aliens last year.

•OBP is developing Counter Terrorism Response (CTR) teams to enhance CBP's ability to detect potential terrorists (

(

b2 high
b7E

]

•Teams of specially trained agents to conduct interviews and debriefings

•Cultural training to identify true nationality

[

b2 high
b7E

]

s



U.S. Customs and Border Protection

FOR OFFICIAL ~~USE~~ ONLY

Procedures for Special Interest Aliens

b2 high
&
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

FOR OFFICIAL ~~USE~~ ONLY

Summary

- As the frontline border security agency, CBP has a significant responsibility but also has the trained personnel, authorities, and a range of other resources to apply to a point where terrorists are particularly vulnerable

[

b2 high
b7E

]

- The detection strategy of CBP's Office of Border Patrol, for apprehending illegal aliens, combined with its handling guidelines (b2 high, b7E) makes potential terrorist entry between the ports equally difficult, provided they are apprehended. SBI and the implementation of the National Border Patrol Strategy will increase the overall apprehension rate and unilaterally achieve operational control of our borders. As CBP, we increase apprehension rate, terrorists will be deterred from attempting to use illegal, between the POE's, entry as a means for infiltrating into the U.S.



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

WARNING: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION AND IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. THIS INFORMATION MAY NOT BE RELEASED OUTSIDE CBP WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FROM THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE. RECIPIENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ARE AUTHORIZED TO DISSEMINATE THIS INFORMATION WITH APPROPRIATE CBP OFFICES ON A NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

**Commissioner's Alert
Increased Vigilance and Operational Tempo (b2 high, b7E).**

[b2 high
b7E]

In response, Secretary Ridge has directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to implement heightened security measures and to increase vigilance during this critical period. Perhaps no agency within DHS has a more important responsibility in securing the Homeland and preventing terrorist attacks than U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). This notice provides information to focus our response and increase our border security in support of our priority mission: preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States.

[b2 high
§
b7E]

CBP Officers should be alert to the following trends and patterns associated with terrorist activity:

[b2 high
b7E]



b2high

b7E

Intelligence analysis, along with past and recent movement of terrorist operatives, suggests that terrorists can and will use a wide variety of means to enter the U.S.

~~OFFICIAL~~ USE ONLY

b2 high

b7E

Various reports and warnings have been issued concerning regional areas and potential targets of interest to Al-Qaida and/or other terrorist groups.

b2 high
b7E

The following are Significant Events and Dates over the next 6 months:

b2 high
b7E

CBP Officers are encouraged to remain vigilant throughout (b2 high, b7E); and report any suspicious events immediately via your established reporting mechanisms. Questions or

~~OFFICIAL~~ USE ONLY

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

comments reference this message may be directed to (b6, b7C) Director, CBP Office of Intelligence at (b2)

Robert C. Bonner
Commissioner

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Ways to Link People to People

194

[b2high
b7E]

APIS

[b2high
b7E]

PNR

[b2high
b7E]

Visa

[b2high
b7E]

SAVI

[b2
high
b7E]

SAS/OIL

[b2high
b7E]

Secondary Referrals

[b2high
b7E]

[b2high
b7E]

D:\Area51\ats-plinking

[b2high, b7E]

NCIC

[b2high
b7E]

(b6 & b7C)
06/14/2005 08:13 AM

To: NTC BORDER PATROL, NTC PERMANENT, NTC STAFF, NTC TDY,
NTC TVR, NTC WATCH COMMANDERS
cc:
Subject: Weekly TVR Stats June 7 - 13, 2005

During the last week we had a total of (b2 high b7E)
The breakdown of the positive matches is listed below.

Jun 07 - Jun 13, 2005
Office of Field Operations Weekly Report

TIPOFF
Jun 07 - Jun 13
FYTD 2005
FYTD 2004

Encounters	Positives	Entry Denied	Arrest	Paroled	Admitted	Other
[b2 high b7E]

TIPOFF
Jun 07 - Jun 13
FYTD 2005
FYTD 2004

Entry Denied	Sec 237	Sec 240	ER	WR	275	259
[b2 high b7E]

TIPOFF - Other
Jun 07 - Jun 13

MX APIS	Outbound	Cargo	BP	CIS/ICE	Exterior
(b2 high	b7E)

Visa Revocations
Jun 07 - Jun 13
FYTD 2005
FYTD 2004

Positives	Entry Denied	Arrest	Paroled	Admitted	Other
[b2 high b7E]

(b6 , b7C)
National Targeting Center
Customs & Border Protection
Department of Homeland Security
(b2)



Display the
Visual

Lookouts & NTC



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Lesson Purpose: The purpose of this lesson is to identify the procedures for coordinating with the NTC when a lookout is encountered.

Time: 1 hour

Content Outline: This presentation includes the following topics:

- Objectives
- NTC: Typical Day
- NTC Misconceptions
- Lookouts: Types
 - [b2 high]
 - [b7E]
- CTR Suggested Process Flow
- Prior to Calling NTC
 - [b2 high, b7E]
- Other Notifications
- Calling the NTC
- NTC Research
 - Available Systems
 - Case Example
 - NTC Response Time
- Collect Additional Facts
- Follow Up
- Sample NTC Activity Log
- Lesson Summary

Materials:

- PowerPoint Visuals (1 through 28)
- CTR Worksheet



Display the
Visual

What You'll Learn

- To describe the role of the National Targeting Center (NTC).
- To identify the different types of lookouts.
- To list the steps that should be taken when coordinating with the National Targeting Center.



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

State that at the end of this lesson, participants should be able to:


- Describe the role of the National Targeting Center (NTC).
- Identify the different types of lookouts.
- List the steps that should be taken when coordinating with the National Targeting Center.



Display the
Visual

NTC: Typical Day

b2 high
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Summarize the following background information about the National Targeting Center (NTC):

- **Background:** The National Targeting Center was established on October 21, 2001—before September 11, no national-level targeting of people or goods crossing our borders existed. The NTC is the centralized coordination point for all of CBP's anti-terrorism efforts. Utilizing sophisticated targeting methodology it analyzes, screens, and targets for intensive anti-terrorism inspection all passengers and cargo before arrival in the United States.

b2 high
b7E



Display the
Visual

NTC Role

To support the field by . . .

- Conducting research.
- Identifying high-risk targets.
- Coordinating the processing of (b2, b7E)
- Accessing systems not available to the field.
- Serving as liaisons to internal and external organizations.
- Identifying emerging nationwide trends.



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection




Instructor Notes

Explain that the role of the NTC is to support the field by . . .

- Conducting research.
- Identifying high-risk targets.
- Coordinating the processing of (b2, b7E)
- Accessing systems not available to the field.
- Serving as liaisons to internal and external organizations.
- Identifying emerging nationwide trends.



Display the
Visual



Instructor Notes

Using the example case on the visual, explain that the NTC is able to take a small bit of information and put the pieces together.


Emphasize the importance of collecting and documenting even small pieces of information.



Display the
Visual

NTC Misconceptions

b2 high
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Explain the following points:


b2 high
b7E



Display the
Visual

NTC Liaisons

b2high
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Review the list of onsite and offsite liaisons that interact with the NTC.


b2high
b7E



Display the Visual

Lookouts: Types

b2 high
b7E



U.S. Customs and Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Present an overview of the following types of lookout.


b2 high
&
b7E

Lookouts & NTC — Instructor Guide



Display the Visual

b2 high
&
b7E

 U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CBP Directive Number: 3340-021A



Instructor Notes


b2 high
&
b7E

Lookouts & NTC — Instructor Guide



Display the Visual

b2 high
b7E



U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CBP Directive Number: 3340-021A



Instructor Notes

b2 high
&
b7E

Lookouts & NTC — Instructor Guide



Display the Visual

b2 high
&
b7E

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CBP Directive Number: 3340-021A




Instructor Notes

b2 high
&
b7E



Display the Visual

b2 high
&
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Present the following key points:


b2 high
b7E

Lookouts & NTC — Instructor Guide



**Display the
Visual**

b2 high
&
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes


b2 high
&
b7E

Lookouts & NTC — Instructor Guide



Display the
Visual

b2high
&
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes


b2high
&
b7E

Lookouts & NTC — Instructor Guide



Display the Visual

ba high
⊕
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection




Instructor Notes

ba high
⊕
b7E



Display the Visual



Instructor Notes


Refer to the flow diagram that was presented earlier in Lesson 3. Point out that before calling the NTC it is important to collect and organize key information about the lookout.

Lookouts & NTC — Instructor Guide



Display the
Visual

b2 high
&
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection




Instructor Notes

b2 high
&
b7E



Display the
Visual

b2high
&
b7E

 U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Refer the participants to the (b2, b7E) at the end of this lesson.


Direct the participants to review the list of items on the visual. Ask the participants if there are any other items they would add to the list.



Display the Visual

Other Notifications

b2 high
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Refer the participants to the (b2, b7E) at the end of this lesson.

Explain that CTR Officers should:


b2 high
&
b7E



Display the Visual

Calling the NTC

b2high
b7E



U.S. Customs and Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Explain that when calling the NTC, the CTR Officer should be prepared to provide:


b2high
&
b7E



Display the Visual

NTC Research: Available Systems

b2high
b7E



U.S. Customs and Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Explain that the NTC:

- Starts an Activity Log.
- Conducts routine queries.
- Conducts more advanced queries, if warranted. The advanced queries may include the researching in the following systems:

b2high
b7E

c.

S



Display the
Visual

NTC Research: Case Example

b2high

b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

b2high

b6

b7C


b7E



Display the
Visual

NTC Research: Case Example

b2high
&
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Use this visual to demonstrate the value of the NTC access to tools such as the
(b2high, b7E)

Point out how the combination of effective interviewing at the ports and NTC research
expertise/access can help ensure that potential terrorists do not enter the country.




Display the Visual

NTC Response Time

b2high

b7E



U.S. Customs and Border Protection



Instructor Notes

b2high


b7E

Lookouts & NTC — Instructor Guide



Display the Visual

b2high
&
b7E



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

b2high
&
b7E



Display the Visual

Follow Up

[b2high
b7E]



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes

Explain that the CTR Officers must:

[b2high
b7E]



Display the Visual

Sample NTC Activity Log

b2high
&
b7E

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

What are the significant facts?



Instructor Notes

Present the following key points:



b2high
b7E

Tell the participants to review the log.

After a few minutes, ask the participants to identify the significance facts.

If not mentioned by the group add the following points:



b2high
b7E





Display the
Visual

Lesson Summary

Do you now know how to:

- Describe the role of the National Targeting Center (NTC)?
- Identify the different types of lookouts?
- List the steps that should be taken when coordinating with the National Targeting Center?



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection



Instructor Notes


State that the participants should now be able to:


- Describe the role of the National Targeting Center (NTC).
- Identify the different types of lookouts.
- List the steps that should be taken when coordinating with the National Targeting Center.

Ask the participants if they have any questions about the topics in this lesson. Answer any questions and transition to the next topic.


Threshold Targeting

- Uses strategic intelligence to identify passengers of interest.
- Is based on rules created from strategic intelligence threat stream.
- Runs rules against CBP databases to target previously unidentified high-risk travelers.





b2high
b7E



Threshold Targeting: Successes

[

ba high

&

bo7E

]

National Targeting Center
September 8, 2004

Threshold Targeting - b2, b6, b7C, b7E

ISSUE:

[b2 high & b7E, b7C, b6]

BACKGROUND:

[b2 high
b6
b7C
b7E]

STATUS:

[b2 high
b6
b7C
b7E]

[

b2 high
b6, b7C, b7E

]

] was admitted as a lawful permanent resident.

CONTACT: NTC Watch Commander

(b2)