
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advice concerning Science	his absence. It is improper for you to	land my role here. We are here to lis my backup for CEAU and my oth send general "taskers" to either one	er units, just as I am
Assistant General Counse Science and Technology Phone: Cell phone Secure phone Fax			
To:	(OTD) (CON) 727, 2007 4:45 PM (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FE t FOIA Request - Deadline - Friday, August 3, 20		
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-28-2008 BY 60322UC/LP/STP/gjg



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 09-18-2008 BY 60322UC/LP/STP/gjg

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	is to be turned in by COB Friday, August 3rd, 2007. Additionally, it is requested	
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Thanks,		
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Management		Ď6
	echnology Division (OTD) <u>I</u> d Electronic Analysis Unit (CEAU)	ъ7С
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Science and Technology Law Unit b6 Phone: ъ7С Cell phone Secure phone: Fax -----Original (OTD) (CON) From: Friday, July 27, 2007 4:45 PM Sent: FW: Urgent FOIA Request - Deadline - Friday, August 3, 2007 To: b6 Subject: b7C Importance: High SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED **NON-RECORD** Good Afternoon, Per a request from CEAU UC he wanted you both to review the Urgent FOIA request below. If you have any questions, please contact me at the below numbers. v/r.

b6 b7C -----Original Messag OTD) (CON) From: 2007 2:06 PM Sent: To: (OTD) (FBI OTD) (CON); OTD) (CON): (OTD) (CON) (FBI) (OTD) ((CON) (OTD) (FBI OTD) (CON (OTD) (CON) OTD) (FBI); OTD) (FBI) (OS) (CON) (OTD) (FBI) (OTD) (CON) OTD) (FBI (OTD) (FBI (OTD) (FRI) OTD) (FBI) (OTD) (FBI) OTD) (CON):[(OTD) (FBI) (OTD) (CON OTD) (FBI (OTD) (FBI) OTD) (FBI) (OS) (CON) (OTD) (CON) Cc: Urgent FOIA Request - Deadline - Friday, August 3, 2007 Subject:

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD Good Afternoon, Per UC please provide hard copies of ALL documentation, to include e-mails, concerning CIPAV Technology. All information is to be turned in by <u>COB Friday</u>, <u>August 3rd</u>, <u>2007</u>. Additionally, it is requested that you <u>please out all documents</u> in chronological order. If I am not in the office that day, please take your documents to Thanks. b2 Ъ6 b7C Management Assistant Operational Technology Division (OTD) Cryptologic and Electronic Analysis Unit (CEAU) Chantilly) Quantico) (Cell) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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Importance: High

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Importance: High	
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Per a request from CEAU UQ he wanted you both to review the Urgent FOIA request below. have any questions, please contact me at the below numbers.	lf you
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Thanks,	
Management Assistant Operational Technology Division (OTD) Cryptologic and Electronic Analysis Unit (CEAU) (Chantilly) (Quantico) (Cell)	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-28-2008 BY 60322UC/LP/STP/gjg



JUST FYOriginal Messa From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:	(OGC) (FBI) Monday, July 23, 2007 11:38 AM (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI) FW: CIPAV/Magic Lantern news blurb - FYI	(OGC) (FBI);	OGC) (FBI)
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I assume you fo	olks know of this–but just in case.		
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From: <u>L</u> Sen <u>t:</u>	(OGC) (FBI) Wednesday, July 18, 2007 12:18 PM		
To:	(OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI);	(OGC) (FBI)	(FBI);
Subject:	CIPAV/Magic Lantern news blurb - FYI		
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b6 b7C

FBI's Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats

Wired.com


2:00 AM

By Kevin Poulsen

July 18, 2007

SEATTLE, WA -- <u>FBI</u> agents trying to track the source of e-mailed bomb threats against a Washington high school last month sent the suspect a secret surveillance program designed to surreptitiously monitor him and report back to a government server, according to an <u>FBI</u> affidavit obtained by Wired News.

The court filing offers the first public glimpse into the bureau's long-suspected spyware capability, in which the <u>FBI</u> adopts techniques more common to online criminals. The software was sent to the owner of an anonymous MySpace profile linked to bomb threats against Timberline High School near Seattle. The code led the <u>FBI</u> to 15-year-old Josh Glazebrook, a student at the school, who on



Monday pleaded guilty to making bomb threats, identity theft and felony harassment. In an affidavit seeking a search warrant to use the software, filed last month in U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington, <u>FBI</u> agent Norman Sanders describes the software as a "computer and internet protocol address verifier," or CIPAV.

FBI Spyware In A Nutshell

The full capabilities of the <u>FBI</u>'s "computer and internet protocol address verifier" are closely guarded secrets, but here's some of the data the malware collects from a computer immediately after infiltrating it, according to a bureau affidavit acquired by Wired News.

- IP address
- MAC address of ethernet cards
- A list of open TCP and UDP ports
- A list of running programs The operating system type, version and serial number
- The default internet browser and version
- The registered user of the operating system, and registered company name, if any
- The current logged-in user name
- The last visited URL

Once that data is gathered, the CIPAV begins secretly monitoring the computer's internet use, logging every IP address to which the machine connects. All that information is sent over the internet to an <u>FBI</u> computer in Virginia, likely located at the <u>FBI</u>'s technical laboratory in Quantico. Sanders wrote that the spyware program gathers a wide range of information, including the computer's IP address; MAC address; open ports; a list of running programs; the operating system type, version and serial number; preferred internet browser and version; the computer's registered owner and registered company name; the current logged-in user name and the last-visited URL. The CIPAV then settles into a silent "pen register" mode, in which it lurks on the target computer and monitors its internet use, logging the IP address of every computer to which the machine connects for up to 60 days.

Under a ruling this month by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, such surveillance — which does not capture the content of the communications — can be conducted without a wiretap warrant, because internet users have no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the data when using the internet.

According to the affidavit, the CIPAV sends all the data it collects to a central <u>FBI</u> server located somewhere in eastern Virginia. The server's precise location wasn't specified, but previous <u>FBI</u> internet surveillance technology — notably its Carnivore packet-sniffing hardware — was developed and run out of the bureau's technology laboratory at the <u>FBI</u> Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

The FBI's national office referred an inquiry about the CIPAV to a spokeswoman for the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, who declined to comment on the technology. The FBI has been known to use PC-spying technology since at least 1999, when a court ruled the bureau could break into reputed mobster Nicodemo Scarfo's office to plant a covert keystroke logger on his computer. But it wasn't until 2001 that the FBI's plans to use hacker-style computer-intrusion techniques emerged in a report by MSNBC.com. The report described an FBI program called "Magic Lantern" that uses deceptive e-mail attachments and operating-system vulnerabilities to infiltrate a target system. The FBI later confirmed the program, and called it a "workbench project" that had not been deployed.

No cases have been publicly linked to such a capability until now, says David Sobel, a Washington, D.C., attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. "It might just be that the defense lawyers are not sufficiently sophisticated to have their ears perk up when this methodology is revealed in a prosecution," says Sobel. "I think it's safe to say the use of such a technique raises novel and unresolved legal issues." The June affidavit doesn't reveal whether the CIPAV can be configured to monitor keystrokes, or to allow the <u>FBI</u> real-time access to the computer's hard drive, like typical Trojan malware used by computer criminals. It notes that the "commands, processes, capabilities and ... configuration" of the CIPAV is "classified as a law enforcement sensitive investigative technique, the disclosure of which would likely jeopardize other ongoing investigations and/or future use of the technique."

The document is also silent as to how the spyware infiltrates the target's computer. In the Washington case, the <u>FBI</u> delivered the program through MySpace's messaging system, which allows HTML and embedded images. The <u>FBI</u> might have simply tricked the suspect into downloading and opening an executable file, says Roger Thompson, CTO of security vendor Exploit Prevention Labs. But the bureau could also have exploited one of the legion of web browser vulnerabilities discovered by computer-security researchers and cybercrooks — or even used one of its own. "It's quite possible the <u>FBI</u> knows about vulnerabilities that have not been disclosed to the rest of the world," says Thompson. "If they had discovered one, they would not have disclosed it, and that would be a great way to get stuff on people's computer. Then I guess they can bug whoever they want."

The FBI's 2008 budget request hints at the bureau's efforts in the hacking arena,

including \$220,000 sought to "purchase highly specialized equipment and technical tools used for covert (and) overt search and seizure forensic operations. ... This funding will allow the technology challenges (sic) including bypass, defeat or compromise of computer systems." With the <u>FBI</u> in the business of hacking, security companies are in a tight place. Thompson's LinkScanner product, for example, scans web pages for security exploits, and warns the customer if one is found. How would his company respond if the <u>FBI</u> asked him to turn a blind eye to CIPAV? He says he's never fielded such a request. "That would put us in a very difficult position," Thompson says. "I don't know what I'd say."

The Washington case unfolded May 30, when a handwritten bomb threat prompted the evacuation of Timberline High School in Lacey, Washington. No bomb was found. On June 4, a second bomb threat was e-mailed to the school from a Gmail account that had been newly created under the name of an innocent student. "I will be blowing up your school Monday, June 4, 2007," the message read. "There are 4 bombs planted throughout Timberline high school. One in the math hall, library hall, main office and one portable. The bombs will go off in 5 minute intervals at 9:15 AM." In addition, the message promised, "The e-mail server of your district will be offline starting at 8:45 am."

The author made good on the latter threat, and a denial-of-service attack smacked the North Thurston Public Schools computer network, generating a relatively modest 1 million packets an hour. Responding to the bomb threat, school administrators ordered an evacuation of the high school, but, once again, no explosives were found. That began a bizarre cat-and-mouse game between law enforcement and school officials and the ersatz cyberterrorist, who e-mailed a new hoax bomb threat every day for several days, each triggering a new evacuation. Each threat used the same pseudonym, but was sent from a different, newly created Gmail account to complicate tracing efforts.

On June 7, the hoaxer started issuing threats through other online mediums. In his most brazen move, he set up a MySpace profile called Timberlinebombinfo and sent friend requests to 33 classmates. The whole time he was daring law enforcement officials to trace him. "The e-mail was sent over a newly made Gmail account, from overseas in a foreign country," he wrote in one message. "Seeing as you're too stupid to trace the e-mail back lets (sic) get serious," he taunted in another. "Maybe you should hire Bill Gates to tell you that it is coming from Italy. HAHAHA. Oh wait. I already told you that it's coming from Italy." As promised, attempts to trace the hoaxer dead-ended at a hacked server in Grumello del Monte, Italy.

The <u>FBI</u>'s Seattle Division contacted the <u>FBI</u> legal attaché in Rome, who provided an official request to the Italian national police for assistance. But on June 12, perhaps fed up with the mocking, the <u>FBI</u> applied for and obtained a



search warrant authorizing the bureau to send the CIPAV to the Timberlinebombinfo MySpace profile. Court documents reveal the search warrant was "executed" June 13 at 5:49 p.m. Though the CIPAV provided a wealth of information, Glazebrook's IP address would have been enough to guide the <u>FBI</u> to the teen's front door. John Sinclair, Glazebrook's attorney, says his client never intended to blow anything up -- "it was a prank from the getgo" -- but admits he hacked into computers in Italy to launder his activities, and that he launched the denial-of-service attack against the school district's network.

Glazebrook was sentenced Monday to 90 days in custody, and given credit for 32 days he's spent behind bars since his arrest. When he's released he'll be on two years' probation with internet and computer restrictions, and he's been expelled from high school. The teen is being held at the Thurston County Juvenile Detention Center, where he will serve out his sentence, says Sinclair. Sinclair says he was told that the FBI had tracked down his client in response to a request from local police — but that he didn't know exactly how the bureau did it.


"The prosecutor made it clear that they wouldn't indicate how this device works or how they do it," says Sinclair. "For obvious reasons." Larry Carr, a spokesman with the <u>FBI</u>'s Seattle field office, couldn't confirm that the CIPAV is the same software previously known as Magic Lantern, but emphasized that the bureau's technological capabilities have grown since the 2001 report. The case shows that <u>FBI</u> scientists are equipped to handle internet threats, says Carr. "It sends a message that, if you're going to try and do stuff like this online, that we have the ability to track individuals' movements online and bring the case to resolution."

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Assistant General Counsel		
OGC, Privacy & Civil Liberties Unit		•
Phone	• •	•
Fax		

THE FOREGOING MAY BE A PRIVILEGED

FBI OGC COMMUNICATION AND SHOULD NOT BE DISSEMINATED WITHOUT OGC APPROVAL



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
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great strategy in id	entifying the Tha	land we think this links for all your help.	would be a
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From: (SE) (FBI) Sent: Monday, June 25, 2007 11:53 AM To: (OGC) (FBI) Cc: (SE) (FBI); Subject: RE: Question	b2 b6 b7C (CG)b7E
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Thanks Hoping to hear a decision soon. The strategy in identifying the Thanks for all your help. SA FBI Seattle Fax) Nextel) DC:	and we think this would be a great b2 b6 b7c b7E
From: QGC) (FBI) Sent: Monday, June 25, 2007 7:55 AM To: SE) (FBI) Subject: Question SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD	
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Assistant General Counsel Science and Technology Law Unit Phone: Secure phone Fax:	

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

OTD) (CON)	
From: (OGC) (FBI) Sent: Monday June 25, 2007, 10:55 AM To: (SE) (FBI) Subject: Question	
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	.
Assistant General Counsel Science and Technology Law Unit Phone: Secure phone: Fax:	

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DATE 09-26-2008 BY 0322UC/LP/STP/gjg

	(OTD) (CON)	
From: Sent: To: Subject:	(OGC) (FBI) Wednesday, June 20, 2007 4:24 PM (OGC) (FBI) Question	b6 b7C
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Since we won't ov	verlap this week (I'm on leave on Friday), I wanted to get your Seattle. Here are the facts:	thoughts on a question I received from SA
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(OTD) (CON)	
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Thanks for your help.	
	b6 b7С FBI) ;
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Here are my comments on my legal review of the application for a search warrant in this case. This application is much better than the previous version, and there are only a few issues that I believe need to be addressed or clar Not a legal point, but check your formatting in para 11. The way the document printed on my computer there wer some problems.	rified.
That's all that I have. I have spoken with and he has no technical issues that need addressing. Let know how we can be of further help. Assistant General Counsel Science and Technology Law Unit Phone: Secure phone Fax: b2 b6 b7c	me
Original Message From: (SE) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2007 1:28 AM To: (OTD) (FBI)	(FBI);

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	it. Copy was also sent to AUSA	to review
made the changes we discussed ear		strategy, decribed the search warrant
by the AUSA's secretary. Hoping to	sign and deploy on Tuesday. Thanks,	The formatting will be cleaned up
<< File: Revised Affidavit for	>>	
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(OTD) (CON)	
From: Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2007 9:25 AM To: (OTD) (FBI) Subject: FW: CIPAV Affidavit - Seattle Division	b6 b7c
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Assistant General Counsel Science and Technology Law Unit Phone Secure phone Fax:	b2 b6 b7c
Original Message From:	.b.7 (SE) (FBI);(SE) (FBI);
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SA FBI Seattle (Fax) (Nextel) DC:	

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(OTD) (CON)	•
From: (OTD) (FBI) Sent: Monday, June 11, 2007 3:38 PM To: (OGC) (FBI) Subject: FW: 288A-SE-93709	b2 b6 b7C
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SSA Operational Technology Division Digital Evidence Section Cryptologic and Electronic Analysis Unit Software Development Group (desk) (cell) (fax-unclass)	
Original Message From:	b1 b2 b7E b6 b7C

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CLASSIFIED BY 0322UC/LP/STP/gjg

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 09-26-2033

SECRET	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Please contact me at the below listed numbers if you have any questions.	
Sincerely,	
SSA	
Operational Technology Division Digital Evidence Section	b2 b6
Cryptologic and Electronic Analysis Unit	ъ7с
Software Development Group (desk)	•
(cell) (fax-unclass)	
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Original Message	
From: (SE) (FBI) Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2007 5:12/PM	
To: (OTD) (FBI) Cc: (SE) (OGA) Subject: 288A-SE-93709	
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	(OTD) (CON)	
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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD	FW: UR5214/SE/THREAT INVESTIGATION	brought to their attention and the
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To:	(PG) (FBI) av. June 08, 2007 12:38 AM (Cyd) (FBI); MOTTA, THOMAS GREGORY (OTD) (FBI) UR5214/SE/THREAT INVESTIGATION	b6 b7C
UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD		
SSA Watch Supervisor - 9	your information is Urgent Report 5214 from FBI-Seattle regarding	ng email bomb threats.
To: FBI_	(SE) (FBI) rsday, June 07, 2007 11:46 PM URGENT REPORTS	b6 b7C b2

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

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UNSUB TIMBERLINE HIGH SCHOOL - VICTIM, COMPUTER INTRUSION - THREAT; 288A-SE-93709

UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

Please see the attached Urgent Report. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.





158brf02.ec (11 KB)

b2 b6 b7C

A/ASAC Seattle Division
SSA - Squad 5
Gang/Criminal Enterprise Program;
Organized Crime Program;
Violent Crimes Program;
Desk:
NEXTEL

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FBI URGENT REPORT

Precedence: IMMEDIATE Date: 06/07/2007

To: Director

SIOC Cyber

Operational Technology

CIRG Rome

From:	Seattl Con	tact:	
Approv	ed By:		b2 b6
			.b70

Drafted By:

Subject/Title/Case ID #: UNSUB;

TIMBERLINE HIGH SCHOOL - VICTIM, COMPUTER INTRUSION - THREAT;

288A-SE-93709

Purpose/Synopsis: OTHER MATTER WARRANTING THE IMMEDIATE

ATTENTION OF FBIHQ EXECUTIVES

INITIAL URGENT REPORT

On 06/06/2007, the Seattle Field Office was contacted by the Lacey Police Department (LPD), Lacey, WA, regarding e-mail bomb threats and Distributed Denial of Service(DDOS) attacks received by Timberline High School, 6120 Mullen Road SE, Lacey, WA, 98503, in the North Thurston Public School District.

The e-mail threats commenced on 06/04/2007, and continue to the present. To date, there have been three e-mail threats that resulted in three separate deployments of K-9 Units from the Washington State Patrol and severe disruption in routine school operations. There has also been an increase in local media coverage of the incidents and growing parental concerns.

The e-mail content has repeatedly demeaned school faculty and teachers and taunts law enforcement. The UNSUB(S) also posted three of the e-mail threats in the "Comments" section of "The Olympian" news online website.

To: Director From: Seattle

Re: 06/07/2007, 288A-SE-93709

Investigation conducted by LPD identified three

Internet Protocol (IP) addresses being utilized,

which at this time are believed to be b7E

proxies. A request for assistance has been forwarded to the by LEGAT Rome.

LPD conducted several interviews on persons of interest, however, no subject have been identified. Logical investigative leads are being pursued.

FBI Seattle is developing a strategy to deploy a Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier (CIPAV) and drafting a search warrant affidavit. Seattle will also coordinate the investigation with LEGAT Rome and the Behavioral Analysis Unit.

FBI involvement in the investigation will not be revealed at this time to facilitate a scenario through which the CIPAV could be successfully deployed.

Graduation at Timberline High School is scheduled for 06/15/2007, and the last day of instruction is 06/21/2007.

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Internet Files\158brf02.ec b7C