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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
9	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA / SAN JOSE		
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11	ONLINE POLICY GROUP, NELSON CHU PAVLOSKY, and LUKE	Case No. 03-4913JF	
12	THOMAS SMITH,	RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' POST- HEARING LETTER AND	
13	Plaintiffs,	SUPPLEMENTAL NG DECLARATION, AND REQUEST FOR EARLY STATUS	
14	v.	CONFERENCE OR REFERENCE TO MEDIATION	
15	DIEBOLD, INCORPORATED, and DIEBOLD ELECTION SYSTEMS,	THE DATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PA	
16	INCORPORATED,	Hearing Date: November 17, 2003 Time: 9:00 a.m.	
17	Defendants.	Courtroom: 3	
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20	Defendants respectfully request leave of the Court to file this response to the November		
21	17 letter by plaintiffs' counsel and the supplemental declaration of Mr. Ng enclosed therewith.		
22	We also advise the Court that Diebold, having issued notifications in good faith compliance with		
23	the DMCA, has decided not to take the additional step of suing for copyright infringement for the		
24	materials at issue. Given the widespread availability of the stolen materials, Diebold has further		
25	decided to withdraw its existing DMCA notifications and not to issue any further ones for those		
26	materials. In light of these developments, we request that the Court hold an early status		
27	conference to discuss resolution of the action, or refer the parties to mediation.		

Diebold remains committed to helping America vote better, and to an open discussion of ways to accomplish that goal. Diebold recognizes the value of the First Amendment to our democracy, including the protection of copyright interests and robust debate on matters of public interest. Diebold's foregoing decisions underscore these commitments.

I. THE SUPPLEMENTAL NG DECLARATION DOES NOT ESTABLISH IRREPARABLE INJURY.

Plaintiffs' post-hearing submission attempts to create "irreparable harm" for plaintiff OPG where none exists. As demonstrated by Mr. Ng's first declaration, Diebold's DMCA notification to Hurricane had no material impact on Hurricane's relationship with OPG. Hurricane did not take down OPG's website, or even threaten to do so. To the contrary, Hurricane represented that it "would not take any action against OPG for its clients' links, pending this legal action." Ng 10/31/03 Decl., par. 18.

Like the first notification, Diebold's second notification requested Hurricane's assistance in terminating infringing activity on the identified websites or "whatever steps you are required to take pursuant to your" DMCA policy. It neither threatened legal action nor asserted that Hurricane is liable for copyright infringement. And it is clear from Mr. Ng's supplemental declaration that Hurricane still has not decided to comply with Diebold's request. He states only that "if the court does [not] grant OPG's motion, or indeed, if the court does not rule expeditiously," Hurricane "will have to seriously consider" terminating OPG's contract. Contrary to the assertion in plaintiffs' post-hearing letter, Hurricane has not "conclude[d]" anything, except that it "would not take any action against OPG for its clients' links, pending this legal action." In short, Hurricane has not caused any injury to OPG. The material stolen from Diebold remains linked to websites hosted by OPG.

II. <u>DIEBOLD'S DECISION NOT TO SUE FOR INFRINGEMENT</u> <u>UNDERSCORES THE LACK OF IRREPABLE INJURY TO THEM.</u>

As a threshold technical matter, Diebold's DMCA notification to Swarthmore College did not refer to the student plaintiffs' website. *See* Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 4 n. 4. Thus, plaintiffs' implication that Swarthmore was required by Diebold's notification

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to take down the infringing material from plaintiffs' website is erroneous. To the contrary, Swarthmore's action was evidently based on the evaluation of its legal counsel that the students' wholesale publication of stolen material was contrary to Swarthmore's policy on Internet use. *Id.*, p. 3.

In any event, the students have now availed themselves of the DMCA's counternotification procedure and, in light of Diebold's decision not to sue for infringement, the
students have no basis for complaint. Under well-established copyright law, the wholesale
publication of stolen material with no transforming analysis was not "fair use," and issuing
DMCA notifications was entirely proper. At this point, however, attempting to take further
steps to enforce copyright interests when infringing material has proliferated across the Internet
would not only be cost-prohibitive but in all likelihood futile. Diebold has informally
encouraged the students to refrain from publishing passwords, source codes, information
protected by employees' privacy interests and trade secret-type information, none of which is
essential for purposes of criticism.

III. AN EARLY STATUS CONFERENCE OR MEDIATION MAY RESOLVE THIS ACTION.

In these circumstances, there is no reason for this action to proceed. If, however, plaintiffs or their counsel are intent on turning this action into a "test case" despite the absence of any present controversy that harms plaintiffs, an early status conference or mediation may be the best way to resolve this action in keeping with Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As noted in Diebold's opposition papers, Count I (contract interference) is fatally flawed because no contract or breach thereof is alleged, and because a copyright owner is justified in giving notice of infringement. Count II (copyright misuse) is non-existent. Count III (section 512(f) misrepresentation) is meritless, *inter alia*, because the challenged notification did not identify the students' website, because Diebold had a good faith belief that wholesale posting or linking to stolen material protected by copyright constitutes infringement, and because employing the DMCA notification procedures without taking the subsequent step of suing for infringement is not bad faith. Count IV (declaratory relief) is either premature given the lack of injury to

1	plaintiffs, moot in light of Diebold's decision not to sue	, or wrong on the merits for the reason
2	2 just stated.	
3	3	
4	4 Dated: November 24, 2003 JONE	ES DAY
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6		bert A. Mittelstaedt
7	/ 	
8 9	DIEB DIEB DIEB INCO	neys for Defendant OLD, INCORPORATED, AND OLD ELECTION SYSTEMS, ORPORATED
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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Yumi Bennett, declare:

I am a citizen of the United States and employed in San Francisco County, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 555 California Street, 26th Floor, San Francisco, California 94104. On November 24, 2003, I served a copy of the within document(s):

1. RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' POST-HEARING LETTER AND SUPPLEMENTAL NG DECLARATION, AND REQUEST FOR EARLY STATUS CONFERENCE OR REFERENCE TO MEDIATION

 by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set
 forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m.

by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at San Francisco, California addressed as set forth below.

by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed <u>FEDERAL EXPRESS</u> envelope and affixing a pre-paid air bill, and causing the envelope to be delivered to a FEDERAL EXPRESS agent for delivery.

by personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.

Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. STANFORD LAW SCHOOL CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305-8610 Phone: (650)724-0014

Fax: (650)723-4426

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on November 24, 2003, at San Francisco, California.