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5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COOLEY GODWARD LLP PETER J. WILLSEY* ADAM L. BAREA* One Freedom Square, Reston Town Cer 11951 Freedom Drive Reston, VA 20190-5656 Phone: (703) 456-8000 Fax: (703) 456-8100 *Not admitted in the Central District of Attorneys for Defendants NCSOFT CORPORATION AND NC INTERACTIVE, INC.	
13 14		S DISTRICT COURT ICT OF CALIFORNIA
15	WESTER	N DIVISION
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	Marvel Enterprises, Inc. and Marvel Characters, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. NCSOFT CORPORATION, CRYPTIC STUDIOS, Inc. and NC Interactive, Inc. Defendants.	Case No. 04CV9253 RGK MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF DEFENDANTS NCSOFT CORPORATION AND NC INTERACTIVE, INC. TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Date: February 7, 2005 Time: 9:00 a.m. Courtroom: 850 (Roybal)
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I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Kids with wandering imaginations have long decorated school notebooks with pictures of fantastic and supernatural beings of their own design. The ingenuity of individuals, as expressed through the creation of characters incorporating timeless themes of mythology, patriotism, "good," and "evil," has been a source of entertainment in the form of role-playing games for ages. In the face of technology that enables individuals to engage in such activities in a virtual, on-line context, Marvel Enterprises, Inc. and Marvel Characters, Inc. (collectively, "Marvel") have taken the unprecedented step of attempting to appropriate for themselves the world of fantasy-based characters, based upon alleged rights in works purportedly embodied in four comic books.

Despite Marvel's efforts to shoehorn thirteen counts into its First Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), this case hinges upon Marvel's claims that the acts of players of defendants' "City of Heroes" game in creating their own characters directly infringe Marvel's trademarks and copyrights. Noticeably absent, however, are allegations of specific acts of infringement by players of the game. Marvel's Complaint amounts to a barrage of hypothetical statements about what players might do. Marvel also fails to allege facts that support a finding that such potential expressions of players' imaginations would constitute infringement, or facts that would support its suspect claims that the defendants have directly infringed its rights. For these and other reasons, the Complaint must be dismissed.

A. Defendants' Online Game and Creative Tool, "City of Heroes"

The following facts come from Marvel's Complaint, with elaboration from the City of Heroes Game Manual referenced in the Complaint, of which the Court may take judicial notice. *See Van Buskirk v. CNN*, 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); *Barron v. Reich*, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); Fed. R. Evid. 201.

¹ Defendants NCsoft Corporation and NC Interactive, Inc. bring this motion, but the arguments here equally apply to defendant Cryptic Studios, Inc., as the complaint treats them all the same.

 A copy of the Game Manual is submitted as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Adam L. Barea ("Barea Decl."); *see* the Request for Judicial Notice filed herewith.

Defendants created, distribute, and facilitate the online play of the "City of Heroes" game. Complaint ¶ 1. City of Heroes is a "massively multiplayer online [MMO] game," by which players create customized avatars called "Heroes" which then enter "Paragon City" by way of defendants' Internet servers and interact with each other. *Id.* Players create their Heroes using the game's software, or "Creation Engine," guided by the Game Manual. *Id.* ¶¶ 1, 16.

The Creation Engine offers the player a variety of different attributes, powers, and appearances to choose from in creating a Hero. First the player chooses one of five "origins" – "mutant," "science," "technology," "natural," or "magic." Complaint ¶ 17; Game Manual at 5-6. Then the player chooses one of five "archetypes" that determine the genre of powers the Hero has – "blaster," "controller," "defender," "scrapper," or "tanker." Complaint ¶ 17; Game Manual at 6-8. After that, the player chooses the specific primary and secondary powers the Hero will have. Complaint ¶ 17; Game Manual at 9, 30. Next the player chooses the Hero's gender and build. Complaint ¶ 17; Game Manual at 10.

The player then selects the Hero's appearance and costume from a wide variety of different skin tones, facial features, hairstyles, masks, helmets, and costume styles. Complaint ¶ 17; Game Manual at 10-11. The Game Manual states that there are millions of possible unique costume combinations. Game Manual at 10. Finally, the player chooses a name for the Hero. Complaint ¶ 20. The player can then send the Hero into Paragon City to interact with other Heroes. *Id.*

The Creation Engine is simply a high-tech version of a box of crayons or a set of building blocks, from which players can turn their ideas into (virtual) reality.

The Game Manual depicts illustrations of numerous, differently-costumed heroes. Game Manual. One, named "Statesman," appears throughout the manual to give hints on game play, and on the game box. *Id.*; Complaint ¶ 30.

B. Marvel's Purported, Unspecified Intellectual Property Rights

Marvel is shrewdly vague about which of its rights have been violated. It alleges copying of "numerous Marvel Characters" totaling "over 4,700," *see*, *e.g.*, Complaint ¶¶ 14, 30-33, yet it pleads copyright registrations in only four issues of comic books.² Any such claims are limited to those four works.

Marvel also alleges four registered trademarks – the words CAPTAIN AMERICA, THE INCREDIBLE HULK, WOLVERINE, and X-MEN – for comic books and illustrated magazines.³ Marvel suggests it owns common-law rights in a "star emblem that identifies Captain America," Complaint ¶ 62, but does not allege that it has used the emblem to identify its products, a basic requirement of a trademark. Its claims are thus limited to the four registered word marks.

C. Marvel's Untenable Theories For Seeking to Quash the Game

Marvel's primary claims are for copyright infringement (Counts 1-3) and trademark infringement (Counts 4-9). Marvel also asserts three business tort

² These registrations, none of which appear to be owned by either plaintiff, are:

[•] Copyright Registration B958840 for the March 1, 1962 issue of *The Incredible Hulk*, in the name of Zenith Publishing Corp. (Complaint ¶ 25 and Exh. A).

[•] Copyright Registration B51855 for the July 2, 1963 issue of *The X-Men*, in the name of Canam Publishers Sales Corp. (Complaint ¶ 26 and Exh. B).

[•] Copyright Registration B463904 for the Jan. 2, 1968 issue of *Captain America*, in the name of Leading Magazine Corp., Marvel Comics Group (Complaint ¶ 27 and Exh. C).

[•] Copyright Registration B956186 for the Aug. 4, 1974 issue of *Incredible Hulk*, in the name of Marvel Comics Group, a division of Cadence Industries Corp. (Complaint ¶ 28 and Exh. D)

³ The registrations are:

[•] U.S. Trademark Registration No. 854655 for the word trademark CAPTAIN AMERICA for "a magazine published periodically, particularly comic books and magazines" (Complaint ¶ 60; Exhibit 3 to Barea Decl.).

[•] U.S. Trademark Registration No. 890917 for the word trademark THE INCREDIBLE HULK for "publications, particularly comic books and magazines and stories in illustrated form" (Complaint ¶ 60; Exhibit 4 to Barea Decl.).

[•] U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1395639 for the word trademark WOLVERINE for "publications, particularly comic books and magazines and stories in illustrated form" (Complaint ¶ 60; Exhibit 5 to Barea Decl.).

[•] U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1161898 for the word trademark X-MEN for "publications, particularly comic books and magazines and stories in illustrated form" (Complaint ¶ 60; Exhibit 6 to Barea Decl.).

claim (Count 13) derives from the contributory and vicarious copyright claims; it seeks a judicial declaration that defendants have no defense to infringement under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C. § 512.

1. Copyright-Based Claims

claims (Counts 10-12) based on the copyright and trademark claims. Marvel's last

The central theme of Marvel's copyright-based claims is not that there has been any actual copying, just that it is "possible" for players to use the Creation Engine to infringe. Complaint ¶ 19. Its objection that City of Heroes "brings the world of comic books alive," id. ¶1, assumes Marvel owns the world of comic books, and that budding artists should be denied a creative tool, to stop them from imitating a "Marvel Character" that may or may not be copyrighted. Indeed, it does not allege copying of any of the four copyrighted comics identified in the Complaint; just copying of unspecified "Marvel Characters."

Marvel's theory of how a player might create a character that purportedly resembles its "Wolverine" shows that City of Heroes, far from "encouraging" copying of Marvel characters, offers numerous creation options to design a Hero using general attributes or themes (e.g., the nature of a "mutant," a specialty in combat, regeneration powers) that cannot be monopolized under copyright.

To its main premise that defendants have created a tool allowing *players* to infringe its copyrights, Marvel adds one charge of direct infringement by *defendants*: that Statesman "is a blatant rip-off of Marvel's Captain America." Complaint ¶ 30. But the Complaint reveals that Statesman does not resemble Captain America – for one thing, he is distinguished by an ancient Greek-style helmet; Captain America is not. Complaint ¶ 16; Game Manual, cover. The only alleged similarity is that both have a white star on their chests. *Id*.

2. Trademark-Based Claims

Echoing its copyright theory, Marvel's trademark claims are based primarily on the idea that because City of Heroes lets players name their

Heroes, players *might* give them names of Marvel characters. Complaint ¶ 20. Marvel does not allege that this has ever happened, and in fact admits that it is not possible to give Heroes the names "Wolverine" or "The Hulk." *Id.* Nevertheless, trademarks by definition are names or symbols used in commerce to identify goods or services. Names that players give their Heroes are not trademarks, because the Heroes are not products or services offered for sale by the players.

Marvel also charges defendants with direct infringement of a registered mark, making the remarkable assertion that the name "Statesman" is likely to be confused with the word trademark CAPTAIN AMERICA. Marvel also appears to claim that the Statesman character is likely to cause confusion with the design of the Captain America character even though the two bear little resemblance.

3. California Business Tort Claims

Marvel's claims for "intentional interference with actual and prospective advantage," violations of California Business and Professions Code section 17200 *et seq.*, and common law unfair competition are all based on the allegations of copyright and trademark infringement. Complaint ¶¶ 110, 115, 120. Marvel essentially contends that City of Heroes impairs its ability to license its characters for use in competing software games. *Id.* ¶¶ 109, 110.

4. Declaratory Relief Claim

Defendants have a DMCA procedure under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), by which copyright owners may seek redress for alleged infringements. Instead of using that, Marvel wants the Court to rule that defendants may not invoke the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA as a defense to Marvel's copyright claims, Complaint ¶¶ 125-26, even though defendants have not yet asserted that defense.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. On such a motion, a court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true, *Cahill*

unwarranted deductions of fact based on unreasonable inferences or conclusory statements. *Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors*, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). **III. ARGUMENT**

v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996), but not those that are

A. Marvel Has Failed to State a Claim for Copyright Infringement

The Complaint contains three claims for copyright infringement, all of which fail. Count 1, for direct infringement, fails because Marvel has not pleaded that defendants committed any act of infringement – or even that the purportedly-infringed works (the "Marvel Characters") are covered by any of the pleaded registrations. Count 2, for contributory infringement, fails because Marvel has not pleaded facts supporting an underlying infringement and defendants' knowledge thereof. Count 3, for vicarious infringement, fails because Marvel has not pleaded an underlying infringement, nor a direct financial benefit to defendants.

1. Count 1 Fails Because Marvel Has Not Pleaded Any Act of Direct Copyright Infringement

To claim copyright infringement, Marvel must plead that: (1) it owns a valid copyright; and (2) defendants copied its protectible expression or violated another of the exclusive rights of copyright. *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc.*, 213 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1165-66 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 17 U.S.C §§ 106 *et seq.* One can show copying by substantial similarity between the parties' works and that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work, *Langman Fabrics v. Graff Californiawear, Inc.*, 160 F.3d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing 4 M. NIMMER AND D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.02[B]), but Marvel has not done so.

a. Marvel Has Not Pleaded A Violation Of A Valid Copyright It Owns

A copyright registration is a prerequisite to an infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). The only copyright registrations pleaded

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are those in the four comic books.⁴ Yet Marvel does not allege infringement of those copyrights, just the copying of "numerous Marvel Characters... including, but not limited to, Captain America, Wolverine, and The Incredible Hulk" Complaint ¶ 30. This is not merely a technicality. Any of the unregistered "Marvel Characters" may themselves derive from other works, and thus would not be "original works or authorship" protectible by copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).

Marvel Has Not Pleaded Direct Acts By Defendants b. In Violation Of Any Purported Copyrights

Even assuming that the "Captain America," "Wolverine," and "The Incredible Hulk" characters constitute protectible expression covered by the pleaded registrations, Marvel has not pleaded any direct acts of infringement.

Instead, Marvel makes the unsupported and conclusory allegations that "Defendants knowingly and willfully copied numerous Marvel Characters," Complaint ¶ 30, and that defendants "infringe[d] on Marvel's rights in and to its copyrighted works by marketing, distributing and facilitating their City of Heroes game and otherwise exploiting rights that belong exclusively to Marvel." *Id.* ¶ 32. Such conclusory allegations should be disregarded. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.

"[A] claim of infringement must state ... which specific original work is the subject of the copyright claim, that plaintiff owns the copyright, that the work in question has been registered in compliance with the statute and by what acts and during what time defendant has infringed the copyright." Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 82CV8697, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15688 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1983). "Plaintiffs must also... state by what act or acts on what dates defendants infringed the copyrights." Id. Because there is no specific allegation that City of

⁴ None of the registrations, on their face, are owned by either plaintiff. Complaint, Exhs. A-D, and thus Marvel lacks standing to sue.

⁵ See also Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 816, 820 (W.D. Mo. 1986) ("To be sufficient under Rule 8 a claim of infringement must state ... which specific original work is the subject of the copyright claim," quoting Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 643 (E.D.Pa.

Heroes contains any material copied or derived from any of the four copyrighted comics, Marvel's allegations make it impossible for defendants to form a defense.

The closest Marvel comes to pleading an act of direct infringement is the charge that Statesman is a "rip-off" of Captain America. Complaint ¶ 30. Marvel has not provided depictions of either character – not surprisingly, because what little the Complaint says reveals that the two are not substantially similar.⁶

The only alleged similarity is the presence of a white star on their chests and a "patriotic" theme, Complaint ¶¶ 30, 62, and this is wholly insufficient to support Marvel's claim for direct infringement. Marvel does not allege that a costume bearing a white star on the chest constitutes an original work of authorship owned by Marvel. Marvel also fails to allege any copyright interest in the patriotic red, white and blue colors of Captain America's costume. Patriotic themes are ideas, not copyrightable expression, and the expression of those themes through the use of colors and symbolic elements of a flag are time-worn "scenes a faire" — i.e., features typically used to depict a common idea — that cannot be monopolized by anyone. *Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc.*, 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); *Apple Computer Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994).

Form-fitting costumes with chest emblems are common to the superhero genre, rather than unique aspects of Captain America. Warner Bros., Inc. v.

^{1979));} Sharp v. Patterson, 03CV8772, U.S.Dist.LEXIS 22311 at *48 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2004) ("The obligation to identify the infringing and infringed works in a pleading is not satisfied by alleging a mass infringement of 69 different copyrighted letters by five different novels").

⁶ Statesman has a helmet; Captain America does not. Complaint ¶ 16. Captain America's signature weapon is his shield; Statesman has no shield. Id.; Game Manual (Exh. 1 to Barea Decl.), cover. Captain America's suit includes an elastic half-mask with a prominent letter "A" on the forehead and winglets above the ears; Statesman lacks these distinctive motifs. See Depictions of Captain America from Marvel Website (Exh. 7 to Barea Decl.); Game Manual, cover; City of Heroes Game Box (Exh. 2 to Barea Decl.). Statesman's costume is primarily red, with sides of blue and white stars along the upper arms. Game Manual, cover. Captain America's costume is all blue, with red and white stripes across the abdomen portion and a piece of scaled armor around the upper torso. Exh. 7 to Barea Decl. Captain America's body has grossly exaggerated muscular definition; Statesman's does not. Exh. 7 to Barea Decl.; Game Manual, cover.

21.

American Broadcasting Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir. 1981) (observing that "tight-fitting acrobatic costumes" were standard apparel for superhero characters). And a white star, such as those on the American flag, is a standard emblem to express a patriotic theme, unlike Superman's distinctive "S" shield or Batman's Bat logo. Even if the star is reminiscent of Captain America, "[s]tirring one's memory of a copyrighted character is not the same as appearing to be substantially similar to that character, and only the latter is infringement." Warner Bros., 720 F.2d at 242.

The idea that Statesman is an infringement of Captain America is absurd, and reflects that Count 1 is a throwaway claim. The heart of Marvel's claims is in Counts 2 and 3, which charge that by creating and selling City of Heroes, defendants enable users to imitate "Marvel Characters." Those claims fail as well.

2. Count 2, For Contributory Infringement, Fails Because Marvel Has Pleaded Neither a Primary Infringement Nor Defendants' Knowledge

To plead contributory copyright infringement, Marvel must allege (1) direct infringement by a primary infringer; (2) knowledge thereof; and (3) material contribution to the infringement. *Ellison v. Robertson*, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). Marvel has not sufficiently pleaded the first two elements.

a. Marvel Has Failed To Plead A Direct, Primary Infringement

Marvel has not alleged that any player of City of Heroes ever violated any of the exclusive rights of whoever owns the copyrights to the four comic books that are the subject of the pleaded registrations. There is no allegation that any player copied original artwork from any of those comic books. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (elements of infringement include "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original").

Moreover, of the alleged thousands of Marvel characters, the only two that Marvel even alleges can be imitated despite the many design options of the Creation Engine are Wolverine and The Hulk, Complaint ¶¶ 19-21, thus conceding substantial non-infringing uses to which the Creation Engine can and is applied.

Marvel seeks to squelch the creation of unique characters that spring from the imaginations of individual players. Even if players did make their own versions of Marvel characters, that no doubt would be a fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107, and thus not an infringement. To avoid a chilling effect and to allow pleading a fair use defense where it applies, Marvel must specify its claims precisely.

b. Marvel Has Not Pleaded Defendants' Knowledge Of Any Direct Infringement

Because Marvel has failed to plead an underlying infringement, by definition there can be no knowledge thereof by defendants, and thus no contributory infringement. Even if Marvel had done so, its claim would fail because it has not pleaded defendants' actual knowledge of infringement.

Showing that the product at issue – the Creation Engine – is capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses defeats Marvel's claim of contributory copyright infringement. *A&M Records v. Napster*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001). If the product is not capable of such noninfringing uses, constructive knowledge is enough. *Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417, 441-42 (1984). But if it is capable of such uses, plaintiff must show defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringements and failed to act on that knowledge to prevent the same. *Id.*

Marvel's allegations demonstrate that the Creation Engine is capable of such noninfringing uses. Its description of how "Heroes" are created reflects that the Creation Engine allows players to use their creativity to design their own Heroes. Complaint ¶¶ 17-21. Indeed, although Marvel alleges that "virtually all of the Marvel Characters" fall into the "Mutant" genre, Complaint ¶ 17, the Creation

Engine provides four other "Origins" from which to choose. *See* Game Manual (Exh. 1 to Barea Decl.); City of Heroes Game (Exh. 9 to Barea Decl.).

Thus Marvel must plead that defendants reasonably knew of *specific infringements* and failed to act on that knowledge to stop them. Instead, Marvel merely charges that defendants "knew or should have known that a significant number" of players were infringing the "Marvel Characters." Complaint ¶ 40.

In short, Marvel wants this Court to presume that the over 4,700 "Marvel Characters" are protected by the four pleaded registrations, that some players of City of Heroes have in fact copied them, and that defendants are aware of these unidentified infringements of unspecified works. Such conclusions are insufficient to plead a claim. *See Marvel Entertainment Group*, U.S.Dist.LEXIS 15688 at *7; *Hartman*, 639 F.Supp. at 820; *Gee*, 471 F.Supp. at 643.

3. Count 3, for Vicarious Copyright Infringement, Fails Because Marvel Has Pleaded Neither A Primary Infringement Nor A Direct Financial Benefit to Defendants

Vicarious copyright infringement has three elements: (1) direct infringement by a primary party; (2) a direct financial benefit to the defendant; and (3) the right and ability to supervise the infringers. *Napster*, 239 F.3d at 1022. Marvel fails to plead the first two elements, thus warranting dismissal of Count 3.

a. Marvel's Failure to Plead a Primary Violation Defeats Its Claim

As Marvel has not alleged any specific acts of direct infringement of Marvel's copyrights by any users of City of Heroes, its claim fails.

b. Marvel's Failure To Plead A Direct Financial Benefit From Infringing Activity Likewise Defeats Its Claim

Marvel's sole allegation of a financial benefit to defendants is that users of City of Heroes pay \$14.95 to play the game. Complaint ¶ 49. This Circuit has, however, endorsed the view of Congress that "receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments for service ... [ordinarily] would not constitute receiving a 'financial interest directly attributable to the infringing activity.'" *Ellison*, 357

F.3d at 1079 (citing S. Rep. 105-190, at 44). Thus, the Ellison court found that America Online ("AOL") was not liable for users' posting of copyrighted items on a newsgroup. *Id*.

The exception is that "where the value of the service lies in providing access to infringing material," courts might find such one-time set-up fee and flat periodic fees to constitute a direct financial benefit. *Id.* An example is the swap meet in *Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.*, 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1996), where the sale of pirated recordings was a "draw" for customers. *Ellison*, 357 F.3d at 1078. "[T]he central question of the 'direct financial benefit' inquiry ... is whether the infringing activity constitutes a draw for subscribers, not just an added benefit." *Id.* at 1079.

If City of Heroes had two sets of character options, one "generic" set, and another "premium" set with the unique costumes, logos, and powers of copyrighted characters, and charged an extra price for access to the premium set, Marvel might have an argument that defendants derive a direct financial benefit from allegedly infringing activity. But that is not what Marvel alleges. The Complaint lacks any well-pleaded allegation that City of Heroes players are drawn to the game in order to infringe or to access infringing material, as opposed to play the game. The fee paid by players is no different from the fee AOL users paid for their service, and not a financial interest directly attributable to infringing activity.

B. Marvel Has Failed To State A Trademark Infringement Claim

The Complaint asserts six claims under the Lanham Trademark Act: Count 4 for direct infringement of federally-registered marks, Count 5 for contributory infringement of registered marks, Count 6 for vicarious infringement of registered marks, Count 7 for direct infringement of common law marks, Count 8 for contributory infringement of common law marks, and Count 9 for vicarious infringement of common law marks. All are insufficient.

⁷ In Count 4, Marvel adds that it owns registrations for the marks WOLVERINE, X-MEN, and HULK, Complaint ¶¶ 59-60, but does not allege infringement thereof. Id. ¶¶ 61-62.

1. Counts 4 and 7, For Direct Trademark Infringement, Fail Because Marvel Has Failed To Allege Defendants' Use Of An Infringing Mark

In Counts 4 and 7, Marvel alleges that defendants' use of the name "Statesman" and the Statesman character in the City of Heroes game infringes trademark rights associated with its "Captain America". The only difference is that Count 4 is brought under Section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), which requires a federal trademark registration, and Count 7 is brought under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, which does not.

a. Count 4, For Direct Infringement Of A Registered Mark, Fails Because "Statesman" Cannot Infringe "Captain America"

In Count 4 Marvel objects to defendants' "Statesman" character, and states that "Defendants' use of the star emblem that identifies Captain America, together with the use of the name 'Statesman,' which suggests the patriotic qualities of Captain America, is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)." The claim is frivolous.

Section 32(1)(a) creates liability for use of any "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of a registered mark that is likely to cause confusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). To state a claim for infringement of the CAPTAIN AMERICA mark, Marvel must allege that defendants' use of the term "Statesman" is likely to cause confusion or mistake as to the origin of the goods. *New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, Inc.*, 595 F.2d 1194, 1201-1202 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Jockey Club, Inc. v. Jockey Club of Las Vegas, 595 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1979). If the pleadings show that confusion is unlikely, the claim should be dismissed. *See Murray v. Cable NBC*, 86 F.3d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790-791 (9th Cir. 1981)).

Marvel's registration for CAPTAIN AMERICA is only for the words themselves, not any design or logo. Registration No. 854655, Exh. 3 to Barea Decl. The allegation that both characters sport a "star emblem" is irrelevant: the comparison is of the words "Statesman" and CAPTAIN AMERICA.

The name "Statesman" obviously is not a "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of the words CAPTAIN AMERICA. The terms sound and look different, and have different meanings. Since a finding of likely confusion would be unreasonable, the Court should dismiss Count 4 with prejudice.

b. Count 7, For Direct Infringement Of A Common Law Mark, Likewise Fails Because Marvel Has Failed To Identify A Protectible Mark

Count 7 is based on Lanham Act section 43(a)(1)(A), which provides a cause of action for use in commerce of false designations of origin likely to cause confusion with another's goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Russolio, 186 F. Supp.2d 1055, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2000). To state a claim, Marvel must plead that: (1) its mark is valid (i.e., it is sufficiently distinctive to function as a trademark); (2) it used the mark first; and (3) there is a likelihood of confusion. Kendall Jackson Winery v. E.J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998). As to the first element, Marvel must plead a symbol or device it has used in commerce, and that such mark is sufficiently distinctive to serve as an indicator of the source of its goods or services. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).

The key problem is that Marvel has not pleaded what has been infringed. If it is the word mark CAPTAIN AMERICA, the word "Statesman" is so dissimilar that there is no likelihood of confusion as a matter of law, as shown above.

To the extent Marvel argues it has trademark rights beyond the words themselves, the claim is defective because it has not pleaded what those rights are. It calls "Statesman" "a character that clearly is derivative of Marvel's Captain America," Complaint ¶ 85, and says that the "use of the star emblem that identifies

Captain America, together with the use of the name 'Statesman,' which suggests the patriotic qualities of Captain America," is likely to cause confusion. *Id.* ¶ 86.

Yet there is no specific allegation of what the claimed mark is, other than that it has a star emblem. Is it an illustration of the Captain America character? If so, what does it look like? Or is the mark a logo? Does the logo contain words?

Nor is there an allegation of use as a mark. An illustration of Captain America as it might appear inside a comic is just story artwork and not a source identifier. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9. The claim fails.

2. Counts 5 and 8, For Contributory Infringement, Fail For Lack Of A Primary Violation, Because A Player's Naming A Hero Is Not An Infringement

The theory behind Marvel's Counts 5 and 8 is that "[t]he City of Heroes Creation Engine enables defendants' customers/subscribers to identify their heroes using names that violate Marvel's trademarks in the Marvel Characters," Complaint ¶¶ 68, 92, and thus defendants are contributorily liable for those violations. This ignores that the use of a name other than on or in connection with goods or services is not trademark use, and cannot be infringement.

To state a claim for contributory infringement, Marvel must plead that defendants: (1) intentionally induced users of City of Heroes to infringe Marvel trademarks, or (2) continued to supply the game to users knowing they were using it to infringe. *Fonovisa*, 76 F.3d at 264-65 (citing *Inwood Labs.*, *Inc. v. Ives Labs.*, *Inc.*, 456 U.S. 844, 854-55 (1982)).

Naming a game player is not an infringement because the Lanham Act only applies to words or other symbols used to identify goods or services in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (civil liability arises when a person uses a mark "in commerce" which is likely to cause confusion); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (civil liability arises when a person uses a mark "in commerce" which is likely to cause confusion). A "trademark" is a word or symbol one uses "to identify or distinguish his or her goods . . . and to indicate the source of the goods." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

In Lucasfilm Ltd., v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C. 1985), defendants used plaintiffs' "Star Wars" mark in public debate as shorthand for a controversial missile defense plan. Because they were engaged in promoting ideas and not commercial activity, they were not creating confusion. Id. The court in Felix the Cat Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1856, 1858 (C.D. Cal. 2000) dismissed an infringement claim because the use of plaintiff's cartoon character as a device to set the mood in defendant's movie did not "qualify as use of the mark 'to identify or distinguish' goods 'to indicate their source' as required to fall under the purview of trademark law." (citation omitted).

Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held in *New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc.*, 971 F.2d 302, 305, 307 (9th Cir. 1992), that a paper's "New Kids on the Block" feature did not infringe because it was a nominative fair use – a reference to the group. "Cases like these are best understood as involving a non-trademark use of a mark - a use to which the infringement laws simply do not apply." *Id.*

The Complaint lacks any allegation that users have in fact adopted actual Marvel trademarks as Hero names – and in fact Marvel concedes that it is not possible to select the names WOLVERINE and THE HULK. Complaint ¶ 20-21. Marvel alleges, however, that names like "Wolverine20," "Woolvereen," and "Hulk10" can be chosen. *Id.* Assuming, arguendo, that these are confusingly similar to Marvel's trademarks, their use by players as names for game characters is not use of marks in commerce to identify goods and/or services.

If someone sells a software product and calls it "Microsoft" without permission, that probably would be trademark infringement. If, on the other hand, he calls his pet goat "Microsoft," that would not. That is not use of a trademark in commerce. The same is true of a player's naming of his Hero.

⁸ There are no Heroes in City of Heroes with these names. As Marvel knows, a number of names, including names of Marvel characters, are on a "block list" and cannot be selected. Thus the claim fails for the additional reason that defendants have done nothing to encourage players to use Marvel character names, and indeed have prevented such use.

Because naming a Hero is not a use of a mark to identify the source of goods in commerce, there is no underlying infringement to support Count 5 or Count 8.

3. Counts 6 and 9, For Vicarious Trademark Infringement, Also Fail For Lack of a Primary Violation, As Well As Marvel's Failure To Plead A Joint Relationship

Marvel's vicarious infringement claims in Counts 6 and 9 likewise fail for lack of a primary violation, and for the independent reason that Marvel has not pleaded the joint relationship required for vicarious liability.

The plaintiff must plead that the defendant and the primary infringers "have an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind one another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product." *Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.*, 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 1992). There is no such allegation here nor can there be, as by Marvel's own allegations, the third parties are hundreds of thousands of players whose actions defendants cannot possibly control.

C. Marvel's California Business Tort Claims Likewise Fail

Marvel's deficient claims of copyright and trademark infringement are the basis for its state business tort claims: Count 10, for intentional interference with actual and prospective economic advantage, Count 11, for unfair competition in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., and Count 12, for unfair competition under California law. They fail as well.

1. The Intentional Interference Claim in Count 10 Fails

To state a claim of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, Marvel must plead that: (1) an economic relationship exists between Marvel and another containing a probable future economic benefit to Marvel; (2) defendants knew of the relationship; (3) defendants intended to disrupt the relationship; (4) defendants engaged in wrongful conduct that was not privileged; (5) an actual disruption in the relationship occurred; (6) Marvel was harmed as a result of defendants' acts; and (7) defendants' wrongful conduct was a

⁹ Marvel Press Release "Marvel Has Unprecedented Presence At E3, Confirming Power of the Marvel Brand Within Video Game Industry" (May 14, 2004), Exh. 8 to Barea Decl.

substantial factor in causing Marvel's harm. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CACI) § 2202 (2003); see also Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 376, 393, 902 P.2d 740, 751 (1995); PMC, Inc., v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 4th 579, 603 (1996).

As to the fourth element, Marvel must plead that defendants "engaged in conduct that was wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself." *Della Penna*, 11 Cal. 4th at 393, 902 P.2d at 751. It only restates the deficient "wrongful acts of copyright and trademark infringement." Complaint ¶ 110.

Marvel also does not allege that defendants knew of, and set out to damage, Marvel's business relationships. Marvel merely asserts that "Defendants knew or should have known that licensing and merchandising the Marvel Characters is Marvel's core business," *see* Complaint ¶ 109. Since actual knowledge of Marvel's prospective relationships is required to satisfy the second element of the claim, *Della Penna v. Toyota*, 11 Cal. 4th at 393, 902 P.2d at 751, the failure to plead it warrants dismissal.

Had Marvel alleged actual knowledge, the claim would still fail because Marvel has not alleged that defendants' conduct actually disrupted an existing relationship between Marvel and Universal and/or Activision. Nor can it, because Marvel admits that it has licensed the "Marvel Characters" to Universal Games and Activision for video games. Thus Marvel cannot satisfy the fifth and sixth elements, disruption and actual damage. For these reasons, Count 10 fails.

2. Count 11 Fails To Plead A Violation Of Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.

Business and Professions Code section 17200 defines unfair competition as "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice." Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Count 11 is based on defendants' alleged "infringement of Marvel's intellectual property rights and intentional interference with Marvel's business relationships." Complaint ¶ 116. This is not enough: a plaintiff "must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation." *Silicon Knights v. Crystal Dynamics*, 983 F. Supp. 1303, 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citation omitted). Having failed to plead infringement or intentional interference, Marvel has not asserted, "with reasonable particularity," "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice." Count 11 should be dismissed.

3. Count 12, For Common Law Unfair Competition, Fails For The Same Reasons Marvel's Trademark Claims Fail

In Count 12, Marvel recasts its previously alleged infringement and intentional interference claims as unfair competition. Complaint ¶ 120. At the outset, Marvel's charges of copyright infringement and intentional interference are irrelevant here, because neither can be the basis for a common law unfair competition claim. *Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc. v. Fireworks Entm't Group, Inc.*, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (Copyright Act); *Bank of the West v. Superior Court*, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1263 (1992) (intentional interference).

California common law unfair competition claims are substantially congruent to Lanham Act claims. *See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema*, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1930, 1936 at fn. 6 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing *Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc.*, 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996)). Because Marvel's Lanham Act claims are deficient, Count 12 should too be dismissed.

D. Count 13 Fails Because Marvel Cannot Use The Declaratory Judgment Act To Obtain An Advisory Opinion About A Defense Not Yet Pleaded

Declaratory relief is limited to actual controversies. It cannot be used to get an advance ruling on the merits of a defense to a claim where the defense has not been raised and the claim itself might not survive the pleading stage. But that is what Marvel wants this Court to do in seeking a judicial declaration that

defendants cannot assert the "safe harbor" provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C. § 512, as a defense to a copyright claim.

It is inappropriate to seek declaratory relief as to the validity of a defense that may or may not be raised. *Calderon v. Ashmus*, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998) "Such a suit does not merely allow the resolution of a 'case or controversy' in an alternative format ... but rather attempts to gain a litigation advantage by obtaining an advance ruling on an affirmative defense." *Id.; see also Bilbrey v. Brown*, 738 F.2d 1462, 1470 (9th Cir. 1984). Count 13 should be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

City of Heroes is a tool that encourages originality, not slavish copying. It allows young and old to exercise their imaginations to create super-powered beings and send them off to interact with the creations of other individuals in a virtual world called Paragon City. If it should be banned, then so should the #2 pencil, the Lego block, modeling clay, and anything else that allows one to give form to ideas. In Marvel's view of the world, if people should play online games with super heroes, they must only play with licensed Marvel characters, and imagination shall be damned. Marvel's attempt to monopolize online "hero" games and quash creativity has no basis, and its complaint should be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

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