Ъ6 Ъ7С	From: Sent: Thursday, March 29, 20 To:	(OGC) (FBI); OGC)
	(FBI); Subject: FW: RFPA NSI issue UNCLASSIFIED	(OGC) (FBI)
	NON-RECORD	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-26-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/J
b6	FY Original Message From: Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2007 4:19 Pt To: (OGC) (FBI)	1
b7C b2	Cc: (FBI) Subject: RFFA NSI ISSUE	
b7E	UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD	
.b6		
b7C	After our conversation I spoke to	
b5 b6 b7C	needs to clarify this issue.	I think OGC
.070	Thanks,	
	UNCLASSIFIED	
	<u>Unclassified</u>	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Precedence: ROUTINE		Date: 03/08/2	007
	To:	Attn:	SAC ASAC CDC	
b2 b7E	Inspection	Attn:	IIS, CRS	
b6 b7C	From: Office of the Ge NSLE/GILU/Roo Contact: SSA	m. 7947]
	Approved By: Thomas Ju		ATE: 11-26-2007 LASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSI EASON: 1.4 (c) ECLASSIFY OM: 11-26-2032	R/JB
	Drafted By:	į,	Crewster our risko-role	
(U)	Case ID #: 278-HQ-	C1229736-V10 (E	Pending)	
b2 (U)	Title: INTELLIGE MATTER 20	NCF OVERSIGHT BC	ALL INFORMATION DARD HEREIN IS UNCLAS WHERE SHOWN OTHER	SIFIED EXCEPT
(U)	Synopsis: It is to Counsel (OGC) that the below) must be reported (IOE). OGC will prepart to the IOE.	matters in secti to the Intellig	ons A and B (design gence Oversight Boar	ated d
	(U) Der Dec	ived From : G-3 lassify On: 25x	<u> </u>	
(U) ·····	Administrative: Information from the foldated 02/22/2007 from to OGC r	llowing document he eporting eight p	es: (1) a copy of th Field Office Potential IOB matter	e EC
(U) o2 o7E	opted in one EC. The EC was and our response will be continuity purposes. The from the audit conducte which took place offices.	divided into fiv e drafted in a s hese reported IC	similar manner for DB matters are all d	, A-E, erived l (OIG)

SECRET From: Office of the General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-V10, 03/08/2007 b2 b7E Reference: X 278<u>-HO-</u>C1229736-VIO, serial 2218 62F -97317, serial 63 (U) - Details: -- X By EC dated 02/22/2007, written documentation of eight issues that require a review of the facts in order to determine whether they warrant reporting to the IOB. In our opinion, as to three issues (the one in section A and the two in section B), it does. Our analysis follows. (S) A. (S)b1b2 The issue brought to the attention b7E and OGC, by the OIG, was that allegedly issued a National <u>Security Letter (NSL)</u> without obtaining required approval A detailed r EC indicate that ACS and the actions may have resulted in an unintentional erro-(S) On 10/29/2003, Philadelphia drafted and submitted an EC to FBIHO requesting The case agent, as taught, provided expiration date of 01/29/2004 in his communication requesting an making the assumption his request would be approved. FBIHQ did not respond to his request until 12/01/2003. In its response, FBIHO granted <u>I</u>n its respinse, FBIH<u>O did not</u> date entered by the change agent. Because of this failure, to all now reading this b1 disument, a presumption is made that b2 granted by FBIHO should be added onto b7E Hiwever, this never formally approved by FBIHO. Therefore, given by FBIHQ should


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
(S) To make the matter above more complicated, FBIHQ, after

already having granted requested on 02/05/2004 that Letterhead Memorandum (LHM)

because FBIHO advised

b2	SECRET
b7E	Tr: From: Office of the General Counsel Re: T78-HQ-C1209736-V10, 03/08/2007
(S)	
b1 b2 b7E	(S) It is apparent, that the error was compounded by the fact that a new set of Attorney General Guidelines came into effect on 10/31/2003, further confusing the proper expiration date. Any error made by in the described case was not malicious in nature, and was made in good faith. Had the case agent been aware that the case and not the mistakenly believed date or this error would have never occurred. Unfortunately for the errors reflected on the previous communications in the case file caused an NSL to be issued on 06/23/2004, Although never received any information
b1 b2 b7E b4 b7D	from the carrier concerning this request, the issuing of the NSL still constitutes a violation which is reportable to the IOB. (S) B. (S) (S) (S) (S) (S) (S) (S) (S
b2 (U) b7E	advised that all information received by this unintentional oversight was sequestered in the safe of their Chief Division Counsel. advised that the improperly obtained information has not been used in their investigation. recognizes the error and that the improperly collected information, although unintentional, constitutes a violation which is reportable to the IOB. b1 (3) C. b2 b7E





SUMMARY

- (U) The President, by Executive Order 12334, dated 10/04/1981, established the President's Intelligence Oversight Brand (FIOB). On 09/13/1993, by Executive Order 12863, the President renamed it the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) and established the Board as a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Among its responsibilities, the IOB has been given authority to review the FBI's practices and procedures relating to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence collection.
- (U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order 12863 mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, Inspection Division (INSD), and the General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel (OGC), respectively) report to the IOB intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and

b2

b7E

To: _____ From: Office of the General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-V10, 03/08/2007

Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with EO 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed to ensure the protection of individual rights.

- administrative in nature and not deemed to have been designed to ensure the protection of individual rights are generally not reported to the IOB. The FBI Inspection Division is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations fir three years so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request. The determination as to whether a matter is "administrative in nature" must be made by OGC. Therefore, such administrative violations must be reported as potential IOB matters.
- NSLs are a specific type of investigative tool that allows the FBI to obtain certain limited types of information without court intervention: (1) telephone and email communication records from telephone companies and internet service providers (Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709); (2) records of financial institutions (which is very broadly defined) (Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.§ 3414(a)(5)(A)); (3) a list of financial institutions and consumer identifying information from a credit reporting company (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 1681u(a) and (b)); and (4) full oredit report in an international terrorism case (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 1681v). NSLs may be issued in conformity with statutory requirements, including 18 U.S.C.§ 2709. NSIG, section V.12.
- In these eight potential IOB matters, OGC believes that only three, these in sections A and B, warrant reporting to the IOB. The other five matters are a result of administrative or third-party errors. In regard to the relevant but unintentionally collected information, is instructed to keep all information sequestered until a discussion is had with the issuing entity. As to the reportable matters in sections A and B, OGC will prepare a cover letter and a memorrandum to report these matters to the IOB.

SECRET b2 b7E П., From: Office of the General Counsel Re: /8-HO-C1229736-V10, 03/08/2007 LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON, DC (U) For action deemed appropriate. Set Lead 2: (Action) AΤ In matters involving over-collected materials, the Field Office should contact the parties in which NSLs were served and allow the entities to determine whether the b2 improperly or unintentionally acquired information should be b7E returned or destroyed with appropriate documentation to the file. If the information is relevant, a new MSL requesting the previously unrequested information may be submitted to the entity. (U) is reminded of its responsibility, pursuant to Deputy Director Pistole's directive of 03/06/2007, to review all counterintelligence cases utilizing NSLs to determine if other full credit reports under 15 U.S.C. § 1681v were improperly obtained.

**

cc:

b6 b7C Thomas

Library

	b2 b7E	SECRET	
		INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT FOARD (TOB) MATTER FIELD OFFICE TOB MATTER 2007 (U) ON 11-25-2007	sr/#B
(U) ·	Field Office FBI submitted billing confusion and NSL was error Clarificate FBI audit sequester carrier pro-	By electronic communication dated February 22, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ce	b2 b7E b4
(U) C	seeking <u>fu</u> made avail issued to the part of	By electronic communication dated February 22, reported that, on November 23, 2004, FBI- submitted two NSLs in an intelligence investigation ll credit reports pursuant to a statute specifically able for terrorism matters only. These NSLs were This mistake was an error on f FBI , who has since sequestered all received from these erroneously issued NSLs.	b7D
(^{U)}	from these	Due to the incorrect actions stated above, FBI- has taken steps to sequester all documents obtained two incidents. The errors were discovered during an	b2

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Despite the inadvertent nature of the mistake, the fact remains that information was improperly collected. The improper collection of this information was a violation of the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations.


Thus, the matter is being reported to the IOB.


OIG audit of the FBI's

Field Office

From: Sent: Thursday Ma To: (FBI Subject: NSL Field QU SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD	PEPEIN IS	D6 D7C MATION CONTAINED UNCLASSIFIED 6-2007 BV 65179 DMH/KSR/JB
l am getting a question similar to a	#5 on sheet.	b5 b6 b7c
Office of General Counsel National Security Law Branch Counterintelligence Law Unit 202-324		.b6 .b7C

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED






SEGRET RECORD XXXXX Julie: As we discussed last week, b5 b6 b7C Do you want to meet some time to discuss these issues?
do you have plans to come to FBIHQ? will not be available to discuss these issues until next Tuesday. She has a double

Subject:


RE: FYI - IOB policy

ear infection and will be out of the office the rest of the week. Thank you. b6 -----Original Mes b7C (OGC) (FBI) From: Tuesday, May 23, 2006 8:56 AM THOMAS, JULIE F. (OGC) (FBI) Sent: To: (OGC) (FBI) OGC) (FBI); Cc: (OGC) OGC)(FBI) (FBI); FW: FYI - IOB policy Subject: **SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED** NON-RECORD last week and she said Julie, I was discussing IOBs with that **b**6 b7C b5 b6 b7C ----Original Message (OGC) (FBI) From: **b**6 Friday, April 07, 2006 3:47 PM Sent:

b7C




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


b5

OGC will be issuing official guidance to reflect the principles set forth above shortly.
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DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1 SECRET
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National Security Law Branch Counterintelligence Law Unit 202-324

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