S H

CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JW

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DATE: 05-25-2007

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-25-2032

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1073946


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

	WHERE SHOUN OTHERWISE
	Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 01/04/2007
	To: Inspection Attn: IIS, Room 11861 General Counsel Attn: NSLB, Room 7975
	From: Contact: ISS
	Approved By: b6 b7C b2
	Drafted By: ksh b7E
	Case ID #: (U) 278-HO-C1229736-VIO (Pending)-2037 (U) 278 -C26391 (Pending)-274 bl (S) (Pending)-23
	Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB);
	SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT B6 SPECIAL AGENT B7C REPORT OF A POTENTIAL IOB MATTER
b1 b7D	Synopsis: (%) To report a possible IOB violation involving receipt of unsolicited telephone toll records (U) (X) Derived From: G-3 Declassify On: X1
	(S)×(
	Reference:(S)(X) Serial 11 (U) 278-HQ-C1229736 Serial 2570
	Details: (S) In accordance with reporting requirements relating to known or suspected Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violations, per reference 2, notification is being made to the Office of General Counsel regarding unsolicited telephone toll
	50 MILLEY DAN 3/20/07

NSL VIO-1533

b7C

Jan 1 - 6138



b2 b7E

To: Inspection From:

Re: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 01/04/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Request IIS take appropriate action as necessary in response to this potential IOB matter. $\,$

Set Lead 2: (Action)

GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) At NSLU, review information provided herein and act as deemed appropriate.

**

SECRET

Precedence: ROUTINE	Date: 02/05/2007
To:	Attn: IIS A/CDC
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT b6 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE b7C Counterintelligence b2 b7E	DATE: 05-25-2007 CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/J PEASON: 1.4 (C) DECLASSIFY ON: 05-25-2032
Inspection	Attn: IIS,
From: Office of the General Cou NSLB/CILU/Room 7947 Contact: AGC	202-324
Approved By: Thomas Julie F	<u>)() </u>
Drafted By:	
(U) Case ID #: (X) 278-HQ-C1229736-	VIO Serial $2(99)$ (Pending)
(U) tie: -> INTELLIGENCE OVERS MATTER 2007-	
Synopsis: (X) It is the opinion Counsel (OGC) that this matter is lintelligence Oversight Board (IC) maintained in the control file for the IOB. Our analysis follows.	on of the Office of the General s not reportable to the
(U) Derived From Declassify O	√: G-3 2n: 02/05/2032
b2 information from the EC dated 01	ronic communication (FC) contains //04/2007 from the Field ing a potential IOB matter.
Details: (X) By EC dated 01/04 OGC review the facts of the capt it warrants reporting to the IOB opinion, the FBI is not required	ioned matter and determine whether
1 - 2037 sec	SRET
OIG/DOJ REVIEW DATE: 3/14/12 7 66 FBI INVESTIGATION: 67C	NSL VIO-1536

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,	S), (x)
b1	drafted an NSL pursuant
b2	to 18 U.S.C. § 2709 seeking subscriber information for a
b7E	telephone numbe <u>r that was believed to be used by subject.</u> The
	NSL was sent to
b7D	
_	
2	received the requested the requested
7E	subscriber information along
7 D	toll records pertaining to the requested number.
	the toll records was immediately turned over to the
1	Acting Chief Division Counsel for sequestration.
	neering entire britisten counser for sequestration.

- (U) The President, by Executive Order 12334, dated 12/04/1981, established the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB). On 09/13/1993, by Executive Order 12853, the President renamed it the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) and established the Board as a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Among its responsibilities, the IOB has been given authority to review the FBI's practices and procedures relating to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence collection.
- Section 2.4 of Executive Order 12863 mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, Inspection Division (INSD), and the General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel (OGC), respectively) report to the IOB intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with EO 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed to ensure the protection of individual rights. Violations of provisions that merely are administrative in nature and not deemed to have been designed to ensure the protection of individual rights are generally not reported to the IOB. The FBI Inspection Division is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations for three years so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request. determination as to whether a matter is "administrative in

				`		
To:		From:	Office	of the	General	Counties of
Re:	278-HQ-C12	29736-VI	10, 02/0	05/2007		

b2

b7E

nature" must be made by OGC. Therefore, such administrative violations must be reported as potential IOB matters.

- (U) On 03/28/2006, the FBI's National Security Law Branch (NSLB) sent a letter to the Counsel for the IOB requesting their concurrence to treat third party errors as non-reportable, though NSLB would still require the field to continue to report any improper collection under an NSL as a potential IOB matter. By letter dated 11/13/2006, the Counsel to the IOB agreed that third party errors in the collection of information pursuant to an NSL must be reported to the FBI OGC, but are not reportable to the IOB.
- (U) In the instant case the collection of toll record information was not the fault of ______ Once it was discovered that the information was beyond the scope of the NSL request, the information was immediately sequestered and the matter was reported to OGC.
- (U) Based upon these facts, in accordance with the terms implementing the reporting requirements of Section 2 4 of EO 12863, it is our opinion that this error is not reportable to the LOB. A record of this decision should be maintained in the control sile for future reviet by the Counsel to the LOB.

b2 _{To:} From: The fice of the General Counsel 278-AQ-C1229736-VIC, 02/05/2007 $b7E_{Re}$: LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action) **INSPECTION** AT WASHINGTON, DC (U) INSD should retain a record of the report of the potential IOB matter, as well as a copy of the OGC opinion concluding that IOB notification is not required, for three years for possible review by the Counsel to the IOB. Set Lead 2: (Info) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AT WASHINGTON, DC (U) For information. 'Set head Sr (Action) (X) If deemed relevant should submit the appropriate NSL requesting the toll records or If the information is not relevant does not seek their return, should be return or destroyed with appropriate documentation placed in the file.

IOB Library

b2 b7E

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SECRET

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:	ROUTINE	Date: 03/28/2007
To: General	Counsel Attn:	NSLB
Int	ternal Inve <mark>stigations Sectio</mark>	on, IPU, Room 3041 Ext. b6
Approved By:	Miller David Ian	
Drafted By:		b2
Case ID #:	(U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO	(Pending)
Title: (U)	INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOA INSD/IIS TRACKING# 3443 OGC/IOB# 2007	ard matter b2
(IOB) matter	to the Office of General Co	
Reference:	(U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Se 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Se	
an EC from possible IOB is the IIS's administrative conducted	Division dated 01/0 error. Based upon a review opinion the incident descrive issue. Therefore, no into by the IIS and this matter	04/2007, reporting a w of the referenced EC it ibed therein is an ternal investigation will is being relegated to the
	To: General From: Inspection Into Contact Con	From: Inspection Internal Investigations Section Contact: CRS Approved By: Miller David Ian Drafted By: Case ID #: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOY INSD/IIS TRACKING# 3443 OGC/IOB# 2007 Synopsis: (U) To report a potential Internal


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 05-25-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JU

SECKET//20320328 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 03/28/2007	
To: SAC (Personal Attention)	
From: Inspection Internal Investigations Section, IPU, Room 3041 Contact: CRS Ext.	
Approved By: Miller David Ian Declassified by 65179 DMH/KSR/JW	b6 b7
Drafted By: 0N 05-25-2007	b2
Case ID #: (U) 263-HQ-0-U - 738 (Pending)	
Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER INSD/IIS TRACKING# 3443 OGC/IOB# 2007	
Synopsis: (U) To advise that captioned reporting of potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation has been reviewed by the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), and is not considered willful misconduct. This matter is returned to the field for corrective action as appropriate. Case closed at IIS.	
(U) Derived From: G-3 Declassify On: 20320328	
Enclosure(s): (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2037	
Enclosure(s): (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2037 Reference: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2037 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2199	
Reference: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2037	
Reference: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2037 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2199 Details: (U) Upon review of Division's captioned report of a potential IOB violation, IIS did not find the matter indicative of willful misconduct. IIS only addresses allegations	
Reference: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2037 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2199 Details: (U) Upon review of Division's captioned report of a potential IOB violation, IIS did not find the matter indicative of willful misconduct. IIS only addresses allegations where deliberate and/or aggravated misconduct is evident. (U) IIS recognizes and appreciates that this matter was brought to our attention as required by the revisions mandated by National Security Law Branch/OGC EC, dated 11/16/2006	
	From: Inspection Internal Investigations Section. IPU, Room 3041 Contact: CRS Approved By: Miller David Ian DEGLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JW DW 05-25-2007 Case ID #: (U) 263-HQ-0-U - 738 (Pending) Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER INSD/IIS TRACKING# 3443 OGC/IOB# 2007 Synopsis: (U) To advise that captioned reporting of potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation has been reviewed by the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), and is not considered willful misconduct. This matter is returned to the field for corrective action as appropriate. Case closed at IIS.

SECRET//20320212 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Precedence:	ROUTINE			Date:	02/12/2007	
	To: Inspect General	lion Counsel		Attn:	ADC TS, Room		
	From: Co	ontact: SA				b2	
	Approved By:	<u>L</u>					Ξ
	Drafted By:			1		ALL INFORMAT	C MTAINED
(ប)	Case ID #:	(\$) 278 <u>-60</u> (\$) 278 (\$) 621	C1229736 A95380 A89455-1		2154 168 20	HEREIN IS UNCLA WHERE SHOWN OTH	SSIFTED EXCEP
	Title: (U)	REPORT OF INTELLIGEN) (IOB) E	RROR	
(U)	Synopsis: (S	() To repor	t possibl	e IOB err		DATE: 05-25-2007 CLASSIFIED BY 651	.79 DMH/KSR/JW
	(U) \)8	Der	ived From	n : G-3 On: 02/12		PEASON: 1.4 (C) DECLASSIFY ON: 05	
	Details:						
	(S) 1.						
	(S) 2.					·	
_ n (U))(X) 3. Po	ssible IOB	Frror:				
ol '"	/ \		BIIOI.				•
	(S)						
(U)	-(X) 4. De delays).	scription o	f IOB Err	or (inclu	ding any	reporting	
ſ	<u>(S</u>) A Nation	al Securi	tv Letter	(NSL) records	-	コー
b1 b7D				II Or	recoras		
b6 b7C	CRS	3/20/07 kon	5ECRE	T//203202 NSL V	12 TO-1542		- 1 2 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1



SECRET//20320212

b2 To: Inspection From: b7E(U) Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 02/12/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.


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SECRET//20320212

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	Precedence:	ROUTINE		Date: 3/2/07
	Counter Inspect	intelligence ion .	Attn: SAC, CDC Attn: AD Attn: IIS, CRS	, ADC
b6 b7C b2	Na ⁻ Coi	al Counsel tional Security Affa: ntact: Julie F. Thor	nas III	LL INFORMATION CONTAINED EREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT HERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
b7E	Approved By:	Thomas Julie AM	<u>/</u>	Section (Control of Advances Wilderstein
	Drafted By:			DATE: G5-25-2007 CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/J
(U) ···	Case ID #:	\S\\ 278-HQ-C1229736 (\$) 278-A95380- \S\\ 62F-A89455_	5-VIO-2234 -75 - 101	REASON: 1.4 (C) DECLASSIFY ON: 05-25-2032
(U) ···	Title: (X)	POSSIBLE INTELLIGEN 2007- b2	• •	ARD MATTER
(U) ·	therefore not decision show	It is the opinion that no error was of thing need be reported in the Counsel to the	committed in this ed to the IOB. A the investigation	s matter, and A record of this
	J)	J) Derived from : Declassify On:	G-3 X1	
(U)	Reference: (K b2 (S b7E (£	278-HQ-C1229736-N 278 -A95380 62F -A89455	1105enia 2154	,
	Details: (S)	<u> </u>		
b1 b7D				
_		b6 sed	RET	
OIG/DOJ FUI INVE DIG/DOJ	 	DATE: 3/14/8	NSL VIO-1545	

SECRET



- (U) The President, by Executive Order 12334, dated 12/04/1981, established the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB). On 9/13/1993, by Executive Order 12863, the President renamed it the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) and established the Board as a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Among its responsibilities, the IOB has been given authority to review the FBI's practices and procedures relating to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence collection.
 - (U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order (E.O.) 12863, dated 09/13/1993, mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, INSD, and the General Counsel, OGC, respectively) report to the IOB "concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential Directive." This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with E.O. 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed to ensure the protection of individual rights. Violations of provisions that merely are administrative in nature and not

b2 From: Office of the General Counsel b7E 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 3/02/07 Re: deemed to have been designed to ensure the protection of individual rights are generally not reported to the IOB. Inspection Division is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations for three years so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request. The determination as to whether a matter is "administrative in nature" must be made by OGC. Therefore, such administrative violations must be reported as potential IOB matters. NSLs are a specific type of investigative tool that allows the FBI to obtain certain limited types of information without court intervention: (1) telephone and email communications record from telephone companies and internet service providers (Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709; (2) records of financial institutions (which is very broadly defined) (Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.§ 3414(a)(5)(A); (3) a list of financial institutions and consumer identifying information from a credit reporting company (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§n 1681u(a) and (b); and (4) b1full credit report in an international terrorism case (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 168v). NSLs may be issued in conformity with statutory requirements, including 18 U.S.C. § 2709. (S) Here, during an authorized investigation, the FBI properly served an NSL In response to the properly served NSL, the FBI obtained containing information beyond what it is legally authorized to receive. The FBI, having ascertained were beyond the scope of the NSL, forwarded the b1 unasked for information to the ADC for sequestering and redacted b7D

SECRET

their files to reflect only information responsive to the NSL.

for future review by the Counsel to the IOB.

By agreement with the Counsel to the IOB, it is our opinion that this error is not reportable to the IOB. A record of this decision should be maintained in the control file



From: Office of the General Counsel 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 3/02/07

b2 b7E

> (Read and Clear) Set Lead 1: stact with the provider and s) Aeturn original documents which reflect information beyond the scope of the NSI (S) (Info) for destroy, at the providers option, b1 b7D Set Lead 2:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC


(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Read and clear. (U)



	Precedence:	ROUTINE	I	Date:	03/28/2007
	To: General	Counsel	Attn: NSLB		
o 6		ction cernal Investigation ntact: CRS	s Section. IPU, Ext.		3041
o7C	Approved By:	Miller David Ian		cinestro:	ed by 65179 dmh/ksr/Jw
02	Drafted By:			05-25-2	
į	Case ID #:	(U) 278-HQ-C122973	6-VIO (Pending	3)	
(U	Title: (U)	INTELLIGENCE OVERS INSD/IIS TRACKING# OGC/IOB# 2007		ΞR	b2
,-	Synopsis: ()	to the Office of Ge			
	Reference:	278A95380 S	-VIO Serial 2154 erial 68 -VIO Serial 2234		
o2 o7E	an EC from IOB error. IIS's opinion nature. The by the IIS an	Division dated Based upon a review the incident description of the matter is being they deem appropriately.	02/12/2007, report the reference ibed therein is investigation within the relegated to	porting ed EC : admin: ill be	g a possible it is the istrative in conducted


SECKET//20320328 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


b2	Precedence: ROUTINE	Date:	03/28/2007					
	To:	tn: SAC (Persona	l Attention)					
	From: Inspection Internal Investigations S Contact: CRS	ection, IPU, R <u>oom</u> Ext.	3041					
	Approved By: Miller David Ian		SIFIED BY 85179 DWH/KSP/JW					
b7C b2	Drafted By:	***************************************	25-2007					
√.a	Case ID #: (U) 263-HQ-0-U - 754	(Pending)						
	Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGH INSD/IIS TRACKING# 36							
	OGC/IOB# 2007	b2						
	Synopsis: (U) To advise that captioned reporting of potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation has been reviewed by the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), and is not considered willful misconduct. This matter is returned to the field for corrective action as appropriate. Case closed at IIS.							
	(U) Derived From: Declassify On:	G-3 20320328						
	Enclosure(s): (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-	VIO Serial 2154						
o2	Reference: (U) 278-HO-C1229736-VI 278 A95380 Seri 278-HQ-C1229736-VI	.al 68						
7E	Details: (U) Upon review of of a potential IOB violation, IIS dindicative of willful misconduct. where deliberate and/or aggravated	id not find the m IIS only addresse	atter s allegations					
	(U) IIS recognizes and ap brought to our attention as require National Security Law Branch/OGC EC (278-HQ-C1229736, serial 2570).	d by the revision	s mandated by					
	THIS EC IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARA	TED FROM CLASSIFI	ED ENCLOSURE.					
	**							

SECRET//20320328

NSL VIO-1550

SECRET//20320201 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION





SECRET//20320201

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b7E LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

GENERAL COUNSEL


AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.

SECRET



	Precedence: ROUTINE		Date: 2/21/2007
1 6	To:	Attn:	SSA SA CDC
b6 b7C	Counterintelligence	Attn:	CD-4
b2 b7E	Inspection	Attn:	IIS, CRS
	From: Office of the General Cour NSLB/CILU/Room 7947 Contact: AGC	nsel	, 202-324-
	Approved By: Thomas Julie # 1/1	<i>)</i>	
	Drafted By:		2202
(U) ···	Case ID #: (x) 278-HO-C1229736-1	VIO (P	ending)
(U)	Title: (X) INTELLIGENCE OVERS		
	Synopsis: (X) The Field the Office of the General Counse determine whether it warrants repoversight Board (IOB). It is the incident does not need to be reported should be maintained in the coupy Counsel to the IOB.	Office 1 (OGC) porting e opinio	requested that review an incident and to the Intelligence on of OGC that the the the IOB. Rather, this
	(U) Derived From Declassify On	: G-3 n: 2/2	1/2032
	Administrative: (X) This electrinformation from: the EC dated 2, reporting a potential IOB matter.	701/200	ommunication (EC) contains 7 from to OGC
(U) ·	Reference: 278-HQ-C1229736-	-vio ve	nial 2119
CLA REA	E: 05-30-2007 ASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JW SEC ASON: 1.4 (C) CLASSIFY ON: 05-30-2032	RET	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
	DATE: 3/14/27 b6 VESTIGATION: DATE: 3/14/27 b6 b7C	NS	L VIO-1555



Section 2.4 of Executive Order (E.O.) 12863, dated 09/13/1993, mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, INSD, and the General Counsel, OGC, respectively) report to the IOB "concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive." This language was adopted verbatim from E.O. 12334, dated 12/04/1981, when the IOB was known as the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB). By longstanding agreement between the FBI and the IOB (and its predecessor, the PIOB), this language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of the Attorney General Guidelines for National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with E.O. 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed in full or in part to ensure the protection of the individual rights of U.S. persons. Violations of provisions that are essentially administrative in nature need not be reported to the IOB. The FBI is required, however, to



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b2	151.73		er and	Office	of	the	General	Counsel
b7E	Re.	778-HQ	-C12297	36-VIO,	2/2	21/2	007	

maintain records of such administrative violations so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request.

(U) On 03/28/2006, the FBI's National Security Law Branch (NSLB) sent a letter to the Counsel for the IOB requesting their concurrence to treat third party errors as non-reportable, though NSLB would still require the field to continue to report any improper collection under an NSL as a potential IOB matter. By letter dated 11/13/2006, the Counsel to the IOB agreed that third party errors in the collection of information pursuant to an NSL must be reported to the FBI OGC, but are not reportable to the IOB.

	(U) In the instant case the collection of information
	by the FBI was not the fault of FBI Once the case agent
b2	discovered that he had received information beyond the scope of
b7E	the NSL request, the case agent immediately notified the
	CDC and notified Thereafter, all copies and
	emails regarding this request were deleted and or destroyed. As
	a result, this matter does not need to be reported to the IOB.

SECRET b2 b7E To: From: Office of the American Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 2/21/200/ LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Info) **INSPECTION** AT WASHINGTON, DC (U) For information. Set Lead 2: (Info) **COUNTERINTELLIGENCE** AT WASHINGTON, DC (II)For information. Set Lead 3: (Action) b2 b7E is requested to coordinate with to has the appropriate protocols in place to prevent similar types of disclosures in the future. b7E b7D

b1 cc:

1- Ms. Thomas
1
1- IOB Library

b6 b7C

++

SECRET

b2 b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:	ROUTINE	Date: 01	3/28/2007
To: General	Counsel Attn: NSL	3	
	etion ternal Investigations Section, tact: CRS	PU, Room 304 Ext.	41
Approved By:	Miller David Ian b6	ALL INFORMATI HEREIN IS UNG	O - 2 - 1 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2
Drafted By:	b7	C DATE 05-26-20)07 BY 65179D M H/KSR/JW
Case ID #:	(U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO (Fe.	ıuıng)	
Title: (U)	INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD ! INSD/IIS TRACKING# 3555 OGC/IOB# 2007	MATTER	b2
Synopsis: (U (IOB) matter Law Branch (N	J) To report a potential Intell to the Office of General Counse NSLB).	gence Overs: el, National	ight Board Security
Reference: ((U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial		
an EC from IOB error. EIIS's opinior nature. Then by the IIS ar	Internal Investigations Solutions Division dated 02/01/2007 Based upon a review of the reference of the incident described thereing refore, no internal investigation this matter is being relegated on they deem appropriate.	reporting a renced EC it is administ on will be co	a possible is the trative in onducted

NSL VIO-1559

SEXRET//20320328 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Precedence:	ROUTINE		Date:	03/28/2007
	To:]	Attn: SAC (Personal	Attention)
o6 o7C	In Co	ction ternal Investigation ntact: CRS	E	PU, Room 3	3041
o2 o7E	Approved By:	Miller David Ian	ta .		
J/Li	Drafted By:			DECLASSII ON 05-26-	TED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JW 2007
÷ .	Case ID #:	(U) 263-HQ-0-U -	749 (Pending	;)	
	Title: (U)	INTELLIGENCE OVERS INSD/IIS TRACKING# OGC/IOB# 2007		ATTER b2	
	Intelligence the Internal willful misc	U) To advise that ca Oversight Board (IC Investigations Sect conduct. This matter action as appropriate	DB) violation tion (IIS), and t is returned	ting of phas been do is not to the fi	reviewed by considered ield for
	(U)	Derived From Declassify	G-3 m: 20320328		
	Enclosure(s)	: (U) 278-HQ-C12297	736-VIO Serial	2119	
	Reference:	(U) 278-HQ-C1229736 278-HQ-C1229736			
b2 b7E	of a potenti indicative o	J) Upon review of al IOB violation, II of willful misconducterate and/or aggravate	IS did not fin	nd the mat addresses	tter allegations
	brought to o National Sec	I) IIS recognizes and our attention as requ ourity Law Branch/OGO 9736, serial 2570).	ired by the r	revisions	s matter was mandated by
	THIS EC IS U	NCLASSIFIED WHEN SEF	PARATED FROM C	CLASSIFIE	ENCLOSURE.
	••				

SECRET//20320328

NSL VIO-1560


SECRET


3619

Precedence: ROUTINE	Date: 02/05/2007
To: Inspection Division	Attn: IIS
Office of the General Coun	sel Attn: NSLB
From:	
Contact: SA	1
Approved By:	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
	HEPEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCE WHERE SHOWN UTHERWISE
Dun Stad Pour	
Drafted By:	and the second second
Case ID #: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-	
(U) 278 -C136372	(Pending) $\frac{\text{Classified By 6:}}{\text{Classified By 6:}}$ $\frac{\text{D2}}{\text{NH/KSI}}$
Title: (U) REPORT OF A POTENT	FIAL IOB MATTER DECLASSIFY ON: 05-26-2032
(U) REPORT OF A POTENT	FIAL IOB MATTER
Synopsis: (U) To report potent (IOB) matter.	tial Intelligence Oversight Board
(U) Derived From Declassify	n : G-3 On: X1
Details:	
Case Background and Case Agent	
(9)	
Gara TDV	
Case ID#: (S)	b1
ille (\$\frac{2007}{2007}\) SEC	CRET
	b6 b7C
CRS Kno 08 26/07	NSL VIO-1561
	Angel of the second of the sec
2/16/07/	

SECRET

	Precedence: ROUTINE	Dat	te: 02/05/2007	
	To: Inspection Division	Attn:	IIS	
	Office of the General Counsel	Attn:	NSLB	
	From:		7	
	Contact:			
	Approved By:		ALL INFORMATION CONT. HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFI WHERE SHOWN OTHERWIS)	ED EXCEPT
b2	Drafted By:		DATE: 05-26-2007	
b7E b6 b7C	Case ID #: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO		7	79 DMH/KSR/JI -26-2032
U/C	(U) 278 -C136372	(Pending)	1-124	
	Title: (U) REPORT OF A POTENTIAL	IOB MATTER		
	(U) REPORT OF A POTENTIAL	IOB MATTER		
	Synopsis: (U) To report potential (IOB) matter.	Intelligend	ce Oversight Board	
	(U) Derived From : Declassify On:	G-3 X1		
	Details:			
	Case Background and Case Agent			7
Г	(s			-
				b1 b6 b7C
L				
	Case ID#:	b 1		
	(S) secret	•		





To: Inspection Division From:

Re: $(U)^{\frac{1}{2}}$ 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 02/05/2007

b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION DIVISION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.

Set Lead 2: (Action)


OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.

SECRE

Precedence: ROUTINE		Date	: 03/0	5/2007	
To:	Attn:	SAC CDC			
Counterterrorism	Attn:	ITOS1, C	ONUS 4,		
Inspection	Attn:	IIS		MATION CONTAI UNCLASSIFIED	
b2 NSLB/CTLU I Contact:				WN OTHERWISE	1
b6 b7C Approved By: Thomas Julie FAD	N	- 62	CLASSI Reason	05-26-2007 FIED BY 6517: : 1.4 (C) SIFY ON: 05-	
Drafted By:	_	7233			##:::##:##
Case ID #: (S) 278-HO-C1229736-V (S) 278-C136372		Pending) Pending)	b1 b2		
(U) Title: (X) INTELLIGENCE OVERS		ard 2	b7E		
(U) Synopsis: (X) It is the opinion Counsel (OGC) that the above reference over analysis follows.	erenced	matter n	eed not	be	1
(U) (S) Derived From Declassify On	√. G-3 n: 03/	05/2032			
(U) Reference: 278-HQ-C1229736-V	VIO Ser	ial 2153			
Details: (5) By electronic commod by 5, 2007 and referenced above, the b2 reported to the OGC's National Set b7Ethe Inspection Division this potential	ecurity	l Law Brane	Divisior ch (NSLE	3 I I	
/01					1_ 4
	_				b1 b6 b7C
SEC	RET				b7A
3/4/0/ b6	NSI	VIO-1566		v	



(2	, pursuant to this authorized investigation, a National Security Letter (NSL) was issued
	to produce all financial
	records pertaining
JAL	
(S) ·	provided the records and they were received by SA
01	. Upon review, SA found
06	provided the records requested but had also included records for which had not been
o7C o2	requested.
b7E	SA contactedChief
b7D _	Division Counsel, who advised send the
	records to
	be seguestered.

(U) The President, by Executive Order 12334, dated 12/04/1981, established the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB). On 09/13/1993, by Executive Order 12863, the President renamed it the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) and established the Board as a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Among its responsibilities, the IOB has been given authority to review the FBI's practices and procedures relating to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence collection.

(U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order 12863 mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, Inspection Division (INSD), and the General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel (OGC), respectively) report to the IOB intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with EO 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed to ensure the protection of individual rights. Violations of provisions that merely are administrative in nature and not deemed to have been designed to ensure the protection of individual

secret

b2 To: From: Office of General Counsel b7E(U) Re: - (\$\infty 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 03/05/2007

rights are generally not reported to the IOB. The FBI Inspection Division is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations for three years so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request. The determination as to whether a matter is "administrative in nature" must be made by OGC. Therefore, such administrative violations must be reported as potential IOB matters.

that allows the FBI to obtain certain limited types of information without court intervention: (1) telephone and email communication records from telephone companies and internet service providers (Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709); (2) records of financial institutions (which is very broadly defined) (Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.§ 3414(a)(5)(A)); (3) a list of financial institutions and consumer identifying information from a credit reporting company (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 1681u(a) and (b)); and (4) full credit report in an international terrorism case (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 1681v). NSLs may be issued in conformity with statutory requirements, including 18 U.S.C.§ 2709.

b1

In this instance, properly served an NSL requesting financial records relevant to the subject of the preliminary investigation. In addition to responsive records, due to an error by the financial institution, also obtained records beyond the scope of the NSL.

(U) Based on our analysis, the financial institution's mistake is not reportable to the IOB as the FBI has not acted unlawfully or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive.

b2

b7E


(U) Based upon these facts, in accordance with the terms implementing the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of EO 12863, it is our opinion that this error is not reportable to the IOB. A record of this decision should be maintained in the control file for future review by the Counsel to the IOB.

(U) Since the additional records in this instance are still relevant to the authorized investigation, the additional records may be maintained by the FBI if an additional NSL is served for those records. Otherwise,

SECRET

3

(U)	To: From: Office of General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 03/05/2007
b2 b7E .	
	should contact the financial institution and ask whether the improperly or unintentionally acquired information should be returned or destroyed with appropriate documentation to the file.




LEAD(s):

file.

Set Lead 1: (Action)

b2 b7E



Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC


(U) For information.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) INSD should retain a record of the report of the potential IOB matter, as well as a copy of the OGC opinion concluding that IOB notification is not required for three years for possible review by the Counsel to the IOB.



44

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Precedence:	ROUTINE		Date:	03/28/2007
	To: General	Counsel	Attn: NSLB		
		ction cernal Investigations ntact: CRS	Section. IPU		b6 b7C b2
	Approved By:	Miller David Ian			FORMATION CONTAINED
	Drafted By:				15 UNCLASSIFIED 5-26-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JW
الموه	Case ID #:	(U) 278-HQ-C1229736	-VIO (Pendi	ng)	
	Title: (U)	INTELLIGENCE OVERSI INSD/IIS TRACKING# OGC/IOB# 2007		TER	
		J) To report a potent to the Office of Gen NSLB).			
 b2	Reference:	(U) 278-HO-C1229736 278 -C136372 S 278-HQ-C1229736	Serial 124		
b7E	an EC from possible IOB is the IIS's administrative will be conducted.	The Internal Invest Division error. Based upon a opinion the incident ve in nature. Theref acted by the IIS and for whatever action t	n dated 02/05/ a review of the described the fore, no inter this matter i	2007, ree reference erein is nal investigation	eporting a enced EC it s estigation relegated

NSL VIO-1571

SECRET//20320328 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 03/28/2007					
	To: SAC (Personal Attention)					
)2)7E)6	From: Inspection Internal Investigations Section, IPU, Room 3041 Contact: CRS Ext.					
7C	Approved By: Miller David Ian Off DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/J					
· .	Case ID #: (U) 263-HQ-0-U - 755 (Pending)					
	Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER INSD/IIS TRACKING# 3619 OGC/IOB# 2007 b2					
	Synopsis: (U) To advise that captioned reporting of potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) violation has been reviewed by the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), and is not considered willful misconduct. This matter is returned to the field for corrective action as appropriate. Case closed at IIS.					
	Derived From: G-3 Declassify On: 20320328					
	Enclosure(s): (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2153					
b2	Reference: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2153 278 C136372 Serial 124 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Serial 2233					
	Division's captioned report of a potential IOB violation, IIS did not find the matter indicative of willful misconduct. IIS only addresses allegations where deliberate and/or aggravated misconduct is evident.					
	(U) IIS recognizes and appreciates that this matter was brought to our attention as required by the revisions mandated by National Security Law Branch/OGC EC, dated 11/16/2006 (278-HQ-C1229736, serial 2570).					
	THIS EC IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE.					
	**					


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
3619

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

To:				e: 03/22/2007
	terrorism			TOS , Conus
Inspect:	ion		Attn: 3	IIS
From: Con	ntact: SA			
Approved By:		m/sst		ALL INFORMATION C
Drafted By:		mac ^{io}		HEPEIN IS UNCLASS WHERE SHOWN OTHER
ا Case ID #: (۱	J) 278-HQ-C12	 29736-VIO	(Pending)	- 1200
				DATE: 05-26-2007
Title: (U)	REPORT OF A	POTENTIAL I	OB MATTER	
(U)	REPORT OF A	POTENTIAL I	OB MATTER	DECLASSIFY ON: 05-:
Synopsis: (I Oversight Boa	J) To report ard (IOB) matt	resolution er.	of potentia	al Intelligence
(C)	Derive Declas	d From : G sify On: X	-3 1	
	(U) 278-HO-C1 (U) 278-C1	229736-VIO- 36372-130	2233 b2 b7E	
Details:				
Case Backgrou	und and Case A	gent		
(S)				

NSL VIO-1573





secre b2
To: From: b7E Re: (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 03/22/2007
S) On 03/12/2007, SA contacted CDC to
acknowledge receipt of the referenced ECs. CDC lirected to contact to contact
would desire the "improperly or unintentionally acquired information" returned or destroyed. On 03/12/2007, SA contacted Division, via electronic mail.
On 03/14/2007, reported
requested the "improperly or unintentionally acquired information" to be destroyed by the FBI, Division. would provide a written communication documenting to the captioned cases.
On 03/16/2007, CDC was informed request for Division to destroy the "improperly or unintentionally acquired information" stated that the "improperly or unintentionally acquired information" would be destroyed by the Division. Further, CDC noted that a written communication would be drafted by the Legal Unit to confirm the



LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

b2 b7E INSPECTION DIVISION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information.


Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information.

Set Lead 3: (Info)





(U) For information.

**

SECRET//20320201 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Prece	edence	: ROUTINE			Date:	02/01/2007
	To:	Inspe Gener	ction al Counsel	Attn: Attn:		Room Room	11861 n 7975
				Attn:	ASAC CDC	;	
	From						
	Appro	oved B	y: SA y:	$\overline{}$			
	Draft	ted By	:		. 2 A	h6	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
(C)	Case	ID #:	(S) 278-HQ-C1229736 (S) 62F A89455	5-VIO - 2	18	b7C b2	DATE: 05-26-2007 CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/J
	Title	∋: (U				b/E	REASON: 1.4 (C) DECLASSIFY ON: 05-26-2032
(U)	Synor	osis:					KKOK
	(U)		Derived From Declassify	G-3) 01/20	32	
	Detai	ils:					
	(S)	1.					
							ERROR D
	(S)	2.					THE ST.
)1	(S)	3.	Possible IOB Error				ERROR b.
)2)7E	(S)						\ 2
H *	×	4.	Description of IOB Ern delays):	or (inc	ludin	ig any	reporting
Г			(8)	Nation	<u> </u>	anniti	· Lotton (NCI)
L SCA Ra	liller	-	M 3/20/07 SERRE	T//2032	0201		b1
			b6 b7C	NSI	L VIO-	1578	1 Jan 1 Jan





(U) (Note: This was the second possible IOB error that resulted from the same request. Both errors were identified as separate incidences. These comments are provided to clarify any confusion associated with the two extremely similar incidences occurring in an extremely close time period.)

b2 b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

GENERAL COUNSEL


AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For action deemed appropriate.


**

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1.0	Precedence: ROUTINE	Date: 2/21/2007
b2 b7E	To:	Attn: SSA SA CDC
	Counterintelligence	Attn: CD-4
	Inspection	Attn: IIS,
	From: Office of the General NSLB/CILU/Room 7: Contact: AGC	947 / WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE b6
	Approved By: Thomas Julie	DATE: 05-26-2007 b2 CLASSIFIED BY 55179 DMH/KSR/JW REASON: 1.4 (C)
(U) ···	Drafted By:	
	Case ID #: (X) 278-HQ-C12:	-
(U) -	Title: X INTELLIGENCE MATTER 2007	OVERSIGHT BOARD 11 b2
b2 b7E	the Office of the General (determine whether it warrand Oversight Board (IOB). It incident does not need to he	Field Office requested that Counsel (OGC) review an incident and its reporting to the Intelligence is the opinion of OGC that the perfect to the IOB. Rather, this the control file for periodic review
(U) · ···	(U) Derived	From: G-3 Sify On: 2/21/2032
b2 ,,,,	Administrative: (%) This information from: the EC dareporting a potential IOB m	electronic communication (EC) contains ted 2/01/2007 from to OGC natter.
b ² (U)	Reference: 278-HQ-C12	29736-VIO Jenual 2120
(U)	Details: (X) By EC dated review an incident and dete	2/01/2007, requested that OGC rmine whether it warrants reporting to
1- (SECRET
FAI INVI		NSL VIO-1582



(U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order (E.O.) 12863, dated 09/13/1993, mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, INSD, and the General Counsel, OGC, respectively) report to the IOB "concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive." This language was adopted verbatim from E.O. 12334, dated 12/04/1981, when the IOB was known as the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB). By longstanding agreement between the FBI and the IOB (and its predecessor, the PIOB), this language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of the Attorney General Guidelines for National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with E.O. 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed in full or in part to ensure the protection of the individual rights of U.S. persons. Violations of provisions that are essentially administrative in nature need not be reported to the IOB. The FBI is required, however, to



maintain records of such administrative violations so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request.

(U) On 03/28/2006, the FBI's National Security Law Branch (NSLB) sent a letter to the Counsel for the IOB requesting their concurrence to treat third party errors as non-reportable, though NSLB would still require the field to continue to report any improper collection under an NSL as a potential IOB matter. By letter dated 11/13/2006, the Counsel to the IOB agreed that third party errors in the collection of information pursuant to an NSL must be reported to the FBI OGC, but are not reportable to the IOB.

	(U) In the instant case the collection of information
1 ()	by the FBI was not the fault of FBI Once the case agent
b2	discovered that he had received information beyond the scope of
b7E	the NSL request, the case agent immediately notified the
_	CDC and notified Thiseafter,
	regarding this request were deleted and or destroyed. As
'	a result, this matter does not need to be reported to the IOB.

	To: From: Office of the Connect Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 2/21/200
	LEAD(s):
	Set Lead 1: (Info)
	INSPECTION
	AT WASHINGTON, DC
b2	(U) For information.
b7E	Set Lead 2: (Info)
	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
	AT WASHINGTON, DC
	$-\sqrt{\sigma}$ For information.
	Set Lead 3: (Action)
)2)7E)7D	
	(U) is requested to coordinate with to ensure that has the appropriate protocols in place to prevent similar types of disclosures in the future.
	cc: 1- Ms. Thomas 1-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


	Precedence:	ROUTINE	Date: 03/28/2007
	To: General	Counsel Attn:	NSLB
o6		ction ternal Investigations Section ntact:	on, IPU, Room 3041
o7C	Approved By:	Miller David Ian	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
02	Drafted By:		NEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 05-26-2007 BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JW
Š	Case ID #:	(U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO	(Pending)
	Title: (U)	INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOA INSD/IIS TRACKING# 3556 OGC/IOB# 2007-	ard matter b2
		J) To report a potential Int to the Office of General Co NSLB).	
	Reference:	(U) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Sei 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO Sei	
b2 b7E	an EC from IOB error. ITS's opinion nature. Then by the IIS and	Internal Investigation Division dated 02/01/2 Based upon a review of the refore, no internal investiged this matter is being reletion they deem appropriate.	007, reporting a possible eferenced EC it is the erein is administrative in eation will be conducted


SECRET//20320328 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b2	Precedence:	ROUTINE		Date:	03/28/2007
b7E	To:		Attn: SAG	C (Personal	Attention)
		ction ternal <u>Investigation</u> ntact:	s Section.	IPU, Room	3041
b6		Miller David Ian 🛭	Jan		
b7C b2	rafted By:			DECLASSIFIE ON 05-26-20) BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JW 17
	Case ID #:	(U) 263-HQ-0-U -	756 (Pend:	ng)	
	Title: (U)	INTELLIGENCE OVERS INSD/IIS TRACKING# OGC/IOB# 2007-		MATTER	
	Intelligence the Internal willful misc corrective a	ction as appropriate	DB) violation (IIS), is returned to Case clo	on has been and is not ed to the fossed at IIS	reviewed by considered ield for
	(U) ·· ····	Derived From Declassify	ົ: G-3 ນ ກ : 2032032	28	
	Enclosure(s)	: (U) 278-HQ-C12297	36-VIO Ser	lal 2120	
	Reference:	(U) 278-HQ-C1229736 278-HQ-C1229736			
b2 b7E	of a potenti indicative o) Upon review of al IOB violation, II of willful misconduct rate and/or aggravat	S did not :	y addresses	tter allegations
	brought to o National Sec) IIS recognizes and our attention as requ ourity Law Branch/OGC 9736, serial 2570).	ired by the	e revisions	
	THIS EC IS U	NCLASSIFIED WHEN SEP	PARATED FROM	M CLASSIFIE	D ENCLOSURE.
	**				

SEXET//20320328

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION






FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Precedence:	ROUTINE		Date:	02/21/2007	
b2 b7E	To:		Attn:			
	<u></u>					
						_
	Inspecti	on	Attn: IIS),		
		of the General Co B/CILU/Roo <u>m 7947</u>	ounsel <u>/</u>			b2
		tact: AGC				b6 b7C
	Approved By:	Thomas Julie F	<u> </u>	HEREIN	FORMATION CONTAINED IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT SHOWN OTHERWISE	-
	Drafted By:				: 05-26-2007	4000-0000
	Case ID #: (U	7) 278-HQ-C1229736	5-VIO (Pendin	g) reas	SIFIED BY 65179 DWH/KS OW: 1.4 (C)	EYJW
(U)	Title:	INTELLIGENCE OVER MATTER 2007	sight board b2	142-6-1	ASSIFY ON: 05-26-2032	
(U)	Intelligence maintained in	It is the opini that this matter Oversight Board (In the control file analysis follows.	is not repor [OB]. Rather for periodic	table to , it sho	o the ould be	
	· (U)	Derived Fro				
(U) b2 b7E	potential IOB	<u>rom: (1)</u> the EC d	dated 01/03/2 <u>reporting</u> a and OGC r 2007; (3) an	007 from potential egarding email from	al IOB matter; g this	
	Reference:	b1 (U) <u>278-HO-</u> (S)		Serial al 21 (E	2090 (Pending) Pending)	
b2 (U) - b7E	Details: (x) review the fa	By EC dated 01/0 cts of the caption	3/2007, ed matter an	req d determ	quested that OGC nine whether it	
		sı	ECRET			
b6 b7C	- ′ -	i				
OIG/DOJ FBI INVI		DATE: 3/14/07	NSL VIO	-1590		
يؤاليها الباؤ زغيبا وجبها		in a Michigan of a spagnet of a standard and mathematical mathematical and a second as a second as a second and a second a				

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


the IOB has been given authority to review the FBI's practices and procedures relating to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence collection.

- (U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order 12863 mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, Inspection Division (INSD), and the General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel (OGC), respectively) report to the IOB intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG), effective 10/31/2003, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with EO 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed to ensure the protection of individual rights.
- (U) Violations of provisions that merely are administrative in nature and not deemed to have been designed to ensure the protection of individual rights are generally not reported to the IOB. The FBI Inspection Division is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations for three years so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request. The determination as to whether a matter is "administrative in nature" must be made by OGC. Therefore, such administrative violations must be reported as potential IOB matters.
- (U) NSLs are a specific type of investigative tool that allows the FBI to obtain certain limited types of information without court intervention: (1) telephone and email communication records from telephone companies and internet service providers (Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709); (2) records of financial institutions (which are very broadly defined) (Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.§ 3414(a)(5)(A)); (3) a list of financial institutions and consumer identifying information from a credit reporting company (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b)); and (4) full credit report in an international terrorism case (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v). In addition to FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b) information (financial institutions and consumer identifying information), under 15 U.S.C. 1681u(c), if certain factors are met, the FBI is able to obtain full consumer reports in both counterintelligence and international terrorism investigations by an exparte court order.







(U) Based upon these facts, in accordance with the terms implementing the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of EO 12863, it is our opinion that this error is not reportable to the IOB. The carrier's mistake is not reportable to the IOB because the FBI has not acted unlawfully or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. A record of this decision should be maintained in the control file for future review by the Counsel to the IOB.

b2 To: From: Office of the General Counsel b7E 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 02/21/2007 LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON, DC (U) INSD should retain a record of the report of the potential IOB matter, as well as a copy of the OGC opinion concluding that IOB notification is not required, for three years for possible review by the Counsel to the IOB. Set Lead 2: (Action) (S) · b2 With respect to the information received that was not b7E associated with the target, should contact and b7D ask whether such information should be returned or destroyed with b1 appropriate documentation to the file. Ms. Thomas cc: b6 b7C IOB Library

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SECRET//20320327 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Precedence:	ROUTINE		Date:	03/27/2007
	To: General	Counsel A	ttn: NSLB		
26	From: Inspection Internal Investigations Section, IPU, Room 3041 Contact:				
o6 o7C	Approved By:	Miller David Ian			PMATION CONTAINED S UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
52	Drafted By:				IOWN OTHERWISE
(C)	Case ID #:	(X) 278-HQ-C1229736-	VIO (Pendi	ng)	
	Title: (U)	INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGNED INSD/IIS TRACKING# 3 OGC/IOB# 2007		CLA REA	E: 05-26-2007 SSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSP/JU SON: 1.4 (C) LASSIFY ON: 05-26-2032
		U) To report a potentia to the Office of Gene NSLB).			
	(U)	Derived From : Declassify On:	G-3 20320327		
	T.CY	(U) 278-HQ-C1229736-V (S) (U) 278-HQ-C1229736-V			
o2 o7E	an EC from IOB error. IIS's opinion issue. There the IIS and	Office dated 0: Office dated 0: Based upon a review of the incident(s) desc: efore, no internal invethis matter is being re ion they deem appropria	1/03/2007, ro the reference ribed therein estigation was elegated to	eporting ced EC n an ad ill be	g a possible it is the ministrative conducted by
	**				


SECRET//20320328 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b2	Precedence: ROUTINE		Date:	03/28/2007
b7E	To:	Attn:	ADIC (Persona	al Attention)
	From: Inspection Internal Invest	igations Secti	on, IPU, Room	3041
b6	Approved By: Miller Davi	d Ian (M)		
b7C b2	Drafted By:		DECLASSIFIE DN 05-26-20	D BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JW 07
١	Case ID #: (U) 263-H(Q-0-U - 757 (E	ending)	
	,	CE OVERSIGHT BORACKING# 3532	b2	
	Synopsis: (U) To advise Intelligence Oversight Bothe Internal Investigation willful misconduct. This corrective action as appropriate the corrective action as approximately action as approximately action as approximately action and the corrective action as approximately action as approximately action action and the corrective action act	oard (IOB) viol ons Section (Il s matter is ret	ation has been (S), and is not curned to the	n reviewed by t considered field for
	(U) Deriv	ved From : G-3	3 3 2 3 2 1 3 2 1 3	
	Enclosure(s): (U) 278-H	Q-C1229736-VIO	Serial 2090	
		C1229736-VIO S C1229736-VIO S		
b2 b7E	Details: (U) Upon review of a potential IOB violating indicative of willful mix where deliberate and/or a	tion, IIS did r sconduct. IIS	only addresses	atter s allegations
	(U) IIS recogning brought to our attention National Security Law Brought (278-HQ-C1229736, serial	as required by anch/OGC EC, da	the revision	s mandated by
	THIS EC IS UNCLASSIFIED	WHEN SEPARATED	FROM CLASSIFI	ED ENCLOSURE.

SECKET//20320328

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 02/07/2006 To: General Counsel Attn: National Security Law Branch, Room 7975 1 Inspection Division Internal Investigations Sect. From: b2Contact: b7E Approved By: b6 b7C Drafted By: (U) ···· Case ID #: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO (PENDING)-1/26 278 C71404 (PENDING) _ 174 INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) MATTER Title: Synopsis: 💢 Possible IOB error for an unauthorized dissemination of information. Derived From : G-3Declassif On: Details: (S) l. (S) 2. 3. Possible IOB Error: **b**6 (S) Description of IOB Error (including any reporting delays). (S) An NSL vas served the requested records were received b2 and processed Through an error in the mail handling of the responding EC and records, the NSL and b7E records were erroneously sent to b7D b1 SECRET 263-0-U-758 b7C

	SECRET	b2
(U) ··	To: General Counsel From: Re: (X) 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 02/07/2006	b7E
) 101	A copy of the records were returned The originals were picked up by an Agent T	
02 100 1	TITO STIGINGTO WOLCOWNER IN THE ALIENT	
	was informed of the mull ensure corrective action is taken.	nishap and
b6 b7C	Questions concerning this EC or others aspects of process may be addressed to either CDC and/or National Security Law Branch.	



b2 b7E

To: General Counsel From: (U) Re: 278-HQ-C1229736-VIO, 02/07/2006

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC


(U) For action deemed appropriate.

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
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Precedence: ROUTI	NE b2		Date: 03/24/2006	
	Counterterror Inspection From: General Counterror	b7E ism	Attn: SAC, C Attn: AD Attn: IIS	DC DATE: 05-26-2007 CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/KSR/JU REASON: 1.4 (C) DECLASSIFY ON: 05-26-2032	
		Patrice I.	,	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE	
(U)	Case ID #: 27	8-HQ-C1229736	-vio-2016)	
	Title: () INTE				
	Synopsis: (X It Counsel (OGC) that	is the opini this matter ight Board (I	on of the Off does not warr OB). Submiss	ice of the General ant reporting to the ion of this matter to	
	(U) ————————————————————————————————————	Derived from Declassify On	: G-3 : 03/24/2016		
(0) -	Reference: 278-HQ-	C1229736-VIO	× -1155		
	Administrative: (footnotes. To readocument in WordPe	U) This commu d the footnot	nication cont.	ains one or more and print the	
b2 b7E	Details: (U) Referenced communication from the Field Office dated 02/07/2006, requested that OGC review the facts of the captioned matter and determine whether it warrants reporting to the IOB. In our opinion, it does not. Our analysis follows.				
b6 b7C i ^e /jj(j/3	EVIEW:	5/30/07	CRET		

NSL VIO-1600







(U) Section 2.4 of Executive Order (EO) 12863, dated 09/13/1993, mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, INSD, and the General Counsel, OGC, respectively) report to the IOB concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive. This language was adopted verbatim from EO 12334, dated 12/04/1981, when the 10B was known as the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB). By longstanding agreement between the FBI and the IOB (and its predecessor, the PIOB), this language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of the NSIG, or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with EO 12333, dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed in full or in part to ensure the protection of the individual rights of U.S. persons. Violations of provisions that are essentially administrative in nature need not be reported to the IOB. The FBI is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request.

Section V.11., Investigative Techniques, of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG)

b1

(U) However, the improper dissemination was not of a nature of which the NSIG are concerned. The NSIG focus upon assuring that information disseminated to other government

(U) To: ______ From: General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-01229736-VIO-1155-(X), 03/24/2006

agencies or to foreign governments is proper since those entities have the ability to adversely impact a person's constitutional rights if they misuse information. Since this activity involved improper dissemination to another private wire communications service provider, which does not have the same apparent ability to adversely impact the rights of the telephone subscriber, we have determined that this event need not be reported to the IOB. This was simply an administrative error by night clerical staff in sending unclassified telephone records to a service provider other than the service provider who owned the records. An employee of the other wire communications service provider, a person familiar with the NSL process and thus, presumably familiar with the non-disclosure aspect of it, immediately recognized the mistake and reported it to the records' owner, and the mistake was rectified. There does not appear to be any potential damage to national security. There was no impact upon the rights of a United States person, nor, apparently, the non-USP subscriber. There was no improper collection of information.

CONCLUSION

b1

(S)

b7D

 $\left(\text{U}\right)$ OGC concludes that this matter does not warrant being reported to the IOB.

From: General Counsel

AG: 278-EQ-C1229736-VFO-1155 (, 03/24/2006)

LEAD(s):

b2 Set Lead 1: (INFO)

b7E FIELD OFFICE

(U) Read and Clear.

Set Lead 2: (INFO)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, PC

(U) Read and Clear.

Set Lead 3: (ACTION)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For review and action deemed appropriate.

b6 1 -