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Case No. CGC-24-618681

PREPARED BY PETENSE COUNSEL FOR SUSTACK.

DEC 1 3 2024

William Trupek

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

JOHN DOE, an individual,

Plaintiff.

v.

SUBSTACK, INC., a Delaware Corporation; AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC., a Delaware Corporation; JACK POULSON, an individual; TECH INQUIRY, INC., a Delaware corporation; DOES 1-25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CGC-24-618681

PROPOSED ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF JOHN DOE'S MOTION SEEKING PERMISSION FOR PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED UNDER A FICTITIOUS NAME

DATE: December 12, 2024

TIME: 9:30 a.m.

DEPT: 301

JOSEPH M. QUINN

Judge:

Action Filed: October 3, 2024

Trial Date:

Fictitious Name is before this Court. and the Court having considered the arguments of the parties rules that the motion is DENIED.

PLAINTIFF JOHN DOE'S Motion Seeking Permission For Plaintiff To Proceed Under A

Plaintiff John Doe filed his defamation complaint on October 3, 2024, generally alleging that Defendants unlawfully published false information about him taken from a sealed arrest record. Plaintiff alleges causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) gross negligence, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic relations, (4) negligent interference with prospective economic relations, (5) intentional interference with contractual relations, (6) public disclosure of private facts, (7) false light, (8) intrusion into private affairs, (9) IIED, (10) NIED, (11) defamation, (12) Bus & Prof. Code Section 17200, (13) violation of California Constitution Section 1, (14) violation of California Penal Code Section 851.92, and (15) violation of California Penal Code Section 11143Plaintiff now moves to proceed under a fictitious name.

Generally, "[i]n the complaint, the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties." (CCP Section 422.40.) Where a statute does not specifically allow a party to file the complaint anonymously, a plaintiff must file a conditionally anonymous complaint. (Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 105, 111 ["DFEH"].) The court must conduct a hearing and apply the overriding interest test. (Id.) Under that test, "[a] party's request for anonymity should be granted only if the court finds that an overriding interest will likely be prejudiced without use of a pseudonym, and that it is not feasible to protect the interest with less impact on the constitutional right of access." (Id.) The court "must bear in mind the critical importance of the public's right to access judicial proceedings. Outside of cases where anonymity is expressly permitted by statute, litigating by pseudonym should occur 'only in the rarest of circumstances." (DFEH, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 111.) California courts look to the Advanced Textile factors to evaluate the need for anonymity. (Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1058, 1068.) Under Advanced Textile, courts consider: (1) severity of

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harm, (2) reasonableness of fears, and (3) vulnerability. (Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).)

This is not a case where anonymity is expressly permitted. Nor is it a case that presents "the rarest of circumstances" that would allow Plaintiff to proceed anonymously. (DFEH, supra, 82 Cal. App. 5th at 111.) Plaintiff argues he has an overriding privacy interest in not being tied to his sealed arrest record. Plaintiff, however, admits, "[a]n article in the San Francisco Chronicle...identified Plaintiff's actual name and connected him to the incidents described in the sealed arrest report..." (MPA, 4.) As such, the highly personal details of Plaintiff's arrest record have already been publicly disclosed and tied to this complaint. The cat, so to speak, is out of the bag. Further, Plaintiff's argument that neither Defendants nor the public interest will be prejudiced if he proceeds anonymously is unpersuasive. (MPA, 8.) Plaintiff's identity, his reputation, his specific economic relationships and opportunities, the extent to which his affairs are private or public are among the issues raised by his claims and the parties, including the defendants, have an interest in developing an accurate record specific to Plaintiff. Imposing anonymity requirements will interfere with this process. "[T]he public has an interest, in all civil cases, in observing and assessing the performance of its public judicial system, and that interest strongly supports a general right of access in ordinary civil cases." (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1210. On this record, Plaintiff's generalized concerns in anonymity do not predominate.

It might be one thing if Plaintiff's claims were limited to whether the media is (or should be) prohibited from publishing facts taken exclusively from sealed criminal records and he was seeking no personal relief. Perhaps affording such a plaintiff anonymity would not prejudice any other party. But that's not this case. Plaintiff, here, is seeking relief personal to him that requires development of a record about him. Additionally, he is alleging that the information published was false and seeking personal damages resulting from publication of the falsities. Requiring Defendants

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To be one, that a party one hour aprivary interest in inframental related to a stated annest. It does not follow, however, this interest alone po moles this costs the rocast 1 cooper supporting and one of the lowing blownship to interest alone po moles this costs the rocast 1 cooper supporting and one of allowing blownship to project without a possession and to linigate such claims without disclosing Plaintiff's identity in any way would be to impose an undue burden, if not make it nearly impossible for Defendants to develop their defenses and protect their interests

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has not established he will face severe harm in the form of retaliation if he is named. As his name and arrest record have been published, Plaintiff cannot show he will encounter any new harm he has not already encountered or would not likely encounter based on the existing public record. Second, Plaintiff's fear is unreasonable because no retaliatory harm is threatened against him. Third, naming Plaintiff would not render him more vulnerable than when this information was first disseminated to the public. Plaintiff claims he is vulnerable because "Defendants have been unwavering their position that they can act in direct violation of California Law..." (MPA, 7.) However, this is not a vulnerability recognized in the cited cases. In DFEH, the plaintiff was scared his family would be the subject of immediate caste violence in India if his identity were revealed. (DFEH, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 108.) In Advanced Textile, the plaintiffs feared immediate physical violence and deportation for themselves and their families. This case, where a third-party news publication has already reported the sealed arrest record and the facts surrounding it, is not one where privacy interests override the public's interest in this information.

Loss of employment or employment opportunities cannot generally be "retaliation" green lighting anonymity for a party. If so, every employment plaintiff who concedes some wrongdoing but claims his termination was unjustified would be able to proceed anonymously because, for example, the admitted wrongdoing would give current and future potential employers pause. Similarly, every fraud defendant would have a claim to anonymity whenever the allegations put them in a bad light with employers and potential employers. Likewise, here Plaintiff's employment issues and concerns do not override the general and specific interests in open litigation of this matter. \checkmark

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2	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: PLAINTIFF JOHN DOE'S Motion Seeking Permission For
3	Plaintiff To Proceed Under A Fictitious Name is DENIED .
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5	DATED: Dec 12, 2024
6	JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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	Case No. CGC-24-618681 [Proposed] Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Under a Fictitous Name

CGC-24-618681 ET AL

I, the undersigned, certify that I am an employee of the Superior Court of California, County Of San Francisco and not a party to the above-entitled cause and that on December 13, 2024 I served the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF JOHN DOE'S MOTION SEEKIING PERMISSION FOR PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED UNDER A FICTITIOUS NAME on each counsel of record or party appearing in propria persona by causing a copy thereof to be enclosed in a postage paid sealed envelope and deposited in the United States Postal Service mail box located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco CA 94102-4514 pursuant to standard court practice.

DAVID MAREK, ESQ. THE MAREK LAW FIRM 228 HAMILTON AVENUE PALO ALTO, CA 94301

JOSHUA A. BASKIN, ESQ., WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 1 MARKET PLAZA, SPEAR TOWER STE 3300 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105

SARA E. BYRNS, ESQ DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 50 CALIFORNIA STREET 23RD FLOOR SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111