1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	THE MAREK LAW FIRM, INC. DAVID MAREK (CA Bar No. 290686) David@marekfirm.com AMI SANGHVI (CA Bar No. 331801) ami@marekfirm.com 228 Hamilton Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94301 (650) 460-7148 BERMAN NORTH LLP Stacy Y. North (CA Bar No. 219034) stacy@bermannorth.com 2001 Van Ness, Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94109 (650) 843-1988 Attorneys for Plaintiff John Doe		ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 12/05/2024 Clerk of the Court BY: ERNALYN BURA Deputy Clerk
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12	SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO		
13	UNLIMITED JURISDICTION		
14	JOHN DOE, an individual,	Case No.: CGC-24-6	18681
15	Plaintiff,		LY MEMORANDUM OF
16	V.	POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED UNDER A FICTITIOUS NAME	
17	SUBSTACK, INC., a Delaware		
18	Corporation; JACK POULSON, an individual; TECH INQUIRY; AMAZON	Hearing Date:	December 12, 2024
19	WEB SERVICES, INC., a corporation; DOES 1-25, inclusive	Time: Department:	9:30 AM 302
20	Defendants.	Before: Complaint	Hon. Richard B. Ulmer, Jr.
21		Conditionally Filed: Trial Date:	October 3, 2024 None Set
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REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion Seeking Permission to Proceed Under a Fictitious Name (the "Opposition") lacks merit and should be rejected. Plaintiff has demonstrated that proceeding under a pseudonym is necessary to safeguard compelling privacy interests in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature, consistent with established legal principles. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, the records and information at issue—sealed by court order pursuant to California Penal Code § 851.91—are legally deemed not to exist and involve a level of privacy protection expressly intended to shield individuals like Plaintiff from stigmatization and harm. Defendants' reliance on inapplicable case law involving convicted individuals or public trials fails to address the critical distinction here: Plaintiff w

as not charged or convicted, the arrest records were sealed by judicial mandate, and the arrest was "deemed not to have occurred." These cases cited by Defendants further miss the mark because in the matter before this Court it was Defendants' unlawful conduct that caused this violation of Plaintiff's privacy interests. Defendants' "cat is out of the bag" argument holds no weight when it was Defendants who let the cat out of the bag and refused for more than a year to put the cat back in the bag. Furthermore, allowing Plaintiff to litigate anonymously would not prejudice Defendants or the public, as any minimal procedural costs are outweighed by Plaintiff's legitimate interest in preventing further harm. Accordingly, the Court should grant Plaintiff's motion to ensure the protections afforded by California law and to preserve the integrity of its sealing order.

ARGUMENT

1. Disclosure Of Plaintiff's Identity Would Vitiate The Interests He Seeks To Protect.

Defendants fail to address that "the injury litigated against would occur as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity." *Doe v. Rostker*, 89 F.R.D. 158, 162 (N.D. Cal. 1981); *see also In re William M.*, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 394, 396 (Ct. App.), *review granted and opinion superseded*, 982 P.2d 726 (Cal. 1999) (recognizing as a valid reason to permit a party to proceed anonymously where "publication of his name could well result in even more notoriety than if he had chosen not to pursue the litigation."). In *Rostker*, the Court analyzed *Roe v. Ingraham*, 364 F.Supp. 536, 541 fn.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where the plaintiffs contended that "disclosure of their identities prior to the adjudication on the merits of their claim of a Privacy Act violation would cause them to sustain the very injury they sought to avoid." *Id.* at 161. The *Roskter* Court

"recognize[d] the *Ingraham* dilemma as a valid reason for permitting plaintiffs to proceed anonymously." Id. Here, like in Ingraham, Plaintiff commenced this action to protect his privacy interest pursuant to the California Penal Code and a Court Order. Disclosing Plaintiff's identity before the adjudication on the merits would cause him to further suffer the very injury he is seeking to avoid and cure. Moreover, in this case – unlike *Ingraham* – Plaintiff was only forced to litigate because Defendants refused for more than a year to adhere to the Penal Code and the Court Order, even after repeated requests to do so by both Plaintiff and the San Francisco City Attorney. 1 Thus, Defendants' Opposition ignored their unclean hands in this matter: Defendants first unlawfully violated Plaintiff's privacy, and now argue they should not have to abide by the Penal Code or the Court Order because the "cat is out of the bag." 2. Plaintiff's Lawsuit Concerns Matters That Are "Sensitive and Highly Personal." Defendants argued that Plaintiff's lawsuit does not concern matters that are "sensitive and highly personal." (Opposition, pp. 12-13) Defendants ask this Court to accept that Plaintiff cannot have a legitimate privacy interest "when his identity has long been widely known," and that, as a matter of law, an arrest record is not sensitive and highly personal "when it was formerly a public document." (Id.) These arguments misstate the applicable law and fail to address the facts before this Court.

As an initial matter, Defendants do not – and cannot – offer any support for their contention that the arrest, the arrest record, and the contents of the arrest record are not matters that are "sensitive and highly personal." Defendants included in their Opposition that the sealed Arrest Report includes Plaintiff's age, the age of his girlfriend, and that he was allegedly arrested for domestic violence. (Opposition, p. 7) The actual posts on Substack also include Plaintiff's name, picture, home address, and rendering of his apartment. (Complaint, ¶25, 32) Indeed, in a case cited by Defendants, Doe v. Corporate Security Solutions, Inc., 2024 WL 4342800 (E.D.N.C.

¹ Courts have held when ruling on delays in seeking injunctive relief that "[w]e are reluctant to rule as a matter of law that an aggrieved party must act immediately to seek an injunction. In view of

the congestion in our courts, we believe such a position would discourage informal resolution of disputes." Youngblood v. Wilcox, 207 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1377 (1989). Comparably, in this instance,

Plaintiff's privacy rights should not be diminished because he tried to resolve this matter without

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formal litigation. 28

2024),² the Court recognized that allegations of domestic violence (among other things) do qualify as a matter of a "sensitive and highly personal nature." *Id.* at *1-2.

Further, in a case Defendants do not address, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that an individual has a legitimate privacy interest in his criminal records, even when those records resulted in conviction, had not been sealed, and were formerly a public document. *U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee For Freedom of the Press*, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989) ("Reporters Committee"). In that case, the Supreme Court explained that:

both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual's control of information concerning his or her person. In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another. Thus the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it private. According to Webster's initial definition, information may be classified as "private" if it is "intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person or group or class of persons: not freely available to the public."

Id. at 763-4. Here, the arrest which was deemed not to have occurred, and the sealed Arrest Report and its contents are therefore private, even if they had been unlawfully disclosed. The documents and information were not "freely available," as they were not even legally allowed to be possessed or disseminated. Accordingly, the arrest record is sensitive and highly personal, even if it was formerly a public document.

Further, matters that will result in social stigmatization are considered highly sensitive. *See Rostker*, 89 F.R.D. at 161, 162 ("The most compelling situations involve matters which are highly sensitive, such as social stigmatization ..."). It is acknowledged that an arrest – and surely one that did not lead to conviction and was deemed not to have occurred – creates a stigma. *See People v. Hadim*, 82 Cal.App.5th 39, 47-48 (2022) (recognizing that in enacting Section 851.91, "the Legislature perceived an arrest, the fact a person was taken into custody, carried a severe stigma

² Defendants' reliance on *Corporate Security Solutions, Inc* is misplaced. 2024 WL 4342800. In that case, the North Carolina Court considered whether an expunged criminal record is of a "sensitive and highly personal nature." *Id.* at *2. That Court determined that while the plaintiff's criminal record is not of a sensitive and highly personal nature, allegations of domestic violence do qualify as a matter of a "sensitive and highly personal nature." *Id.* at *1-2.

with employers and landlords"). Accordingly, Plaintiff's lawsuit concerns matters that are "sensitive and highly personal."

In addition, Defendants' argument that Plaintiff cannot litigate anonymously because Plaintiff's "identity has long been widely known" fails. (Opposition, p. 12-13) Defendants, ironically, based their argument on *Reed v. Paramo*, a case that supports Plaintiff's argument. *Reed v. Paramo*, CV 15-5636-CAS (JEM), 2018 WL 10562057 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018). In *Reed*, where the plaintiff "was tried publicly, was convicted of serious crimes, and is serving a lengthy prison sentence," the Court acknowledged its decision was based on the fact that the proceedings had *not* been "sealed" and the trial evidence "is available electronically to the public." *Id.* at *2. Thus, the holding in that case – where the information was not sealed and legally available to the public – does not support Substack's argument. Rather, *Reed* supports Plaintiff's argument to proceed anonymously because the arrest was sealed and deemed not to have occurred. Moreover, in this case, Defendants caused Plaintiff's identity to be known and therefore cannot credibly argue that, as a result of its own unlawful conduct, Plaintiff should be denied his request to litigate anonymously.

Defendants' argument also fails because there is no record that Plaintiff's identity has long been widely known. There is no record that Plaintiff's arrest, which was a matter of public record for several months until it was sealed, was newsworthy. Similarly, there is no record that the Substack posts at issue were newsworthy or widely distributed. Rather, Plaintiff has alleged that he has been denied personal and professional opportunities because, when someone searches for his name online, the sealed Arrest Report and Poulson's description of its contents are available. Accordingly, the issue is not that Plaintiff's identity was widely known as a result of Poulson's posts – it was not – but rather the posts and the sealed Arrest Report damaged, and continue to damage, him when anyone conducts an online search of his name.

In fact, Defendants did not – and cannot – find one case where a request to proceed anonymously was rejected in an analogous situation. Rather, Defendants relied primarily on cases where individuals who had been convicted of crimes after public trials sought to litigate anonymously. *See Reed*, 2018 WL 10562057; *Davall v. Cordero*, No. 20-CV-1968 JLS (KSC)), 2023 WL 3185781, at *2 (S.D.Cal. May 1, 2023). The facts before this Court are easily distinguished from those cases. Plaintiff's privacy interest far outweighs any prejudice to Defendants because Plaintiff was not charged or convicted with the crime (and therefore had no public trial), a San Francisco Superior Court Judge sealed the arrest record pursuant to Section

851.91, and the arrest itself was deemed not to have occurred well before the first blog posted was disseminated. Thus, Substack's effort to find meaningful similarities between those cases and the case before this Court must fail.

3. Plaintiff Showed A Risk Of Retaliatory Harm.

Defendants' Opposition misstates Plaintiff's position with respect to retaliation. Here, Plaintiff needs to litigate anonymously to avoid being targeted by Defendants during this lawsuit. Defendants have already used Plaintiff's lawsuit to further damage Plaintiff. *See* Declaration of Joshua A. Baskin In Support Of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion Seeking Permission For Plaintiff To Proceed Under A Fictitious Name, Exhibit 2. Exhibit 2 refers to a newspaper article published in the San Francisco Chronicle titled "Tech exec sues journalist for \$25M for publishing his sealed arrest report." The article's title refers to correspondence between Plaintiff and Poulson, evidencing that Poulson was involved in outing Plaintiff's identity to this reporter for broader dissemination of the sealed arrest report and its contents. Indeed, even in Defendants' Opposition, Defendants referred to the crime for which Plaintiff was arrested and the detailed allegations found in the sealed Arrest Report, although Defendants must know that arrest was deemed not to have occurred and all information relating to it has been sealed. (Opposition, p. 7) Thus, it is apparent that, if this motion is not granted, Defendants will continue to retaliate against Plaintiff by using the litigation to further violate the laws intended to protect Plaintiff.

4. Defendants Will Not Be Prejudiced If Plaintiff Proceeds Anonymously.

Defendants argued that it would be prejudiced if Plaintiff litigates this case anonymously because allowing Plaintiff to litigate anonymously "will impose costs on Defendant and will hobble their ability to defend themselves throughout this matter." (Opposition, p. 14) The only actual increased costs or prejudice Defendants could point to was the cost of presenting news articles to the Court under seal. This same argument has been rejected. *See Doe v. U.S. Healthworks Inc.*, No. CV1505689SJOAFMX, 2016 WL 11745513, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016) (rejecting defendant's argument that it would be prejudiced if Plaintiff litigated anonymously because of the increased costs of filing under seal). In that case, where the defendant made the same argument made by Defendants, the Court found "the prejudice Defendant would stand to suffer if Plaintiff is permitted to proceed under a pseudonym to be minimal at this juncture" and that "this factor [prejudice to defendant] does not weigh against allowing anonymity." *Id.*

Here, Defendants' argument also fails because the parties will have to file documents under seal in this matter regardless of whether Plaintiff is permitted to proceed anonymously. The arrest,

the Arrest Report, and the contents of the Arrest Report are all subject to a Sealing Order and protected by the California Penal Code.

5. The Public Will Not Be Prejudiced If Plaintiff Proceeds Anonymously.

Defendants argued that the public would be prejudiced because the public has a right to know who is using their courts. (Opposition, p. 16) While this is the case in every lawsuit, the courts nevertheless recognize a party's right to litigate anonymously in certain instances. *Does 1 through XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp.*, 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, the public does not have a right to know about the arrest, the Arrest Report, or its contents because of the Sealing Order. Accordingly, Plaintiff's privacy interest outweighs any interest the public has in these issues.

Defendants argues that the public would be prejudiced in this case because Plaintiff is a "technology executive ... filing a lawsuit demanding \$25 million in damages". (Opposition, p. 16) But both of these facts are false, and, even if true, neither fact is meaningful to the analysis. First, Plaintiff has not been a technology executive since late 2023, and Plaintiff's complaint did not include a monetary demand in the amount of \$25 million. (See Complaint) Moreover, as Defendants admitted, Plaintiff's arrest – which occurred when he was a technology executive – was not newsworthy at the time it occurred and was available to the public, and was not newsworthy during the year that the sealed report was illegally in the possession of Defendants and being disseminated in violation of the law and a court order. Thus, Plaintiff's arrest was not, and is not, newsworthy, and therefore the public is not prejudiced by enforcement of the Court's sealing order.

6. Plaintiff's Motion Was Not Required To Be Filed When The Complaint Was Filed.

Code of Civil Procedure Section 367 requires an "action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute." Code of Civ. Proc. §367. Courts have interpreted this as requiring that a lawsuit be brought on behalf of a person having legal standing to commence the action rather than as a control of whether pseudonym litigation is appropriate. See Doe v. Lincoln Unified Sch. Dist., 188 Cal. App. 4th 758, 767 (2010). Absent a mechanism to file the Complaint conditionally, Plaintiff complied immediately with the Court's request that Plaintiff file a motion seeking permission. Defendants do not cite any rules of civil or court procedure that dictate the manner and timing of such a filing. See Healthworks, Inc., 2016 WL 11745513, at *2 (explaining that in the Ninth Circuit a plaintiff may file the complaint under a pseudonym, and may move to proceed under a pseudonym even after the defendant filed a motion to dismiss). Moreover, Defendants cite to no cases that justify a denial of the motion on grounds

1	that it was filed one month after the initial filing. Indeed, until the issue was raised by the Court,			
2	Defendants also did not raise any objection to the Complaint being filed under a pseudonym. The			
3	timing of the motion is not a basis to deny Plaintiff's motion.			
4	CONCLUSION			
5	For the reasons stated herein and in Plaintiff's motion, Plaintiff respectfully requests that			
6	this Court grant his Motion Seeking Permission For Plaintiff To Proceed Under A Fictitious Name			
7	Dated: December 5, 2024 Respectfully submitted,			
8	THE MAREK LAW FIRM, INC.			
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10	By: David Marsk			
11	David Marek Attorneys for Plaintiff			
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